A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 14, Issue 6, 1996, Pages 857-886

  Brewer, Paul J ^a   Plott, Charles R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Auctions; Experiment; Privatization

Indexed keywords

EID: 21444435260     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(96)01014-4     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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