Ascending prices and package bidding: A theoretical and experimental analysis

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 160-185

  Kagel, John H ^a   Lien, Yuanchuan ^b   Milgrom, Paul ^c  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85017099818     PISSN: 19457669     EISSN: 19457685     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.3.160     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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