How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 107-126

  Hart, Sergiu ^a   Mansour, Yishay ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Communication complexity; Correlated equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; Speed of convergence; Uncoupled dynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951634170     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.002     Document Type: Article

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