The interaction of capital structure and ownership structure

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 787-815

  Mahrt Smith, Jan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23444440743     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/429644     Document Type: Article

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