The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 31, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1795-1815

  Calcagno, Riccardo ^a   Renneboog, Luc ^b  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bankruptcy; Capital structure; Financial distress; Insolvency; Leverage; Managerial compensation; Remuneration contracts; Seniority of claims

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248344688     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.09.006     Document Type: Article

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