Beyond capture: Towards a new theory of regulation

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 50-69

  Croley, Steven P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84860285354     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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