Expert Advice and Regulatory Complexity

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 119-133

  Heyes, Anthony G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038167319     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024714610368     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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