Political insulation, information exchange, and interest group access to the bureaucracy

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 415-440

  Reenock, Christopher M ^a   Gerber, Brian J ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 45549100169     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum021     Document Type: Article

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