Protection without capture: Product approval by a politically responsive, learning regulator

American Political Science Review

Volumn 98, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 613-631

  Carpenter, Daniel P ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 11044226092     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055404041383     Document Type: Article

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