Theories on the economics of regulation: A survey of the literature from a European perspective

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 337-370

  Goran P ^a   Hagg T ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

European corporatism; Public regulation; The institutional theory; The public interest theory; The special interest theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750407917     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1008632529703     Document Type: Review

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