New evidence for the theory of groups: Trade association lobbying in Washington, D.C

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 303-316

  Drope, Jeffrey M ^a,c   Hansen, Wendy L ^b  

^a MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

^c Marquette University   (United States)

Author keywords

Associations; Interest groups; Lobbying; Logic of collective action; Political spending

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651046514     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1065912908319254     Document Type: Article

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