Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States

Public Choice

Volumn 126, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 45-73

  Holburn, Guy L F ^a   Bergh, Richard G Vanden ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33244483065     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-4317-y     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Baldwin, R. E. (1989). The political economy of trade policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 119-35.
2. Bawn, K. (1995). Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures. American Political Science Review, 89, 62-73.
3. Bawn, K. (1997). Choosing strategies to control the bureaucracy: Statutory constraints, oversight, and the committee system. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 13, 101-126.
4. Brainard, S. L., & Verdier, T. (1994). Lobbying and adjustment in declining industries. European Economic Review, 38, 586-95.
5. Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Elected versus appointed regulators: Theory and evidence. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 1176-1206.
6. Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Jones, B. S. (1997). Time is of the essence: Event history models in Political Science. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 1414-1461.
7. Campbell, J. L. (1988). Nuclear power and the contradiction of U. S. Policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
8. Chen, C., Fanara, P., & Gorman, R. F. (1987). Abandonment decisions and the market value of the firm: The case of nuclear power project abandonment. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 6, 185-197.
9. Coate, S., & Morris, S. (1999). Policy persistence. American Economic Review, 89, 1327-1336.
10. Costello, K. W. (1984). Electing regulators: The case of public utility commissioners. Yale Journal on Regulation, 2, 83-105.
11. De Figueiredo, R. J. (2003) Endogenous budget institutions and political insulation: Why states adopt the item veto. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2677-2701.
12. De Figueiredo, R. J., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2004). The political economy of state-level administrative procedure acts. Journal of Law and Economics, 47, 569-588.
13. De Figueiredo, R. J., Spiller, P. T., & Urbiztondo, S. (1999). An informational perspective on administrative procedures. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15, 283-305.
14. Energy information administration (1997). U. S. Department of the environment, State Energy Price and Expenditure Report.
15. Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1994). Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion. American Journal of Political Science, 38, 697-722.
16. Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1996). Divided government and the design of administrative procedures: A formal model and empirical test. The Journal of Politics, 58, 373-397.
17. Enholm, G. B., & Malko, J. B. (1995). eds., Reinventing electric utility regulation. Public utilities reports, Inc.
18. Gormley, W. T. (1981). Public advocacy in public utility commission proceedings. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 17, 446-462.
19. Gormley, W. T. (1983). The politics of public utility regulation. University of Pittsburgh press, Pittsburgh, Pa.
20. Harris, M. C., & Navarro, P. (1983). Does electing public utility commissioners bring lower electric rates?. Public Utilities Fortnightly, 112, 23-88.
21. Holburn, G. L. F., & Spiller, P. T. (2002). Interest group representation in administrative institutions: The impact of consumer advocates and elected commissioners on regulatory policy in the United States. POWER working paper 002, University of California at Berkeley.
22. Joskow, P. L. (1974). Inflation and environmental concern: structural change in the process of public utility price regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 17, 291-327.
23. Joskow, P. L. (1989). Regulatory failure, regulatory reform, and structural change in the electrical power industry. Brookings Papers: Microeconomics.
24. Joskow, P. L., & Schmalansee, R. (1986). Incentive regulation for electric utilities. Yale Journal on Regulation, 4, 1-49.
25. Kalt, J. P., & Zupan, M. A. (1984). Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics. American Economic Review, 74, 279-300.
26. Kiefer, R. (1988). "Economic duration data and hazard functions." Journal of Economic Literature, 26, 646-678.
27. McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3, 243-277.
28. McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G. & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Structure and process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. Virginia Law Review, 75, 431-508.
29. McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984). Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols vs. fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science, 28, 165-179.
30. Moe, T. (1990). The politics of structural choice: Toward a theory of public bureaucracy. In organizational theory from Chester Barnard to the present and beyond, edited by Oliver E. Williamson.
31. Nelson, R. A. (1982). An empirical test of the Ramsey theory and Stigler-Peltzman theory of public utility pricing. Economic Inquiry, 20, 277-190.
32. Nelson, R. A., & Roberts, M. J. (1989). Ramsey numbers and the role of competing interest groups in electric utility regulation. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 29, 21-42.
33. Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987). A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica, 55, 703-708.
34. Peltzman, S. (1976). Towards a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 211-40.
35. Petersen, T. (1991). The statistical analysis of event histories. Sociological Methods and Research, 79, 211-248.
36. Primeaux, W., & Mann, P. (1986). Regulator selection methods and electricity prices. Land Economics, 63, 1-13.
37. Rausser, G. C. (1992). Predatory versus productive government: The case of U. S. agricultural policies. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6, 133-57.
38. Rodrik, D. (1991). Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries. Journal of Development Economics, 36, 229-242.
39. Ross, T. W. (1985). Extracting regulators' implied welfare weights: Some further developments and applications. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 25, 72-84.
40. Spiller, P. T., & Tiller, E. H. (1997). Decision costs and the strategic design of administrative process and judicial review. The Journal of Legal Studies, XXVI, 347-370.
41. Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics, 2, 3-19.
42. Tiller, E. H. (1998). Controlling policy by controlling process: Judicial influence on regulatory decision making. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 14, 114-135.
43. Woroch, G. (1989). Dividing a sunk cost: A bargaining approach to regulatory treatment of power plant cancellations. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley.
44. Yamaguchi, K. (1991). Event history analysis. Newbury Park: Sage.