The federal judicial power and the international legal order

Supreme Court Review

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 59-113

  Bradley, Curtis A ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 79251541843     PISSN: 00819557     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1086/655182     Document Type: Review

References (252)

1. Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order 72 (1964).
2. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb L Rev 181 (1996)
3. Jennifer Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan L Rev 429 (2003)
4. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va J Intl L 1103 (2000).
5. 126 S Ct 2669 (2006).
6. 126 S Ct 2749 (2006).
7. My description here draws on Curtis A. Bradley, International Decisions: Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 100 Am J Intl L 882 (2006).
8. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261.
9. Id, Art 36(1)(b).
10. Id, Art 36(2).
11. See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 169, 596 UNTS 487, 488.
12. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States), Provisional Measures, 1998 ICJ Rep 248, para 41 (Apr 9).
13. See Breard v Greene, 523 US 371, 375 (1998).
14. 523 US at 375.
15. For additional discussion of the Breard litigation, see Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 Stan L Rev 529 (1999)
16. Agora: Breard, 92 Am J Intl L 666 (1998).
17. LaGrand (Federal Republic of Germany v United States), 2001 ICJ Rep 466, paras 67, 73, 77, 91 ( June 27).
18. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States), 2004 ICJ No 128 (Judgment Mar 31).
19. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States), Provisional Measures, 2003 ICJ 128 (Feb 5).
20. See 2004 ICJ No 128, at para 121.
21. See Medellin v Dretke, 544 US 660 (2005).
22. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 9, Medellin v Dretke, No 04-5928 (US Supreme Court, Feb 2005).
23. Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, Wash Post, Mar 10, 2005, at A01.
24. See Memorandum for the Attorney General, "Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena" (Feb 28, 2005), at http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/2005-03-10-Avena-compliance.pdf.
25. See 126 S Ct 2669 (2006).
26. See Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at 2-3, 20, 25 and n 41, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, Nos 04-10566, 05-51 (US Supreme Court).
27. 126 S Ct at 2684.
28. See id at 2690-2709 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
29. See id at 2700 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
30. See id at 2698, 2702-03 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
31. See 126 S Ct 2749 (2006).
32. Id at 2794; see also id at 2774, 2786; id at 2802 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
33. See, e.g., id at 2788 ("[T]he procedures governing trials by military commission historically have been the same as those governing courts-martial.").
34. See, e.g., United States v Stuart, 489 US 353, 369 (1989)
35. Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v Avagliano, 457 US 176 184-85 1982
36. Kolovrat v Oregon, 366 US 187, 194 (1961).
37. See 126 S Ct at 2795-96.
38. See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 415 F3d 33, 38-40 (DC Cir 2005).
39. 126 S Ct at 2677-78.
40. Compare Jogi v Voges, 425 F3d 367 (7th Cir 2005) (concluding that Article 36 confers judicially enforceable private rights)
41. United States v Jimenez-Nava, 243 F3d 192, 195-98 (5th Cir 2001) (concluding that Article 36 does not confer judicially enforceable private rights). Many courts prior to Sanchez-Llamas had avoided deciding this question, instead holding simply that Article 36 did not confer the particular remedies being sought in those cases (such as suppression of evidence).
42. See Vienna Convention, Art 36(1)(b) ("The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.").
43. US Const, Art VI.
44. See Foster v Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet) 253, 314 (1829).
45. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399, 457-59 (2000).
46. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am J Intl L 695 (1995).
47. See Brief for Petitioner Mario A. Bustillo, at 20, Bustillo v Johnson, No 05-51 (US Supreme Court, Dec 2005)
48. Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas, at 13, Sanchez- Llamas v Oregon, No 04-10566 (US Supreme Court, Dec 22, 2005)
49. Brief of International Court of Justice Experts, at 20 (cited in note 33).
50. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 11, Bustillo v Johnson, Nos 05-51, 04-10566 (US Supreme Court, Jan 2006).
51. Edye v Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 US 580, 598 (1884).
52. See, e.g., Clark v Allen, 331 US 503 (1947)
53. Asakura v Seattle, 265 US 332 (1924)
54. United States v Rauscher, 119 US 407 (1886).
55. See Paul B. Stephan, Private Remedies for Treaty Violations after Sanchez-Llamas, 11 Lewis and Clark L Rev 65 (2007).
56. See, e.g., Gonzaga University v Doe, 536 US 273 (2002) (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974)
57. Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275 (2001)
58. (Section 602 of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
59. 126 S Ct at 2680, 2682.
60. See United States v Li, 206 F3d 56, 63 (1st Cir 2000) (quoting view of State Department that the Vienna Convention is not a treaty "establishing rights of individuals").
61. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 150 (2d ed 1996).
62. See, e.g., United States v Pink, 315 US 203, 233 (1942) ("[P]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.")
63. United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937)
64. See generally Dennis J. Palumbo, The States and American Foreign Relations (1960)
65. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617 (1997). (Pubitemid 127445655)
66. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 Am J Intl L 675 (1998)
67. Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S Cal L Rev 1327 (2006).
68. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 Mich L Rev 98, 131-32 (2000) (providing examples).
69. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v Greene, Nos 97-8214, 97-1390 (US Supreme Court).
70. Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America, LaGrand Case, para 124 (Mar 27, 2000), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/ igusframe.htm.
71. See Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 (1920).
72. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich L Rev 390 (1998)
73. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich L Rev 1075 (2000)
74. Bradley, 99 Mich L Rev (cited in note 66)
75. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 Harv L Rev 1867 (2005).
76. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 Va J Intl L 713 (2002)
77. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U Colo L Rev 1317 (1999).
78. See, e.g., David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 Stan L Rev 1693 (2003).
79. Cf. United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 617 (2000) ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States.")
80. United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 561 n 3 (1995) ("Under our federal system, the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.'") (citations omitted).
81. 126 S Ct at 2680.
82. Id at 2689 (Ginsburg, J, concurring).
83. See generally Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980)
84. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954).
85. See also Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 550-53 (1985).
86. But cf. Bradley, 97 Mich L Rev at 442-43
87. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 80 Tex L Rev 327 (2001).
88. For an argument along these lines, see Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev (cited in note 64).
89. See, e.g., Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 139 (cited in note 62)
90. Brannon P. Denning and Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States' Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs? 26 Hastings Const L Q 307, 349-50 (1999)
91. John Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 Duke L J 248, 275-76.
92. 389 US 429 (1968).
93. See id at 460 (Harlan, J, concurring).
94. 512 US 298 (1994).
95. See American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003)
96. Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000).
97. 539 US at 439 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
98. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(1) (1987).
99. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 Supreme Court Review 295
100. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich L Rev 1555 (1984)
101. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? 110 Harv L Rev 1824 (1997).
102. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997).
103. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law: A Constitutional Perspective, 29 Pepperdine L Rev 187 (2001).
104. See, e.g., Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 Am J Intl L 91 (2003)
105. Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 Va J Intl L 365 (2002).
106. 28 USC § 1350.
107. 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
108. Irving R. Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for International Torture? NY Times Mag 44 (Nov 9, 1980).
109. 542 US 692 (2004).
110. For an extended argument to this effect, see Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, and David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv L Rev 869 (2007).
111. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1, 15 (1985) ("[T]he federalism principle identified by Erie still exists but has been silently transformed from a general constraint on the powers of the federal government into an attenuated constraint that applies principally to one branch of that government-the federal judiciary.").
112. See Restatement (Third), § 114 ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.") (cited in note 91)
113. Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.").
114. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Georgetown L J 479 (1998). (Pubitemid 128429253)
115. See also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L Rev 2162, 2238-41 (2002).
116. See 28 USC §§ 1602-11.
117. See, e.g., Princzv Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F3d 1166, 1183-84 (DC Cir 1994) (Wald, J, dissenting)
118. Adam C. Belsky et al, Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 Cal L Rev 365 (1989).
119. See, e.g., Sampson v Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F3d 1145 (7th Cir 2001).
120. See 488 US 428 (1989).
121. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 Am J Intl L 337, 341 n 24 (2002)
122. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 BC L Rev 93 (2005).
123. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv L Rev 2047, 2098-99 (2005) (criticizing this use of the canon).
124. 542 US 507 (2004).
125. 126 S Ct 2749 (2006).
126. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 Ga J Intl & Comp L 421, 427 (2004)
127. Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U Cin L Rev 3, 36 (1983)
128. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary International Law Norms to the Death Penalty in the United States, 25 Ga J Intl & Comp L 165, 179 (1995-96).
129. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 25 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 179 (cited in note 116).
130. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 Duke L J 485, 555-56 (2002) (explaining this point).
131. See also Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on "Outsourcing Authority," 69 Alb L Rev 653, 673-74 (2006) (criticizing efforts to apply the Charming Betsy canon to the Constitution)
132. John O. McGinnis, Contemporary Foreign and International Law in Constitutional Construction, 69 Alb L Rev 801, 803 n 4 (2006) (same).
133. Cf. Fund for Animals, Inc. v Kempthorne, 472 F3d 872 (DC Cir 2006) (emphasizing that the canon about avoiding international law violations applies only when a statute is ambiguous).
134. 126 S Ct at 2679.
135. Compare, for example, Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 Minn L Rev 71 (2000)
136. David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 Stan L Rev 1697 (2003).
137. See also Edward Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 Colum L Rev 1492 (2004).
138. See, e.g., United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US 304, 315 (1936).
139. But cf. NRDC v EPA, 464 F3d 1, 9 (DC Cir 2006) (concluding that, if certain regulatory decisions made by the parties to the Montreal Protocol constituted binding law, it "would raise serious constitutional questions in light of the nondelegation doctrine, numerous constitutional procedural requirements for making law, and the separation of powers").
140. I develop this analogy further in a forthcoming article, Constitutional Process, Treaty Amendments, and Accountability, which will be published in Law & Contemporary Problems.
141. 126 S Ct at 2684.
142. Cf. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721 (2002) (relying on such arguments in questioning the nondelegation doctrine)
143. see also id at 1755 ("Congress couldn't, for example, transfer to executive agents a power that the Constitution vests in some other institution, such as the Supreme Court.").
144. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan L Rev 1557, 1569-70 (2003).
145. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982).
146. See, e.g., Peretzv United States, 501 US 923, 936-39 (1991)
147. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 847-56 (1986)
148. Thomas v Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co 473 US 568 582-89 1985
149. See, e.g., Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 US 211, 218-19 (1995) (holding that it was unconstitutional for Congress to retroactively reopen final judgments by Article III courts because doing so interfered with the power of the federal judiciary "'to render dispositive judgments.'")
150. Frank Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W L Rev 905, 926 (1990).
151. See 2 Dall 409 (1792).
152. See also Miller v French, 530 US 327, 343 (2000) (describing Hayburn's Case).
153. See 13 Wall 128, 146 (1872)
154. Plaut, 514 US at 218 ("Whatever the precise scope of Klein . . . later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress 'amend[s] applicable law.'") (citation omitted).
155. See 4 Wall 2, 121 (1866)
156. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 Harv L Rev 643, 647-48 (2004) (describing academic theories).
157. Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv L Rev 2311 (2006)
158. See, e.g., Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 536 (1997)
159. 523 US at 378. See also Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 NYU J Intl L & Pol 35, 36-42 (1995-96) (raising the possibility that the vesting of decisionmaking authority in international tribunals would violate Article III).
160. See 126 S Ct at 2775
161. Schor, 478 US at 851. The Court's ultimate functional inquiry is whether the delegation "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch." Id.
162. Ethan Boyer, Article III, The Foreign Relations Power, and the Binational Panel System of NAFTA, 13 Intl Tax and Bus Lawyer 101 (1996)
163. Cf. Matthew Burton, Note, Assigning the Judicial Power to International Tribunals: NAFTA Binational Panels and Foreign Affairs Flexibility, 88 Va L Rev 1529 (2002) (defending the constitutionality of the tribunals based on the special need for flexibility in foreign affairs).
164. 490 US 858 (1989).
165. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Supreme Court Review 223
166. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315 (2000).
167. 126 S Ct at 2684.
168. See generally Bradley, 55 Stan L Rev at 1587-95 (cited in note 126).
169. See 555 F2d 848, 851 (DC Cir 1976).
170. 859 F2d 929 (DC Cir 1988).
171. 464 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2006).
172. See, e.g., Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005)
173. Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 572-73 (2003)
174. Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304, 316 n 21 (2002).
175. Compare, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am J Intl L 43 (2004)
176. John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw U L Rev (2006).
177. See, e.g., Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Georgetown L J 487 (2005).
178. See, e.g., Roper, 543 US at 622-28 (Scalia, J, dissenting, along with Rehnquist and Thomas).
179. 543 US at 578.
180. 126 S Ct at 2685.
181. See 544 US 660 (2005).
182. see also id at 669 (Ginsburg, J, concurring).
183. See Ex parte Medellin, 2006 Tex Crim App LEXIS 2236 (Tex Ct Crim App, Nov 15, 2006).
184. See Curtis A. Bradley, Enforcing the Avena Decision in U.S. Courts, 30 Harv J L & Pub Pol 119 (2006)
185. Mark L. Movsesian, Understanding Sanchez-Llamas (draft on file with author).
186. See 126 S Ct at 2685.
187. US Const, Art II, § 3.
188. See UN Charter, Art 94(1) ("Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.").
189. See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v Reagan, 859 F2d 929, 937-38 (DC Cir 1988)
190. A. Mark Weisburd, International Judicial Decisions, Domestic Courts, and the Foreign Affairs Power, 2004-05 Cato Sup Ct Rev 287, 299-304.
191. See UN Charter, Art 94(2).
192. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va L Rev 649, 670-71 (2000)
193. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 Am J Intl L 683, 689 (1998).
194. 539 US at 413.
195. See Brannon P. Denning and Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 825 (2004)
196. Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L Rev 309 (2006).
197. See 2006 Tex Crim App LEXIS at *66-67.
198. But see Weisburd, 2004-05 Cato Sup Ct Rev at 313 (cited in note 164) ("Since the president's power to supersede state law in foreign affairs matters derives from his authority to bargain with foreign governments, the absence of a bargain eliminates any basis for presidential authority.").
199. See generally Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 Wash L Rev 1, 25-31 (2006)
200. Martinez, 56 Stan L Rev at 436-41 (cited in note 2)
201. Cesare P. R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 Intl L and Pol 709 (1999).
202. For a chart showing 125 international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and mechanisms, see The Project on International Courts and Tribunals-Synoptic Chart, version 3.0 (Nov 2004), at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/ synoptic-chart/Synop-C4.pdf.
203. See, e.g., UN Security Council, Res 1718 (Oct 14, 2006) (concluding that nuclear test by North Korea created a threat to international peace and security and therefore imposing a variety of sanctions).
204. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No 62/02, Case 12.285, Michael Domingues, United States (Oct 22, 2002) (concluding that customary international law prohibits the execution of individuals who commit their crimes prior to the age of eighteen).
205. See Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, at http: //www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ ibasicdeclarations.htm.
206. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org.
207. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 302, entered into force March 23, 1976.
208. See Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ( July 9, 2004), at http://www.icj-cij.org/ icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm.
209. Michla Pomerance, The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 Am J Intl L 26 (2005).
210. See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights, "The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guaranties of the Due Process of Law," Adv Op OC-16/99, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 16 (Oct 1, 1999).
211. See generally Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003)
212. Martinez, 56 Stan L Rev at 431 ("In many situations . . . it is as yet unclear what should happen when more than one court potentially has jurisdiction over the same case; unclear how one court should treat the decisions of another court; and unclear what should happen when courts reach inconsistent decisions.") (cited in note 2).
213. The ICJ in Avena expressed the view that the notice should be given "as soon as it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national" and that the notice need not necessarily be given at the time of the arrest or before questioning, see Case Concerning Avena, at paras 87-88 (cited in note 20).
214. Compare Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 1986 ICJ 14, para 115 (1986) (Judgment of 27 June 1986) (adopting narrow "effective control" standard for attribution of private conduct to states)
215. The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para 145 (1999) ( Judgment of 15 July 1999) (Merits) (adopting broader "overall control" standard).
216. See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke L J 1143 (2005).
217. See The Loewen Group, Inc. v United States of America, Case No ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award) ( June 26, 2003), at http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/22094.pdf
218. Mondev Int'l Ltd v United States of America, Case No ARB(AF)/99/2 (Award) (Oct 11, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
219. See Ruth Mackenzie and Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 Harv Intl L J 271, 277-78 (2003)
220. ICJ Statute, Art 9.
221. See Eric A. Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? 34 J Legal Stud 539 (2005).
222. For debate over whether judicial independence is desirable in international tribunals, compare Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal L Rev 1 (2005) (arguing that it is not)
223. Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal L Rev 899 (2005) (arguing that it is).
224. Posner and Figueiredo, 34 J Legal Stud at 608 (cited in note 189).
225. Even for those courts, there are mediating doctrines that can limit the intrusiveness of the courts on national decision making, such as the "margin of appreciation" and "subsidiarity." See, e.g., Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (1996)
226. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Union and the United States, 94 Colum L Rev 331 (1994).
227. See generally John O. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law? 59 Stan L Rev (forthcoming 2007)
228. Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am J Intl L 489 (2001)
229. Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legitimacy, 17 Nw J Intl L & Bus 681 (1996-97).
230. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 Chi J Intl L 457, 465 (2001)
231. McGinnis and Somin, 59 Stan L Rev (cited in note 194).
232. See Bradley, 55 Stan L Rev at 1594-95 (cited in note 126).
233. See Bradley, 52 Duke L J at 516-35 (cited in note 118).
234. For other examples of jurisdictional expansion by international institutions over time, see Bradley, 55 Stan L Rev at 1577 (cited in note 126).
235. See LaGrand, at paras 90-91 (cited in note 16)
236. Case Concerning Avena, at para 112 (cited in note 20).
237. See 126 S Ct at 2686 n 6.
238. See Case Concerning Avena, at paras 113, 134 (cited in note 20).
239. See Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963) (allowing denial of habeas corpus relief where there has been "deliberate bypass").
240. See 126 S Ct at 2699-2700 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
241. See LaGrand, at para 71 (noting Germany's argument that "due to the doctrine of procedural default and the high postconviction threshold for proving ineffective counsel under United States law, Germany's intervention at a stage later than the trial phase could not 'remedy the extreme prejudice created by the counsel appointed to represent the LaGrands'") (cited in note 16).
242. See, e.g., Karen Alter, Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO's New Dispute Resolution System, 79 Intl Affairs 783, 793 (2003) ("Being products of their national political environment, and working within the same cultural and political context in which they adjudicate, national judges are far more likely to be in harmony with political sentiment.").
243. See Movsesian, Understanding Sanchez-Llamas (cited in note 160) (making this point)
244. see also Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization: Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 Mich J Intl L 775 (1999).
245. 252 US at 433.
246. 126 S Ct at 2700 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
247. 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 348 (1816).
248. ICJ Statute, Art 59.
249. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J Intl L 1, 17-18 (2002).
250. See, e.g., Lori F. Damrosch et al, International Law: Cases and Materials 160-61 (4th ed 2001) ("International law requires a state to carry out its international obligations but, in general, how a state accomplishes that result is not of concern to international law or to the state system.").
251. See LaGrand, at paras 121, 123-24 (cited in note 16).
252. See Eric A. Posner and Cass Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J (forthcoming 2007).