Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause

Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-35

  Bederman, David J ^a,b,c,d,e,f  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^e International School the Hague   (Netherlands)

^f NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031540972     PISSN: 00222410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (227)

1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
2. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
3. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
4. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
5. Id. art. I, §, cl. 3.
6. See Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States, 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 123, 128-29 (1925).
7. The Federalist No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1672 (5th ed. 1833).
8. The Federalist No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1672 (5th ed. 1833).
9. See Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117 (1993); and Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1332-60 (1996).
10. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 251 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting) (who makes this point).
11. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
12. See also Jensen, 244 U.S. at 227-28 (Pitney, J., dissenting) (collecting early cases on the intent behind the Admiralty Clause). For more on this, see Gutoff, Admiralty, Article III, and Supreme Court Review of State-Court Decisionmaking, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2169 (1996); and Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 325, 326-27 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (power to regulate pilotage affecting interstate commerce); and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 207 (1824) (interstate steamers).
14. See The St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 522 (1861).
15. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
16. Id. at 574-75.
17. Id. at 581.
18. Id.
19. See Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893) (federal rules of navigation preempted state law).
20. 179 U.S. 552 (1890).
21. See id. at 558.
22. Id. at 563. See also Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty over the Common Law, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 647 (1921); Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 246, 253-54 (1950); and Wright, supra note 6, at 238.
23. See The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
24. See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404 (1907).
25. See id. See also Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 158, 166 (discussing The Roanoke). 25 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
26. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
27. 1913 N.Y. Laws 816; and 1914 N.Y. Laws 41 & 316.
28. See 244 U.S. at 209-09.
29. See id. at 209, 212 (where Southern Pacific's argument that the New York statute was expressly preempted by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, June 11, 1906, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232, was rejected).
30. See 109 N.E. 600 (1916).
31. 244 U.S. at 215 (citing The Lottawanna and Workman).
32. Id. at 216.
33. See id. (citing The Lottawanna, Cooley, and The Hamilton).
34. Id. at 216.
35. See also Palfrey, The Common Law Courts and the Law of the Sea, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 777 (1923).
36. See 244 U.S. at 217.
37. Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
38. See also Wright, supra note 6, at 249 (who pointed out that Jensen was the first case where a plaintiff chose a state forum and proceeded to use a favorable state statute in contravention of the general maritime law).
39. See id. at 220, 223 ("[I]t is too late to say that the mere silence of Congress excludes the statute or common law of a state from supplementing the wholly inadequate maritime law of the time of the Constitution. . . .") (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Robertson, supra note 11, at 326 n.5 (collecting sources on this point).
40. See id. at 226.
41. See id. at 243-47. See also Wright, supra note 6, at 238-39 & n.44.
42. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
43. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
44. See Part III.
45. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918) (dicta).
46. See Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1919). See also Stevens, supra note 21, at 255-56.
47. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
48. 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
49. 257 U.S. at 242. See also Currie, supra note 24, at 178-79 (discussing "maritime but local" exception to Jensen). 50 257 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1922) (state law applied where "parties contracted with reference to the state statute; their rights and liabilities had no direct relation to navigation, and the application of the local law cannot materially affect any rules of the sea whose uniformity is essential").
50. 264 U.S. 109 (1924) (state arbitration statute upheld as dealing "merely with the remedy in the state courts in respect of obligations voluntarily and lawfully incurred. It does not attempt either to modify the substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty.")
51. 312 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1941) (Florida's wrongful death statute did not offend the dormant admiralty clause because "the State may modify or supplement the maritime law by creating liability which a court of admiralty will recognize and enforce when the state action is not hostile to the characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation.").
52. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
53. See id. at 244-45.
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953). But see Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155, 157-58 (1947) (suggesting an opposite result). See also Stevens, supra note 21, at 258-62.
56. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
57. 121 P.2d 365 (1941).
58. Codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.
59. 317 U.S. at 252.
60. 1927 LHWCA, § 3.
61. 317 U.S. at 255.
62. See id. at 255-56, 259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 255-57. See also Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244 (1941) (recognizing that 1927 LHWCA embodied "Jensen line" between land and sea).
64. 317 U.S. at 256.
65. See id. at 254, 256.
66. See id. at 257-58.
67. 319 U.S. 306 (1943).
68. Id. at 309 (citing to Just and Davis). 70 Id. at 309-10.
69. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
70. Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. See 244 U.S. at 216.
73. Id.
74. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
75. Id. at 373.
76. 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
77. See id. at 330 (discussing application of state wrongful death statutes).
78. See also Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 119 (1962) (making this same point in the context of compensation schemes for longshoremen).
79. 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
80. See 248 U.S. 308 (1919).
81. 365 U.S. at 741-42.
82. Id. at 739. See also 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 144-45 n.15 (2d ed. 1994) (suggesting that Kossick's interest balancing was a reformulation of the earlier, "maritime but local" doctrine).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 743 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis, 317 U.S. at 259).
85. 370 U.S. at 118 (also ruling that Congress intended to apply the LHWCA to all activities occurring seaward of the Jensen line).
86. 396 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1969).
87. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
88. Id. at 344 (citing Davis, 317 U.S. at 252-53).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1986) (Jensen impliedly endorsed).
91. 864 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1988).
92. See id. at 207.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 206-07.
95. 918 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 979 (1992).
96. 365 U.S. at 741-42 (1961).
97. 918 F.2d at 1424-25.
98. Id. at 1428 (Copple, J., dissenting).
99. See Scowcroft, Case Note, 23 J. Mar. L. & Com. 635 (1992). See also Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988) (application of forum non conveniens doctrine by state court hearing maritime wrongful death claim).
100. See Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
101. Id. at 201.
102. See id. at 202 (critiquing Currie, supra note 24, at 166-68).
103. Id. at 209.
104. See id. at 201.
105. Id. at 213.
106. See id. at 209-11.
107. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq.
108. 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
109. See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37 (1926).
110. 580 So. 2d 1091 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
111. 595 So. 2d 615 (La. 1992).
112. See 114 S. Ct. at 985 (comparing Kossick with Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955)). See also id. at 985 n.1 (expressly declining to "overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation.").
113. Id. at 988 n.3.
114. Id. at 985.
115. Id. at 987. See also Comment, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1405 (1994) (for a criticism of the Court's gloss on "characteristic feature").
116. 347 U.S. 409, 429 (1954). See also Robertson, supra note 11, at 345-56.
117. See 114 S. Ct. at 990 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
118. See id. at 992-93.
119. See Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (maritime preemption analysis factors "are not unlike those involved when the question is whether a State, in the absence of congressional action, may regulate some matters even though aspects of interstate commerce are affected"); id. at 333 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("Since Congress has power to make federal jurisdiction and legislation exclusive, the [preemption] situation in admiralty is somewhat analogous to that governing state action interfering with interstate commerce.").
120. 114 S. Ct. at 990 (Souter, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 993 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216).
122. With Justice Blackmun's retirement and Judge Breyer's elevation to the Court, the voting alignments are again fluid. Justice Breyer is on judicial record only once as to this issue, as a member of the First Circuit's Carey panel, which arguably anticipated Justice Scalia's majority formulation in American Dredging. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
123. But see State of Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220 (4th Cir. 1995) (for a relatively uncomplicated application of Jensen in striking down a Maryland statute imposing strict liability against vessel which went aground on oyster bed).
124. 32 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1994).
125. See id. at 627. See also Ruhl, Finding Federalism in the Admiralty: 'The Devil's Own Mess' Revisited, 12 Tul. Mar. L.J. 263, 271 (1988).
126. See 32 F.3d at 627.
127. Id. (citing American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987).
128. See id. at 628-29.
129. See 918 F.2d at 1424-25. See also supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
130. See 317 U.S. at 257-58.
131. See 32 F.3d at 630 & n.5.
132. Id. at 630 n.5. (citing American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 988 n.3).
133. 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994).
134. Id. at 629 (citing Justice Stevens' concurrence in American Dredging). 137 Id. at 629 & n.8.
135. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
136. See id. at 100-01.
137. See 40 F.3d at 629 n.9. See also Ceres Terminals, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Illinois, 53 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1995).
138. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
139. See Brief of Petitioner, at 14-17, Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun (No. 94-1387), 1995 WL 451711 (July 26, 1995); Brief of Respondents, at 27-32, id., 1995 WL 551075 (Sept. 15, 1995).
140. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 626 n.8.
141. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 (1917).
142. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
143. Id. at 160.
144. See id. at 162-63.
145. Id. at 164.
146. Ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (1922).
147. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
148. Id. at 223.
149. Id. at 227-28. This last passage was obviously the invitation for Congress to draft the LHWCA.
150. See 253 U.S. at 161.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 167 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 168 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
154. See id. (citing provisions in U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 4 (concerning duties, imposts and excises, naturalization and bankruptcy law)).
155. See id.
156. 264 U.S. at 234 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 231 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But cf. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924) (characterizing Knickerbocker Ice as a case where the Court was obliged to act because Congress had adopted provisions "held to modify or displace essential features of the substantive maritime law.").
158. See id. at 164-65.
159. 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
160. Id. at 560.
161. 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905).
162. The remaining cases cited by the majority in Knickerbocker Ice were Field v. Clarke, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904); and Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 (1912). Each concerned delegations by Congress to the Executive branch, an analytically distinct question. See also Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1890) (in which the Court said that Congress was free to remove a dormant Commerce Clause disability on state legislation).
163. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
164. Id. at 320-21.
165. See 253 U.S. at 169 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
166. See Morris, Workmen's Compensation and the Maritime Law, 38 Yale L.J. 472, 480 (1928) ("The writer is unable . . . to view with . . . complacency the doctrine of Knickerbocker Ice. . . .").
167. Id. at 480-81.
168. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 24, at 191 ("It is difficult to understand why the federal interest in a free commerce, whether land or sea, is in need of protection from the action of the very body to whose care it is intrusted.").
169. Id.
170. Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 387, 402-03 (1983). See also H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 482-83 (1953) ("There seems to be small chance" that the principle of Knickerbocker Ice will be applied today); 1 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure 316 n.14 (2d ed. 1992) ("the Knickerbocker rule is analytically unsound and makes little sense.").
171. See Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 629 n.8 (Knickerbocker Ice and Dawson "rest on a strong nondelegation doctrine the likes of which has not been seen since the 1930s.").
172. 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
173. Id. at 321 n.29.
174. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). See also Eubank, Patchwork Justice: State Unlimited Liability Laws in the Wake of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 149, 168-70 (1994).
175. 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
176. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
177. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 296 n.10.
178. See Ruhl, supra note 127, at 272.
179. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the commerce clause."); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (state law ratified by Congress passed commerce clause muster, but failed on equal protection grounds); and Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990) (federal act endorsing state law mooted commerce clause challenge). See also Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 173, at 397-98.
180. Justice Stevens' concurrence in American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 990-91, features a broad attack on Knickerbocker Ice. Justice Stevens also published a law review article (concerning the rule of stare decisis in the Supreme Court), in which he was sharply critical of the Knickerbocker Ice doctrine. See Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1983).
181. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
182. 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended by 41 Stat. 1007 (1920).
183. 264 U.S. at 386 (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
185. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
186. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
187. See id. at nn. 19 & 20.
188. See Eubank, supra note 177, at 170.
189. Romero, 358 U.S. at 361 (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 55).
190. Some scholarly attention has been focussed on whether a non-delegation challenge could be made to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, especially its provision, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a), (c), allowing recovery under state laws for kinds of oil pollution damages expressly barred under the doctrine of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). See generally Eubank, supra note 177. This issue has arisen in an analogous context with the construction of a similar provision in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(9), which was construed in In Re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991). The district court interpreted the TAPAA provision in such a way as to avoid a non-delegation challenge under Knickerbocker Ice. See id. at 1515-16. See also Note, The Adequacy of the Oil Pollution Act's Compensation Scheme in the Case of a Catastrophic Spill, 7 J. Min. L. Pol'y 105 (1991).
191. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
192. 918 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
194. See 709 F. Supp. at 1524-25.
195. See 918 F.2d at 1421.
196. Id. (citations omitted).
197. See id. at 1424-26.
198. 102 Stat. 432, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106.
199. Section 4 of the ASA made clear it is the declared policy of Congress that States have a duty, once they take title to abandoned shipwrecks within the scope of the Act's § 6, to develop policies to: (A) protect natural resources and habitat areas; (B) guarantee recreational exploration of shipwreck sites; and (C) allow for appropriate public and private sector recovery of shipwrecks consistent with the protection of historical values and environmental integrity of the shipwrecks and the sites. 42 U.S.C. § 2103(a). The development of these policies was to be aided, under the terms of the Act, by guidelines prepared by the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the National Park Service, among which were those designed to "recognize the interests of individuals and groups engaged in shipwreck discovery and salvage." Id. § 2104(a)(4). Congress made clear that these federal guidelines would be "available to assist States . . . in developing legislation and regulations to carry out their responsibilities under the Act." Id. § 2104(c). The scheme of §§ 4 and 5 of the ASA clearly indicate States are given the discretion to legislate on the substantive salvage law to be applied to abandoned shipwrecks covered by the Act. Congress appeared to be fully aware that it was giving the States license to deviate from the uniform admiralty law of salvage. For example, the House Report on the legislation noted that "[w]hile recognizing that the [federal] guidelines [to be adopted pursuant to ASA § 5] are non-binding, the Committee strongly encourages the states to act consistently with the guidelines." Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(II), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 365, 375 (House Report 514(II)). Moreover, the Guidelines actually issued by the Interior Department, pursuant to § 5 of the ASA, explicitly directed states to enact their own salvage laws. See 55 Fed. Reg. 50116, 50132 (1990). In a section entitled "Providing for Public and Private Sector Recovery" the Guidelines noted that "[p]rivate sector recovery activities would include, but not be limited to, the collection of artifacts and other materials from shipwrecks by sports divers who desire personal souvenirs, the salvage of shipwrecks by commercial salvors and treasure hunters for profit-making purposes." Id.
200. See 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a).
201. See House Report 514(II), at 8, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 365, 377 ("The Committee also believes that it is acting fully within its authority under Article III, section 2 of the Constitution (the admiralty clause). . . . The Committee intends to carve out a limited exception from general admiralty principles. . . .").
202. The writer served as counsel for Mr. Zych in the last appeal before the Seventh Circuit, 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1993), and in the subsequent Petition for Certiorari, which was denied, 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994).
203. 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991).
204. See 941 F.2d at 531. See also Stevens, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the Proper Ballast for the States, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 573, 610-11 nn.184-85 (1992) (who discusses the problem of federal delegation of powers under the ASA).
205. 941 F.2d at 533.
206. Id. at 532.
207. Id. at 533.
208. See 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1312-13 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
209. M. at 1315-16.
210. See 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994).
211. See Seabird I, 941 F.2d at 532.
212. See Sunken Treasure, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 857 F. Supp. 1129, 1135-36 (D.V.I. 1994). But see Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (strongly suggesting, in dicta, that ASA might be unconstitutional as an impermissible delegation of non-uniform maritime law-making to the states). See also Comment, Full Fathom Five: Legal Hurdles to Treasure, 42 Emory L.J. 1099 (1993) (for a full explication of the Seabird and Lady Elgin cases and the doctrine of uniformity).
213. See, e.g., Houseman v. The Schooner North Carolina, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 40, 48 (1841) ("The Admiralty is the only Court where such a question [salvage] can be tried; for what other Court, but a Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction to try a case of salvage?"). See also Owen, Some Legal Trouble with Treasure: Jurisdiction and Salvage, 16 J. Mar. L. & Com. 139, 148 (1985) ("the traditional statement is that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction of an action seeking a salvage award."). But see Lucas v. "Brinkness" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange, 387 F. Supp. 440, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("Article III, section 2 does not reach the substantive law of admiralty but only the jurisdiction and the uniform application of its laws.").
214. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the commerce clause.").
215. See Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 629 n.8. For more on the evolution of the non-delegation doctrine in the context of Congressional-Executive relations, see Krent, Book Review, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 710 (1994) (reviewing D. Schoenbrod, Delegation and its Discontents, Power Without Responsibility (1993)).
216. See Eubank, supra note 177, at 164-71.
217. Askew, 411 U.S. at 344.
218. 264 U.S. at 386.
219. See supra notes 155-56 and 181 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
223. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 993 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216).
224. See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
225. Of course, federal legislation could impermissibly expand admiralty jurisdiction, but then it would likely be challenged on Seventh Amendment grounds (as an impermissible denial of jury trial), or, less successfully, on Tenth Amendment grounds (as an impermissible intrusion on state authority).
226. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
227. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidating, as legislation in excess of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, a statute making it a federal offense to possess a handgun in proximity to a school). The Court's decision in Lopez concerned only one, very narrow, aspect of Congress' power under the Interstate Commerce Clause: regulating those intrastate activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce or those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See id. at 1629-30.