The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: What are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub-) firm?

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 285-303

  Baudry, Bernard ^a   Chassagnon, Virgile ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE LYON   (France)

Author keywords

Authority; Boundaries of the firm; Incentives; Incomplete contracts theories of the firm; Power; Vertical network organization

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858281426     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-010-9148-z     Document Type: Article

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