The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation, incentives and optimality of executive stock options

Quantitative Finance

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 35-47

  Henderson, Vicky ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544438446     PISSN: 14697688     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14697680500116957     Document Type: Review

References (35)

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