Self-enforcing democracy

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 126, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1661-1708

  Fearon, James D ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; DEMOCRACY; ELECTION; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; MODELING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 84857382144     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjr038     Document Type: Article

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