Anonymous rituals

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 478-489

  Hugh Jones, David ^a   Reinstein, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Anonymity; Club goods; Religion; Signaling; Social capital; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856234665     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.005     Document Type: Article

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