The word of command: Communication and cohesion in the military

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 493-512

  King, Anthony ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Communication; Primary groups; Royal Marines; Social cohesion

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745024312     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X05283041     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. In the recent literature, a division has been drawn between social cohesion and combat readiness. This article employs the word cohesion to refer to the collective effectiveness of military groups in combat in line with Janowitz and Shils's original definition of the term. M. Janowitz and E. Shils, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," in Military Conflict, ed. M. Janowitz (London: Sage, 1975), 177-220.
2. M. Janowitz and E. Shils, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, Military Conflict, 1975, 177-220, Ibid.
3. See O. Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1992), for a critique of Janowitz and Shils's argument.
4. Bartov's argument is itself unconvincing. He claims that casualty rates were so high on the Eastern Front that no primary groups could have endured. In fact, he fails to recognize that while primary groups of experienced soldiers underwent slow attrition, casualty rates among the replacements was inordinately high. Autobiographical accounts of the Eastern Front demonstrate that primary groups did in fact endure to the very end of the war; see, for example, G. Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier (London: Cassell, 1999). Bartov is certainly correct in emphasizing that Nazi ideology was significant in the conduct of the war against Soviet Russia, but ideology cannot explain why the Wehrmacht was so operationally successful.
5. Janowitz and Shils, "Cohesion and Disintegration," 216.
6. Janowitz and Shils, Cohesion and Disintegration, Ibid., 184.
7. Janowitz and Shils, Cohesion and Disintegration, Ibid., 196-203.
8. Janowitz and Shils, Cohesion and Disintegration, Ibid., 181.
9. See C. Moskos, "The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam," Journal of Social Issues 31, no. 4 (1975): 25-37;
10. C. Moskos, Soldiers and Sociology (London: Macmillan, 1989);
11. W. Arkin, "Military Socialization and Masculinity," Journal of Social Issues 34, no. 1 (1978): 151-66;
12. W. Cockerham, "Attitudes towards Combat among US Army Paratroopers," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 6 (Spring 1978): 1-15;
13. E. Ben-Ari, "Tests of Soldiering, Trials of Manhood," in Military, State and Society in Israel, ed. E. Ben-Ari and Z. Rosenhek (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001);
14. J. Hockey, Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter, 1986);
15. N. Kinzer Stewart, Mates and Muchacos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War (New York: Brassey's, 1991);
16. S. Stouffer, A. Lumsdaine, M. Harper Lumsdaine, R. Williams Jr., M. Brewster Smith, I. Janis, S. Star and L. Cottrell Jr., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949);
17. D. Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry (Ottawa, Canada: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services, 1997);
18. D. Vaughan and W. Schum, "Motivation and US Narrative Accounts of the Ground War in Vietnam,' Armed Forces & Society 28, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 7-31;
19. L. Rosen, K. Knudson, and P. Fancher, "Cohesion and the Culture of Hypermasculinity in the US Army Units," Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 325-52;
20. and D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985).
21. L. Rosen, D. Durand, P. Bliese, R. Halverson, J. Rothberg, and N. Harrison, "Cohesion and Readiness in Gender-Integrated Combat Service Support Units: The Impact of Acceptance of Women and Gender Ratio," Armed Forces & Society 22, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 537-54;
22. L. Rosen and L. Martin, "Sexual Harassment, Cohesion and Combat Readiness in the US Army Support Units," Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 221-44.
23. Interview with Manoeuvre Support Group, April 27, 2004.
24. See C. Spence, Sabre Squadron (London: Penguin 1998);
25. and P. Ratcliffe, The Eye of the Storm (London: Michael O'Mara, 2001).
26. See R. Holmes, The Western Front (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2004).
27. Kinzer Stewart, Mates and Muchacos;
28. and Henderson, Cohesion, 2-3.
29. G. Aran, "Parachuting," American Journal of Sociology 80, no. 1 (1974): 123-52.
30. P. Boer, "Small Unit Cohesion: The Case of Fighter Squadron 3-VI.G.IV," Armed Forces & Society 28, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 33-54.
31. W. Kretchik, "Multinational Staff Effectiveness in UN Peace Operations: The Case of the US Army and UNMIH, 1994-5," Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 393-413.
32. See also E. Elron, B. Shamir, and E. Ben-Ari, "Why Don't They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces,' Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 73-98.
33. S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire. (New York: William Morrow, 1968), 9.
34. S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire, Ibid., 44-47.
35. S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire, Ibid., 47.
36. S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire, Ibid., 47.
37. This article is based on research conducted on the British armed forces between 2003 and 2005. In particular, the article draws ethnographic observation of Royal Marines Young Officers training between December 2003 and May 2004, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the Platoon Commanders' Division (post-Sandhurst infantry officer training) in the summer and fall 2004, and exercises with 42 Commando Royal Marines in 2005.
38. P. Griffith, "Test of a Model Incorporating Stress Strain, and Disintegration in the Cohesion-Performance Relation," Journal of Applied Social Psychology 27, no. 17 (September 1997): 1489-1526.
39. See Cameron, Sabre Squadron, 251;
40. and Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm, 354.
41. In environments where it is difficult to dig pits, "ponchos" (neoprene sheets used as bivouac shelters) are used as models. They are pegged out flat and made into relief models by inserting rocks, pieces of equipment, or clothing beneath them.
42. E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. J. Ward Swain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976), 216.
43. E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Ibid., 221.
44. E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Ibid., 231.
45. E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Ibid., 220.
46. E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 220, Ibid.
47. The exercise took place between January 12 and 15, 2004, on a wooded estate some eight miles from the Commando Training Centre, Royal Marines at Lympstone. The Commando Training Centre is situated on the Exe Estuary, five miles south of Exeter in southwest England.
48. The use of nick-numbers and nicknames is also intended as a security measure; the enemy will be unaware of the significance of these terms.
49. This training lecture, conducted by the Young Officer training team, took place at the Commando Training Centre on January 6, 2004.
50. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, 230-1.
51. R. Collins, Interaction Ritual Chains (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
52. G. Matthews, Operation Telic: 3 Commando Brigade's Desert War (Portsmouth, UK: RN Graphic Centre, 2003), 11.
53. The use of rehearsals by the Royal Marines before the Iraq operation accords closely with Collins's recent discussion of training rituals: "'Training' is not simply a matter of learning; it is above all establishing identity with the group who carry out their skills collectively"; Collins, Interaction Ritual, Chains, 91. Training is a Durkheimian ritual in which the group is periodically recreated. Only through the collective practice of training - of conducting synchronized bodily movements - do military groups become cohesive, oriented to shared goals and to the communal means of achieving them.
54. Damien Lewis, Operation Certain Death (London: Arrow), 297-98.
55. British forces also employ a diversity of hand signals in tactical situations that coordinate movement and that, in well-drilled groups, have the effect of sustaining social cohesion.
56. The following discussion is made on the basis of observation of a Royal Marines Young Officers' live-firing exercise at the Sennybridge training area in Wales between March 15 and 19, 2004, and a live-firing exercise by 42 Commando on the same range on June 28 and 29, 2005.
57. The term four-man team is used in this article because in the British Army and in the Royal Marines, only males are allowed to serve in the combat units that will perform the drills described here.
58. Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Justin Holt, Officer Commanding Alpha Company, 40 Commando, "The Functions and Tasks of a Close Combat Company" (Unpublished paper, January 2003), 6.
59. His criticisms of the Young Officers occurred on the exercise already cited from January 12 to 15, 2004.
60. M. Coburn, Soldier Five (London: Mainstream, 2004), 74-75.
61. This facility included the three buildings: Plymouth, Taunton, and Arbroath.
62. Corporal (now Sergeant) Watts was awarded a Military Cross for his part in the action.
63. Interview with the Manoeuvre Support Group, April 27, 2004.
64. British troops also use friendly and enemy fire to coordinate their actions. This is not discussed here for reasons of space.
65. Discussion with a Special Boat Service officer, January 15, 2004.
66. V. Bramley, Excursion to Hell (London: Pan Books, 1991), 170.
67. S. Preece, Among the Marines (Edinburgh, UK: Mainstream, 2004).
68. S. Preece, Among the Marines, Ibid., 160.
69. The exercise took place on June 13 and 14, 2005, at the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer in Warminster.
70. Interview, June 28, 2005.
71. B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).