Governance with multiple objectives: Evidence from top executive turnover in China

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 230-244

  Chang, Eric C ^a   Wong, Sonia M L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b LINGNAN UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Firm performance; Managerial turnovers; Multiple firm objectives; State ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 59649096422     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.10.003     Document Type: Article

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