Health Care Spending Risk, Health Insurance, and Payment to Health Plans

Handbook of Health Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2011, Pages 691-762

  Breyer, Friedrich ^a   Bundorf, M Kate ^a   Pauly, Mark V ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Health care markets; Health care spending; I1; Insurance; Public policy; Risk variation

Indexed keywords

EID: 83255192319     PISSN: 15740064     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53592-4.00011-6     Document Type: Chapter

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