Incentive-compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 395-417

  Herring, Bradley ^a   Pauly, Mark V ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Guaranteed renewability; Health insurance; Risk classification

Indexed keywords

CONSUMER-RESOURCE INTERACTION; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH RISK; INCENTIVE; MEDICAL GEOGRAPHY;

ARTICLE; COMPARATIVE STUDY; CONSUMER; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH INSURANCE; PREDICTION; QUALITY CONTROL; RISK; SIMULATION; THEORETICAL MODEL; UNITED STATES;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; FEMALE; HUMANS; INSURANCE COVERAGE; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; RISK ADJUSTMENT; UNITED STATES;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 33646074804     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.09.008     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Altman D., Cutler D., and Zeckhauser R. Adverse selection and adverse retention. The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 88 2 (1998) 122-126
2. American Academy of Actuaries, 1995. Medical savings accounts: cost implications and design issues. AAA Public Policy Monograph.
3. Anderson R. US Abridged Life Tables, 1996. National Vital Statistics Reports, 47.13. (1999), Centers for Disease Control's National Center for Health Statistics, Atlanta
4. Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund, 2003. 2003 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Washington, DC.
5. Cochrane J. Time-consistent health insurance. Journal of Political Economy 103 3 (1995) 445-473
6. Cutler, D., 1993. Why doesn't the market fully insure long-term care? NBER Working Paper #4301.
7. Eichner M., McClellan M., and Wise D. Insurance or self-insurance? Variation, persistence, and individual health accounts. In: Wise D. (Ed). Inquiries in the Economics of Aging (1998), University of Chicago Press, Chicago
8. Frick K. Consumer capital market constraints and guaranteed renewable insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16 (1998) 271-278
9. Hall M. Perspective: of magic wands and kaleidoscopes: fixing problems in the individual market. Health Affairs Web Exclusive Supplement 2 (2002) 353-358
10. Harrington S., and Niehaus G. Risk Management and Insurance (1999), Irwin McGraw Hill, New York
11. Hendel I., and Lizzeri A. The role of commitment in dynamic contracts: evidence from life insurance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118.1 (2003) 299-327
12. Herring B., and Pauly M. Premium variation in the individual insurance market. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 1.1 (2001) 43-58
13. Manning W., and Mullahy J. Estimating log models: to transform or not to transform. Journal of Health Economics 20 (2001) 461-494
14. Marquis M., and Holmer M. Choice under uncertainty and the demand for health insurance. (1986), RAND Corporation, Santa Monica (publication number N-2516-HHS)
15. O'Donoghue T., and Rabin M. Incentives for procrastinators. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 3 (1999) 769-416
16. Patel V., and Pauly M. Guaranteed renewability and the problem of risk variation in individual health insurance markets. Health Affairs Web Exclusive 2 (2002) 280-289
17. Pauly M., and Herring B. Pooling Health Insurance Risks (1999), AEI Press, Washington, DC
18. Pauly M., Kunreuther H., and Hirth R. Guaranteed renewability in insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 10 (1995) 143-156
19. Pauly M., Percy A., and Herring B. Individual versus job-based health insurance: weighing the pros and cons. Health Affairs 18 6 (1999) 28-44