Premium subsidies for health insurance: Excessive coverage vs. adverse selection

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 709-725

  Selden, Thomas M ^a  

^a AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONSUMER; EMPLOYER; EMPLOYMENT; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HEALTH INSURANCE; HIGH RISK POPULATION; HUMAN; MODEL;

FEES AND CHARGES; HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS, EMPLOYEE; HEALTH SERVICES NEEDS AND DEMAND; HUMANS; INSURANCE COVERAGE; MODELS, ECONOMIC; RISK; TAXES;

EID: 0032708671     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(99)00031-4     Document Type: Article

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