Beyond testing: Empirical models of insurance markets

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 311-336

  Einav, Liran ^a   Finkelstein, Amy ^b   Levin, Jonathan ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Asymmetric information

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956573811     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254     Document Type: Article

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