On strategy-proof allocation without payments or priors

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 7090 LNCS, Issue , 2011, Pages 182-193

  Han, Li ^a   Su, Chunzhi ^a   Tang, Linpeng ^a   Zhang, Hongyang ^a  

^a SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTERS;

ARBITRARY CONSTANTS; COMPETITIVE RATIO; COMPETITIVE STRATEGY; CONTINUOUSLY DIFFERENTIABLE; PRIOR KNOWLEDGE; SECOND ORDERS; SOCIAL WELFARE; STRATEGY PROOFS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 82955184545     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_16     Document Type: Conference Paper

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