On the limits of dictatorial classification

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 609-616

  Meir, Reshef ^a   Procaccia, Ariel D ^b   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Classification; Game theory; Mechanism design; Social choice

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; CLASSIFICATION (OF INFORMATION); MACHINE DESIGN; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; CLASSIFICATION MECHANISM; LINEAR SEPARATORS; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTIPLE AGENTS; NEGATIVE SIDES; OPTIMAL CLASSIFICATION; SINGLE-AGENT; SOCIAL CHOICE; SUBDOMAIN;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 82955182371     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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