From genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 299, Issue , 2012, Pages 120-125

  Traulsen, Arne ^a   Reed, Floyd A ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Genotype; Phenotype; Population genetics

Indexed keywords

ALLELE; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; GENOME; GENOTYPE; PHENOTYPE; POPULATION GENETICS; POPULATION SIZE; PRISONER DILEMMA;

ADAPTATION; ARTICLE; GENE FREQUENCY; GENE LOCUS; GENE MAPPING; GENETIC LINKAGE; GENOTYPE; HETEROZYGOSITY; HOMOZYGOSITY; MEIOSIS; MOLECULAR EVOLUTION; MOLECULAR GENETICS; PHENOTYPE; POPULATION GENETICS; POPULATION SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; SOCIAL DOMINANCE;

ALLELES; ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; GENOTYPE; MEIOSIS; MODELS, GENETIC; PHENOTYPE;

EID: 81455138715     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032     Document Type: Article

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