Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 258, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 637-645

  Hashimoto, Koh ^a,b   Aihara, Kazuyuki ^a,b  

^a JAPAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY   (Japan)

^b INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE   (Japan)

Author keywords

Diploid population; Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Finite population; Fixation probability; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; SIZE EFFECT;

ALLELE; ARTICLE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; DIPLOIDY; EVOLUTION; INHERITANCE; MUTANT; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; STATISTICS;

ALLELES; ANIMALS; DIPLOIDY; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; GENE POOL; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PROBABILITY;

EID: 67349227105     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.004     Document Type: Article

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