Transforming the dilemma

Evolution

Volumn 61, Issue 10, 2007, Pages 2281-2292

  Taylor, Christine ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Direct and indirect reciprocity; Evolution of cooperation; Group selection; Kin selection; Network reciprocity (graph selection); Prisoner's Dilemma

Indexed keywords

GROUP SELECTION; KIN SELECTION; PRISONER DILEMMA; RECIPROCITY;

BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETIC SELECTION; HUMAN; REVIEW; STATISTICS;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; SELECTION (GENETICS); STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 34848881582     PISSN: 00143820     EISSN: 15585646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2007.00196.x     Document Type: Review

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