Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government Performance

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 686-693

  Boix, Carles ^a   Posner, Daniel N ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937266559     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123498000313     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Glenn Loury, ‘Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?’ Social Philosophy and Policy, 5 (1987), 249-71.
2. For an overview of different conceptualizations of social capital in the literature, see Kenneth Newton, ‘Social Capital and Democracy’, American Behavioral Scientist, 40 (1997), 575-86.
3. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert D. Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone, Revisited’, The Responsive Community (Spring 1995), pp. 18-33; and Jim Granato, Ronald Inglehart and David Leblang, ‘The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development: Theory, Hypotheses, and Some Empirical Tests’, American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 607-31.
4. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
5. For a further discussion of the capacities of public and private goods-producing groups to generate social capital, see Carles Boix and Daniel N. Posner, ‘Making Social Capital Work:AReview of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy’ (Harvard University Center for International Affairs Working Paper, no. 96-4, 1996).
6. Because these institutions perform such a valuable function in facilitating co-ordination and co-operation, they would tend to persist and continue to make co-operation possible even after the third-party enforcer had declined (Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)).
7. ‘Again, those who have too much of the goods of fortune, strength, wealth, friends, and the like, are neither willing nor able to submit to authority … On the other hand, the very poor, who are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded. So that the one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically; the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like slaves. Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this’ (Aristotle, Politics, IV, 11).
8. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 124.
9. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 124.
10. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), particularly chaps. 1-3.
11. Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
12. Robert D. Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy, 6 (1995), 65-78, at p. 67.
13. Gary Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 197.
14. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).
15. Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).