What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence

Economics Letters

Volumn 83, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 383-389

  Charness, Gary ^a   Grosskopf, Brit ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Coordination; Experimental methodology; Payoff information

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942540751     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.007     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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