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Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 281-297
Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
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EID: 0030210113     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0090     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (72)
References (15)
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    • Abreu, D.1    Pearce, D.2    Stachetti, E.3
  • 3
    • 0002977037 scopus 로고
    • An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 4
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    • The folk theorem with imperfect public information
    • 4. D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, and E. Maskin, The folk theorem with imperfect public information, Econometrica 62 (1994), 997-1040.
    • (1994) Econometrica , vol.62 , pp. 997-1040
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2    Maskin, E.3
  • 5
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    • Folk theorems for repeated games with discounting and incomplete information
    • 5. D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin, Folk theorems for repeated games with discounting and incomplete information, Econometrica 54 (1986), 533-554.
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , pp. 533-554
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 7
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    • Sequential equilibrium
    • 7. D. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential equilibrium, Econometrica 50 (1982), 863-894.
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    • Kreps, D.1    Wilson, R.2
  • 8
    • 0002686672 scopus 로고
    • Lower equilibrium payoffs in two players repeated games with nonobservable actions
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    • (1990) Int. J. Game Theory , vol.18 , pp. 57-89
    • Lehrer, E.1
  • 9
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    • Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information
    • 9. E. Lehrer, Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information, Int. J. Game Theory 19 (1990).
    • (1990) Int. J. Game Theory , vol.19
    • Lehrer, E.1
  • 10
    • 0000647682 scopus 로고
    • A new approach to the implementation problem
    • 10. H. Matsushima, A new approach to the implementation problem, J. Econ. Theory 45 (1988), 128-144.
    • (1988) J. Econ. Theory , vol.45 , pp. 128-144
    • Matsushima, H.1
  • 11
    • 0000868610 scopus 로고
    • On the theory of repeated games with private, information, part II: Revelation through communication
    • 11. H. Matsushima, On the theory of repeated games with private, information, part II: Revelation through communication, Econ. Lett. 35 (1991), 257-261.
    • (1991) Econ. Lett. , vol.35 , pp. 257-261
    • Matsushima, H.1
  • 12
    • 38249039740 scopus 로고
    • Implementation in differential information economies
    • 12. A. Postlewaite and D. Schmeidler, Implementation in differential information economies, J. Econ. Theory 39 (1986), 14-33.
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  • 13
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    • Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting
    • 13. R. Radner, Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting, Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986), 43-58.
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  • 14
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    • An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria
    • 14. R. Radner, R. Myerson, and E. Maskin, An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria, Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986), 59-70.
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    • Radner, R.1    Myerson, R.2    Maskin, E.3
  • 15
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    • Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
    • 15. A. Rubinstein, Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion, J. Econ. Theory 27 (1979), 1-9.
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    • Rubinstein, A.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.