Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 290, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 88-103

  De Weerd, Harmen ^a   Verbrugge, Rineke ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Agent based models; Emergent behavior; Evolution of cooperation; Non uniform costs and payoffs; Strong reciprocity

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; HETEROGENEITY; HOMOGENEITY; INSECT; POPULATION STRUCTURE; POPULATION TYPE; RECIPROCITY; SOCIAL NETWORK;

ALTRUISM; ANT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; EVOLUTION; INSECT SOCIETY; POPULATION MODEL; POPULATION SIZE; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; SIMULATION; SOCIAL NETWORK;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GROUP PROCESSES; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DENSITY; PUNISHMENT;

FORMICIDAE; HEXAPODA;

EID: 80053375412     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.034     Document Type: Article

References (83)

1. Axelrod R., Hamilton W. The evolution of cooperation. Science 1981, 211(4489):13-90.
2. Bicchieri C. The Grammar of Society 2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
3. Bickman L. The effect of another bystander's ability to help on bystander intervention in an emergency. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 1971, 7(3):367-379.
4. Blume L. How noise matters. Games Econ. Behav. 2003, 44(2):251-271.
5. Bolton G., Zwick R. Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 1995, 10(1):95-121.
6. Boyd R., Gintis H., Bowles S., Richerson P. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2003, 100(6):3531-3535.
7. Brandt H., Hauert C., Sigmund K. Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B: Biol. Sci. 2003, 270(1519):1099-1104.
8. Brandt H., Hauert C., Sigmund K. Punishing and abstaining for public goods. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2006, 103(2):495-497.
9. Camerer C., Thaler R. Anomalies: ultimatums, dictators and manners. J. Econ. Perspect. 1995, 9(2):209-219.
10. Caplan M., Hay D. Preschoolers' responses to peers' distress and beliefs about bystander intervention. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 1989, 30(2):231-242.
11. Clutton-Brock T., Parker G. Punishment in animal societies. Nature 1995, 373(6511):209-216.
12. Cramer R., Mcmaster M., Bartell P., Dragna M. Subject competence and minimization of the bystander effect. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 1988, 18(13):1133-1148.
13. Crespi B. The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms. Trends Ecol. Evol. 2001, 16(4):178-183.
14. Dreber A., Rand D., Fudenberg D., Nowak M. Winners don't punish. Nature 2008, 452(7185):348-351.
15. Dugatkin L. Cooperation Among Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective 1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
16. Eldakar O., Wilson D. Selfishness as second-order altruism. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2008, 105(19):6982-6986.
17. Eldakar O., Farrell D., Wilson D. Selfish punishment: altruism can be maintained by competition among cheaters. J. Theor. Biol. 2007, 249(2):198-205.
18. Falk A., Fehr E., Fischbacher U. Driving forces behind informal sanctions. Econometrica 2005, 2017-2030.
19. Fehr E., Gächter S. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 2000, 980-994.
20. Fehr E., Gächter S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 2002, 415(6868):137-140.
21. Fisher J., Isaac R., Schatzberg J., Walker J. Heterogenous demand for public goods: behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Public Choice 1995, 85(3):249-266.
22. Fletcher J., Zwick M. The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness. J. Theor. Biol. 2007, 245(1):26-36.
23. Foster D., Young P. Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theor. Popul. Biol. 1990, 38(2):219-232.
24. Fowler J. Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2005, 102(19):7047-7049.
25. Fudenberg D., Harris C. Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks. J. Econ. Theor. 1992, 57(2):420-441.
26. Fudenberg D., Maskin E. Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games. Am. Econ. Rev. 1990, 80(2):274-279.
27. Gärdenfors P. The cognitive and communicative demands on cooperation. Games, Actions, and Social Software 2011, Springer, Berlin. J. van Eijck, R. Verbrugge (Eds.).
28. Güth W., Schmittberger R., Schwarze B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 1982, 3(4):367-388.
29. Griffin A., West S. Kin selection: fact and fiction. Trends Ecol. Evol. 2002, 17(1):15-21.
30. Grilo C., Correia L. Effects of asynchronism on evolutionary games. J. Theor. Biol. 2011, 269(1):109-122.
31. Gächter S., Herrmann B. Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B: Biol. Sci. 2009, 364(1518):791.
32. Gächter S., Renner E., Sefton M. The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 2008, 322(5907):1510.
33. Hamilton W. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. J. Theor. Biol. 1964, 7(1):17-52.
34. Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 1968, 162(859):1243-1248.
35. Hauert C., DeMonte S., Hofbauer J., Sigmund K. Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games. Science 2002, 296(5570):1129-1132.
36. Hauert C., DeMonte S., Hofbauer J., Sigmund K. Replicator dynamics for optional public good games. J. Theor. Biol. 2002, 218(2):187-194.
37. Hauert C., Traulsen A., Brandt H., Nowak M., Sigmund K. Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. Science 2007, 316(5833):1905-1907.
38. Hauert C., Traulsen A., Brandt H., Nowak M., Sigmund K. Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations. Biol. Theor. 2009, 3(2):114-122.
39. Hemelrijk C. An individual-orientated model of the emergence of despotic and egalitarian societies. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B: Biol. Sci. 1999, 266(1417):361.
40. Hemelrijk C. Towards the integration of social dominance and spatial structure. Anim. Behav. 2000, 59(5):1035-1048.
41. Hemelrijk C. Despotic societies, sexual attraction and the emergence of male 'tolerance': an agent-based model. Behaviour 2002, 139(6):729-747.
42. Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R. In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Am. Econ. Rev. 2001, 91(2):73-78.
43. Herrmann B., Thöni C., Gächter S. Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 2008, 319(5868):1362.
44. Huston T., Ruggiero M., Conner R., Geis G. Bystander intervention into crime: a study based on naturally-occurring episodes. Soc. Psychol. Q. 1981, 44(1):14-23.
45. Hölldobler B., Wilson E. The Ants 1990, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.
46. Ifti M., Killingback T., Doebeli M. Effects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on the spatial continuous prisoner's dilemma. J. Theor. Biol. 2004, 231(1):97-106.
47. Janssen M., Bushman C. Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible. J. Theor. Biol. 2008, 254(3):541-545.
48. Kagel J., Roth A., Hey J. The Handbook of Experimental Economics 1995, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
49. Killingback T., Doebeli M. Spatial evolutionary game theory: hawks and doves revisited. Proc.: Biol. Sci. 1996, 263(1374):1135-1144.
50. Latane B., Darley J. Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 1968, 10:215.
51. Lehmann L., Keller L., West S., Roze D. Group selection and kin selection: two concepts but one process. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2007, 104(16):6736-6739.
52. Lewis D. Convention: A Philosophical Study 1969, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
53. Lindgren K., Nordahl M. Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games. Physica D: nonlinear Phenom. 1994, 75(1-3):292-309.
54. Monnin T., Ratnieks F. Policing in queenless ponerine ants. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 2001, 50(2):97-108.
55. Mulder R., Langmore N. Dominant males punish helpers for temporary defection in superb fairy-wrens. Anim. Behav. 1993, 45:830-833.
56. Nakamaru M., Iwasa Y. The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher. J. Theor. Biol. 2006, 240(3):475-488.
57. Nikiforakis N., Normann H. A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Exper. Econ. 2008, 11(4):358-369.
58. Nowak M. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 2006, 314(5805):1560.
59. Nowak M. Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life 2006, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
60. Nowak M., May R. The spatial dilemmas of evolution. Int. J. Bifur. Chaos 1993, 3:35.
61. Nowak M., Sigmund K. Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. Sci. Signal. 2004, 303(5659):793-799.
62. Nowak M., Tarnita C., Wilson E. The evolution of eusociality. Nature 2010, 466(7310):1057-1062.
63. Orbell J., Dawes R. Social welfare, cooperators' advantage, and the option of not playing the game. Am. Sociol. Rev. 1993, 58(6):787-800.
64. Oster G., Wilson E. Caste and Ecology in the Social Insects 1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
65. Ostrom E. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. J. Econ. Perspect. 2000, 137-158.
66. Pantin H., Carver C. Induced competence and the bystander effect. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 1982, 12(2):100-111.
67. Rand D., Armao J.J., Nakamaru M., Ohtsuki H. Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 2010, 265(4):624-632.
68. Reuben E., Riedl A. Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations. Res. Memo. 2009, 29:1-25.
69. Semmann D., Krambeck H., Milinski M. Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game. Nature 2003, 425(6956):390-393.
70. Sigmund K. The Calculus of Selfishness 2010, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
71. Sigmund K., Hauert C., Nowak M. Reward and punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2001, 98(19):10757-10762.
72. Sigmund K., DeSilva H., Traulsen A., Hauert C. Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. Nature 2010, 466(7308):861-863.
73. Taylor P., Jonker L. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosci. 1978, 40(1-2):145-156.
74. Tomasello M. Why We Cooperate 2009, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
75. Trivers R., Hare H. Haplodiploidy and the evolution of the social insect. Science 1976, 191(4224):249-263.
76. Warneken F., Tomasello M. Extrinsic rewards undermine altruistic tendencies in 20-month-olds. Dev. Psychol. 2008, 44(6):1785-1788.
77. Wenseleers T., Helanterä H., Hart A., Ratnieks F. Worker reproduction and policing in insect societies: an ESS analysis. J. Theor. Biol. 2004, 17(5):1035-1047.
78. Wenseleers T., Tofilski A., Ratnieks F. Queen and worker policing in the tree wasp Dolichovespula sylvestris. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 2005, 58(1):80-86.
79. West S., Pen I., Griffin A. Cooperation and competition between relatives. Science 2002, 296(5565):72-75.
80. West S., Griffin A., Gardner A. Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. J. Evol. Biol. 2007, 20(2):415-432.
81. Wilkinson G. Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat. Nature 1984, 308(5955):181-184.
82. Wilson E. Caste and division of labor in leaf-cutter ants (Hymenoptera: Formicidae: Atta). Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 1980, 7(2):143-156.
83. Wu J., Zhang B., Zhou Z., He Q., Zheng X., Cressman R., Tao Y. Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2009, 106(41):17448-17451.