Misconceptions and political outcomes

Economic Journal

Volumn 113, Issue 484, 2003, Pages 1-20

  Romer, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLITICAL ECONOMY; THEORETICAL STUDY; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 0037246405     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00092     Document Type: Article

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