Redistribution and deadweight cost: The role of political competition

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 205-226

  Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard ^a  

^a JESUS COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Deadweight costs; Pressure groups; Redistribution

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037992631     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00167-2     Document Type: Article

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