How to improve government performance?

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1198-1206

  Liu, Qijun ^a,b  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b HUAZHONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (China)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Agency model; Economy of China; Government failure; Moral hazard; Political process

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048929149     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.12.003     Document Type: Review

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