Physician dual practice: A review of literature

Health Policy

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-7

  Socha, Karolina Z ^a   Bech, Mickael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Dual jobs; Moonlighting; Public private

Indexed keywords

CLINICAL PRACTICE; DOCTOR PATIENT RELATION; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HOSPITAL ADMISSION; HUMAN; MEDICAL LITERATURE; MOTIVATION; PHYSICIAN INCOME; PRIVATE PRACTICE; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE; PUBLICATION; REVIEW; SYSTEMATIC REVIEW; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION;

GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HEALTH CARE COSTS; HUMANS; PHYSICIANS; PRIVATE PRACTICE; PRIVATE SECTOR; PUBLIC SECTOR; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE; WAITING LISTS;

EID: 79960910616     PISSN: 01688510     EISSN: 18726054     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2010.10.017     Document Type: Review

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