Regulating providers' reimbursement in a mixed market for health care

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 53-71

  Rickman, Neil ^a   McGuire, Alistair ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HEALTH CARE; PUBLIC SECTOR;

EID: 0032933874     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00120     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. CHALKLEY, M. and MALCOMSON, J. M. (1995a), Contracting for health services with unmonitored quality. Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9510. University of Southampton.
2. CHALKLEY, M. and MALCOMSON, J. M. (1995b), Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality. Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9514. University of Southampton.
3. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (1989). Working for Patients. HMSO, London.
4. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (1997). The New NHS. Cm 3807. HMSO, London.
5. ELLIS, R. P. and McGUIRE, T. G. (1986), Provider behaviour under prospective reimbursement: cost sharing and supply. Journal of Health Economics, 5, pp. 129-52.
6. ELLIS, R. P. and McGUIRE, T. G. (1990). Optimal payment systems for health services. Journal of Health Economics, 9, pp. 375-96.
7. ELLIS, R. P. and McGUIRE, T. G. (1993). Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in health care. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, pp. 135-51.
8. IVERSEN, T. (1997). The effect of a private sector on the waiting time in a national health service. Journal of Health Economics, 16, pp. 381-96.
9. JOHNSON, N. (ed.) (1995). Private Markets in Health and Welfare: An International Perspective. Berg Publishers Ltd., Oxford.
10. LAFFONT, J-J. and TIROLE, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. The MIT Press, London.
11. MA, C. A. (1994). Health care payment systems: cost and quality incentives. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 3, pp. 93-112.
12. MA, C. A. and McGUIRE, T. G. (1997). Optimal health insurance and provider payment. American Economic Review, 87, 685-704.
13. McAVINCHEY, I. D. and YANNOPOULOS, A. (1994). A cost function approach to the choice between private and public acute health care. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 41, pp. 194-211.
14. MEZZETTI, C. (1997). Common agency with horizontally differentiated principals. RAND Journal of Economics, 28, pp. 323-45.
15. Monopolies and Mergers Commission. (1994). Private Medical Services: A Report on the Agreements and Practices Relating to Charges for the Supply of Private Medical Services by NHS Consultants. Cm 2452. HMSO, London.
16. MOONEY, G. and RYAN, M. (1993). Agency in health care: getting beyond first principles. Journal of Health Economics, 12, pp. 125-35.
17. NEWHOUSE, J. P. (1996). Reimbursing health plans and health providers: selection versus efficiency in production. Journal of Economic Literature, 34, pp. 1236-63.
18. RICKMAN, N. and McGUIRE, A. (1997). Public contracts in mixed health care markets. Paper presented at the HESG meetings, York. July. Mimeo, University of Surrey.
19. SELDEN, T. M. (1990). A model of capitation. Journal of Health Economics, 9, pp. 397-409.
20. SHARMA, R. (1996). Prospective payments and cost reimbursement in health care: cost incentives revisited. Working Paper 95-96-14. Department of Economics, University of Florida.
21. TINBERGEN, J. (1952). On the Theory of Optimal Policy. North Holland, Amsterdam.
22. US Congress (1995). Hospital Financing in Seven Different Countries. Office of Technology Assessment. Background Paper OTA-BP-H-148. Washington DC, US Government Printing Office.