Creaming, skimping and dumping: Provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 537-555

  Ellis, Randall P ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Creaming; Dumping; Skimping

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COST CONTROL; DISEASE SEVERITY; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT; PATIENT SELECTION; PROFIT; REIMBURSEMENT;

ECONOMIC COMPETITION; FRAUD; HEALTH CARE SECTOR; HEALTH SERVICES ACCESSIBILITY; HEALTH SERVICES MISUSE; HEALTH SERVICES NEEDS AND DEMAND; INSURANCE COVERAGE; MODELS, STATISTICAL; PATIENT TRANSFER; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; SEVERITY OF ILLNESS INDEX; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0031662055     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(97)00042-8     Document Type: Article

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