Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach

Health Economics

Volumn 13, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 505-524

  González, Paula ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD PABLO DE OLAVIDE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Exclusive contracts; Moral hazard; Physician's incentives; Public private health services

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CLINICAL PRACTICE; CONTRACT; CONTROLLED STUDY; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HUMAN; INCOME; MEDICAL SERVICE; MODEL; PATIENT CARE; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; PHYSICIAN; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PRIVATE PRACTICE; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE; SOCIAL ASPECT; THEORY;

CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PRACTICE MANAGEMENT; PRIVATE PRACTICE; PUBLIC SECTOR; SPAIN;

EID: 2942700191     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/hec.890     Document Type: Article

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