Chapter 9 Physician agency

Handbook of Health Economics

Volumn 1, Issue PART A, 2000, Pages 461-536

  McGuire, Thomas G ^a  

^a Boston University

Author keywords

agency; I11; insurance; L84; managed care; monopolistic competition; networks; physician induced demand; price regulation; quantity setting; target income

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956856257     PISSN: 15740064     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0064(00)80168-7     Document Type: Chapter

References (234)

1. Anderson G., and Glesnes-Anderson V. Health Care Ethics (1987), Aspen Publication, New York
2. Arrow K.J. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review 53 (1963) 941-973
3. Arrow K.J. Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing (1971), Markham, Rockville, MD
4. Arrow K.J. Agency and the market. In: Arrow K.J., and Intriligator M.D. (Eds). Handbook of Mathematical Economics Vol. 3 (1986), Elsevier Science Publishers, Chicago 1183-1195
5. Auster R.D., and Oaxaca R.L. Identification of supplier induced demand in the health care sector. Journal of Human Resources 16 (1981) 327-342
6. Benham L., Maurizi A., and Reder M. Location and migration medics: physicians and dentists. Review of Economics and Statistics 50 (1968) 332-347
7. Berry C., Held P.J., Kehrer B., Markheim L., and Reinhardt U. Canadian physicians' supply response to universal health insurance: The first years in Quebec. In: Gabel J., Taylor J., Greenspan N., and Blaxall M. (Eds). Physicians and Financial Incentives (1980), US GPO, North Holland 57-59
8. Birch S. The identification of supplier-inducement in a fixed price system of health care provision: The case of dentistry in the United Kingdom. Journal of Health Economics 7 (1988) 129-150
9. Blaug M. Where are we now in British health economics?. Health Economics 7 (1998) 563-579
10. (Fall). Blendon R.J., et al. Health reform lessons learned from physicians in three nations. Health Affairs (1993) 194-203
11. Blomqvist A. The doctor as double agent: information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care. Journal of Health Economics 10 (1991) 411-432
12. Brown D.M. Do physicians underutilize aides?. Journal of Human Resources 23 (1988) 342-355
13. Brundin I., and Ma C.A. Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion. Boston University Industry Studies Program Working Paper #89 (1998)
14. Bunker J.P., and Brown Jr. B.W. The physician-patient as an informed consumer of surgical services. New England Journal of Medicine 290 (1974) 1051-1055
15. Burstein P.L., and Cromwell J. Relative incomes and rates of return for US physicians. Journal of Health Economics 4 (1985) 63-78
16. Carlsen F., and Grytten J. More physicians: improved availability or induced demand?. Health Economics 7 (1998) 495-508
17. Chassin M., et al. Does inappropriate use explain geographic variations in the use of health care services? A study of three procedures. Journal of the American Medical Association 258 18 (1987) 2533-2537
18. Chalkley M., and Malcolmson J.M. Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality. Journal of Health Economics 17 1 (1998) 1-20
19. Comanor W.S. National Health Insurance in Ontario: The Effects of a Policy of Cost Control (1980), American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
20. Cromwell J. Health professions substitution: a case study of anesthesia. In: Osterwies M., McLaughlin C.J., Manasse Jr. H.R., and Hopper C.L. (Eds). The US Health Workforce: Power Politics, and Policy (1996), Association of Academic Health Centers, Washington, DC
21. Cromwell J., and Mitchell J.B. Physician-induced demand for surgery. Journal of Health Economics 293-313 (1986)
22. Culyer A.J. The normative economics of health care finance and provision. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 5 (1989) 34-58
23. Chapter 26. Danzon P.M. Liability for medical malpractice. In: Culyer A.J., and Newhouse J.P. (Eds). Handbook of Health Economics (2000), Elsevier, Washington, DC
24. Danzon P.M., Manning W.G., and Marquis M.S. Factors influencing laboratory tests and prices. Health Care Financing Review 5 (1984) 23-32
25. DeFelice L.C., and Bradford W.D. Relative inefficiencies in production between solo and group practice physicians. Health Economics 6 (1997) 455-466
26. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The Target-Income Hypothesis and Related Issues in Health Manpower Policy (1980), Bureau of Health Manpower, DHEW (HRA), Amsterdam 80-127
27. Dranove D. Demand inducement and the physician/patient relationship. Economic Inquiry 26 (1988) 251-298
28. Dranove D., and Satterthwaite M.A. The implications for resource-based relative value scales for physicians' fees, income and specialty choices. In: French III H.E. (Ed). Regulating Doctors' Fees: Competition, Benefits and Controls under Medicare (1991), AEI Press, Washington, DC 52-70
29. Dranove D., and Satterthwaite M.A. Monopolistic competition when price and quality are imperfectly observable. The Rand Journal of Economics 23 4 (1992) 518-534
30. Chapter 20, this Handbook. Dranove D., and Satterthwaite M.A. The industrial organization of health care markets (1999)
31. Dranove D., Shanley M., and White W.D. Price and concentration in hospital markets: the switch from patient to payer driven competition. Journal of Law and Economics 36 (1993) 179-204
32. Dranove D., and Wehner P. Physician-induced demand for childbirths. Journal of Health Economics 13 (1994) 61-73
33. Dranove D., and White W.D. Agency and the organization of health care delivery. Inquiry 24 (1987) 405-415
34. Dranove D., and White W.D. Specialization, option demand, and the pricing of medical specialists. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5 (1996) 277-306
35. Dyckman Z. Physicians: a study of physicians' fees. Staff Report, Council of Wage and Price Stability (1978), US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC
36. Eastaugh S. Health Economics: Efficiency, Quality and Equity (1992), Auburn House, Washington, DC
37. Eisenberg J.M. Doctors' Decisions and the Cost of Medical Care (1986), Health Administration Press, Westport, CT
38. Eisenberg J.M. Economics: physicians income and set-fee structures. The Journal of American Medical Association 271 (1994) 1663-1666
39. Ellis R.P., and McGuire T.G. Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement. Journal of Health Economics 5 (1986) 129-151
40. Ellis R.P., and McGuire T.G. Optimal payment systems for health services. Journal of Health Economics 9 (1990) 375-396
41. Ellis R.P., and McGuire T.G. Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in health care. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1993) 135-151
42. Emanuel E.J., and Goldman L. Protecting patient welfare in managerial care: six safeguards. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 23 (1998) 635-659
43. Emons W. Credence goods and fraudulent experts. Rand Journal of Economics 28 (1997) 107-119
44. Emons D.W., and Wozniak G.D. Physicians' contractual arrangements with managed care organizations. Socioeconomics of Medical Practice (1997), American Medical Association, Ann Arbor, MI
45. Epstein A.M., et al. The use of ambulatory testing in prepaid and fee-for-service group practices: relation to perceived profitability. New England Journal of Medicine 314 (1986) 1089-1093
46. Escarce J. Effects of lower surgical fees on the use of physician services under medicare. Journal of the American Medical Association 269 19 (1993) 2513-2518
47. Escarce J. Medicare patients' use of overpriced procedures before and after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. American Journal of Public Health 83 3 (1993) 349-355
48. Escarce J. Effects of the relative fee structure on the use of surgical operations. Health Services Research 28 (1993) 479-502
49. Escarce J., and Pauly M.V. Physician opportunity costs in physician practice cost function. Journal of Health Economics 17 (1998) 129-151
50. Escarce J., Polsky D., Wozniak G., Pauly M., and Kletke P. Health maintenance organization penetration and the practice location choices of new physicians. Medical Care 36 (1998) 1555-1566
51. Evans R. Supplier-induced demand: some empirical evidence and implications. In: Perlman M. (Ed). The Economics of Health and Medical Care (1974), Macmillan, Chicago, IL 162-173
52. Farley P.J. Theories of the price and quantity of physician services. Journal of Health Economics (1986) 315-333
53. Farrell J., and Scotchmer S. Partnerships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103 (1988) 279-298
54. (Suppl.). Feldman R., and Begun J. The effects of advertising restrictions: lessons from optometry. Journal of Human Resources 13 (1978) 247-262
55. Feldman R., and Dowd B. A new estimate of the welfare loss of the health insurance. American Economic Review 81 (1991) 297-301
56. Feldman R., and Sloan F. Competition among physicians, revisited. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 13 (1988) 239-261
57. Feldstein M. The rising price of physicians' services. Review of Economics and Statistics 52 2 (1970) 121-133
58. Feldstein M. Hospital cost inflation: a study of non-profit price dynamics. American Economic Review 61 (1971) 853-872
59. Feldstein P. Health Care Economics (1979), John Wiley and Sons, London
60. Folland S., Goodman A., and Stano M. The Economics of Health and Health Care (1997), Prentice Hall, New York
61. Frank R.G. Pricing and location of physician services in mental health. Inquiry 38 (1985) 115-133
62. Frank R.G., and Salkever D. The supply of charity services by non-profit hospitals: motives and market structures. Rand Journal of Economics 22 (1991) 430-445
63. Frank R.G., Weiner J.P., Steinwachs D.M., and Salkever D.S. Economic rents derived from hospital privileges in the market for podiatric services. Journal of Health Economics 6 (1987) 319-337
64. Frech III H.E. Occupational licensure and health care productivity. In: Rafferty J. (Ed). Health Manpower and Productivity (1974), Lexington Books, Upper, Saddle River, NJ
65. Frech III H.E. Competition and Monopoly in Medical Care (1996), AEI Press, Lexington, MA
66. Frech III H.E., and Danger K.L. Exclusive contracts between hospitals and physicians: the antitrust issues. Health Economics 7 (1998) 175-178
67. Frech III H.E., and Ginsburg P.B. Imposed health insurance in monopolistic markets: a theoretical analysis. Economic Inquiry 13 (1975) 55-70
68. Friedman M., and Kuznets S. Income from Independent Professional Practice (1954), National Bureau of Economic Research, Basic Books, Washington, DC 45
69. Fuchs V.R. Who Shall Live? (1974), Basic Books, New York
70. Fuchs V.R. The supply of surgeons and the demand for operations. The Journal of Human Resources (1978) 35-56
71. Fuchs V.R. Economics, values, and health care reform. American Economic Review 86 (1996) 1-24
72. Gabel J.R., and Rice T.H. Reducing expenditure for physicians services: the price of paying less. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 9 (1985) 595-609
73. Ganem J., Krakower J., and Beran R. Review of US medical school finances, 1993-1994. Journal of the American Medical Association 274 9 (1995) 723-730
74. Garg M.L., Gliebe W.A., and Elkhatib M.B. The extent of defensive medicine: some empirical evidence. Leg. Aspects Med. Practice 6 (1978) 25-29
75. Gaynor M. Issues in the industrial organization of the market for physician services. The Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (1994) 211-255
76. Gaynor M., and Gertler P. Moral hazard and risk spreading in partnerships. The RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1995) 591-614
77. Getzen T.E. A 'brand name firm' theory of medical group practice. Journal of Industrial Economics 33 (1984) 199-215
78. Getzen T.E. Health Economics: Fundamentals and Flows of Funds (1997), John Wiley, New York
79. Giuffrida A., and Gravelle H. Paying patients to comply: an economic analysis. Health Economics 7 (1998) 569-579
80. Glazer J., and McGuire T.G. Should physicians be permitted to 'balance bill' patients?. Journal of Health Economics 12 (1993) 239-258
81. Green J. Physician-induced demand for medical care. The Journal of Human Resources 13 (1978) 21-33
82. (Part II). Greenberg W. Marshfield clinic, physician networks, and the exercise of monopoly power. Health Services Research 33 (1998) 1461-1476
83. Greenfield S., Nelson E.C., Zubkoff M., Manning W., Rogers W., Kravitz R., Keller A., Tarlov A., and Ware J. Variations in resource utilization among medical specialities and systems of care: results of the medical outcome study. Journal of the American Medical Association 267 (1992) 1624-1630
84. Chapter 7. Grossman M. The human capital model. In: Culyer A.J., and Newhouse J.P. (Eds). Handbook of Health Economics (2000), Elsevier, New York
85. Gruber J., and Owings M. Physician financial incentives and Cesarean section delivery. RAND Journal of Economics 27 (1996) 99-123
86. Grytten J., Holst D., and Laake P. Supplier inducement: its effect on dental services in Norway. Journal of Health Economics 9 (1990) 483-491
87. Haas-Wilson D. The effect of commercial practice restrictions: the case of optometry. Journal of Law and Economics 29 (1986) 165-185
88. Haas-Wilson D. Consumer information and providers' reputations: an empirical test in the market for psychotherapy. Journal of Health Economics 9 (1990) 321-333
89. Haas-Wilson D., and Gaynor M. Physician networks and their implications for competition in health care markets. Health Economics 7 (1998) 179-182
90. Hadley J., and Lee R. Toward a physician payment policy: evidence from the economic stabilization program. Policy Sciences 10 (1978) 105-120
91. Harris J. The internal organization of hospitals: some economic implications. Bell Journal of Economics 8 (1977) 467-482
92. Havighurst C.C. Professional restraints on innovation in health care financing. Duke Law Journal 2 (1978) 303-387
93. Hay J., and Leahy M.J. Physician-induced demand. Journal of Health Economics 2 (1982) 231-244
94. Hellinger F.J. The impact of financial incentives on physician behavior in managed care plans: a review of the evidence. Medical Care Research and Review 53 (1996) 294-314
95. Hemenway D., et al. Physician responses to financial incentives: evidence from a for-profit ambulatory care center. The New England Journal of Medicine 322 (1990) 1059-1063
96. Hickson G.B., et al. Physician reimbursement by salary or fee-for-service: effect on a physician's practice behavior in a randomized prospective study. Pediatrics 80 (1987) 744-750
97. Hiller M.D. Ethical decision making and the health administrator. In: Anderson, and Glesnes-Anderson (Eds). Health Care Ethics (1987), Aspen Publication, Amsterdam
98. (editorial). Hillman A. Health maintenance organizations, financial incentives and physician judgements. Annals of Internal Medicine 112 (1990) 891-893
99. Hillman A., et al. Frequency and costs of diagnostic imaging in office practice - a comparison of self-referring and radiologist-referring physicians. New England Journal of Medicine 323 (1990) 1604-1608
100. Hillman A., et al. Contractual arrangements between HMOs and primary care physicians: three-tiered HMOs and risk pools. Medical Care 30 (1992) 136-148
101. Hillman A., et al. Physicians' utilization and charges for outpatient diagnostic imaging in a Medicare population. Journal of the American Medical Association 268 (1992) 2050-2054
102. Hirsh H.L., and Dickey T.S. Defensive medicine as a basis for malpractice liability. Trans. Stud. Coll. Physicians Phila. 5 (1983) 98-107
103. Hoerger T.J., and Howard L.Z. Search behavior and choice of physician in the market for prenatal care. Medical Care 33 (1995) 332-349
104. Holahan J., and Scanlon W. Price Controls, Physician Fees, and Physician Incomes from Medicare Medicaid (1978), The Urban Institute, Rockville, MD
105. Hsiao W.C., et al. Estimating physicians' work for a resource-based relative-value scale. New England Journal of Medicine 319 13 (1988) 835-841
106. Hsiao W.C., et al. Results and policy implications of the resource-based relative-value scale. New England Journal of Medicine 319 13 (1988) 881-888
107. Hurdle S., and Pope G. Physician productivity: trends and determinants. Inquiry 26 (1989) 100-115
108. Hurley J., and Labelle R. Relative fees and the utilization of physicians' services in Canada. Health Economics 4 (1995) 419-438
109. Hurley J., Labelle R., and Rice T. The relationship between physician fees and the utilization of medical services in Ontario. Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research 11 (1990) 49-78
110. Jennison K., and Ellis R.P. Comparison of psychiatric service utilization in a single group practice. In: McGuire, and Scheffler (Eds). The Economics of Mental Health Services: Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research Vol. 8 (1987), JAI Press, Washington, DC
111. Keeler E., and Brodie M. Economic incentives and the choice between vaginal delivery and Cesarean section. Milbank Quarterly 71 (1993) 365-404
112. Kessel R. Price discrimination in medicine. Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1958) 20-53
113. Kessler D., and McClellan M. Do doctors practice defensive medicine?. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996) 353-390
114. Klevorick A.K., and McGuire T.G. Monopolistic competition and consumer information: pricing in the market for psychologists' services. Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research 8 (1987) 235-253
115. Kuhn T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd edn. (1970), Univ. of Chicago Press, Greenwich, CT
116. Laffont J.J., and Tirole J. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1993), MIT Press, Chicago
117. Lawthers A., et al. Physicians' perceptions of the risk of being sued. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 17 3 (1992) 463-482
118. Lee A.J., Gehlbach S., Hosmer D., Reti M., and Baker C. Medical treatment differences for blacks and whites. Medical Care 35 (1997) 1173-1189
119. Leffler K.B. Physician licensure: competition and monopoly in American licensure. Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978) 165-188
120. Levy J.M., et al. Impact of the medicare fees schedule on payment to physicians. Journal of the American Medical Association 264 (1990) 717-722
121. Light D.W. From Managed competition to managed cooperation: theory and lessons from the British experience. The Milbank Quarterly 75 (1997) 297-341
122. Localio A.R., et al. Relation between malpractice claims and adverse events due to negligence: results of the Harvard medical practice study III. New England Journal of Medicine 7 (1991) 370-376
123. Lu M. Separating the 'true effect' from 'gaming' in incentive-based contracts in health care. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8 (1999) 383-432
124. Lundback M. Quality and efficiency in health care production. CEFOS Report 10 (1998), Center for Public Sector Research, Goteborg University, Cambridge, MA
125. Lusted L. A study of the efficacy of diagnostic radiologic procedures: final report to the National Center for Health Services Research (1977), National Center for Health Services Research, Sweden
126. Ma C.A. Health care payment systems: cost and quality incentives. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 3 1 (1994) 93-112
127. Ma C.A. Option contracts and vertical foreclosure. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6 (1997) 725-753
128. Ma C.A., and McGuire T.G. Optimal health insurance and provider payment. American Economic Review 87 4 (1997) 685-704
129. unpublished. Ma C.A., and McGuire T.G. Network effects in managed health care (1998), Boston University, Rockville, MD
130. unpublished. Ma C.A., and Riordan M. Health insurance, moral hazard, and managed care (1998), Boston University
131. Manning W.G., et al. Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment. American Economic Review 77 (1987) 251-277
132. Marder W.D., et al. Physician supply and utilization by specialty: trends and projections (1988), American Medical Association
133. McCall T.B. Examining Your Doctor (1996), Citadel Press, Chicago
134. McCarthy T.R. The competitive nature of the primary-care physician services market. Journal of Health Economics 4 (1985) 93-117
135. McGuire T.G. Patient's trust and the quality of physicians. Economic Inquiry 21 (1983) 203-222
136. McGuire T.G., and Pauly M.V. Physician response to fee changes with multiple payers. Journal of Health Economics 385-410 (1991)
137. McKinlay J.B., Potter D.A., and Feldman H.A. Non-medical influences on medical decision-making. Social Science and Medicine 42 (1996) 769-776
138. McLean R.A. The structure of the market for physicians' services. Health Services Research 15 (1980) 271-280
139. Mechanic D. The role of sociology in health affairs. Health Affairs 9 (1990) 85-87
140. Mechanic D. The functions and limitations of trust in the provision of medical care. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 23 4 (1998) 661-686
141. Mechanic D., and Schlesinger M. The impact of managed care on patient's trust in medical care and their physicians. Journal of the American Medical Association 275 (1996) 1693-1697
142. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. Health Care Spending and the Medicare Program: a Data Book (1998), The Commissian, Seacaucus, NJ
143. Mitchell J.B., and Cromwell J. Physician behavior under the Medicare assignment option. Journal of Health Economics 2 (1982) 245-264
144. Mitchell J.M., and Sass T.R. Physician ownership of ancillary services: indirect demand inducement or quality assurance?. Journal of Health Economics 14 (1995) 263-289
145. Mooney G., and Ryan M. Agency in health care: getting beyond first principles. Journal of Health Economics 12 (1993) 125-135
146. Mort E.A., et al. Physician response to patient insurance status in ambulatory care clinical decisions-making. Medical Care 34 (1996) 783-797
147. Moy E., Bartman B., Clancy C., and Cornelius L. Changes in usual sources of medical care between 1987 and 1992. Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 9 (1998) 126-138
148. Newhouse J.P. Toward a theory of nonprofit institutions: an economic model of a hospital. American Economic Review 60 (1970) 64-74
149. Newhouse J.P. The Economics of Medical Care: A Policy Perspective (1978), Addison Wesley, Washington, DC
150. Newhouse J.P. Reimbursing health plans and health providers: efficiency in production versus selection. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1996) 1236-1263
151. Newhouse J.P., and the Health Insurance Experiment Group. Free For All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (1993), Harvard University Press, Reading, MA
152. Newhouse J.P., et al. Does the geographical distribution of physicians reflect market failure?. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982) 493-505
153. Newhouse J.P., and Sloan F. Physician pricing: monopolistic or competitive: reply. Southern Economic Journal 38 (1972) 577-580
154. Nguyen N.X., and Derrick F.W. Physician behavioral response to a Medicare price reduction. Health Services Research 32 (1997) 283-298
155. Noether M. The effect of government policy changes on the supply of physicians: expansion of a competitive fringe. Journal of Law and Economics 29 (1986) 231-262
156. Noether M. The growing supply of physicians: has the market become more competitive?. Journal of Labor Economics 4 (1986) 503-537
157. (Part II). Ohsfeldt R., Morrisey M., Nelson L., and Johnson V. The spread of state any-willing-provider laws. Health Services Research 33 (1998) 1537-1555
158. Oppenheim G.L., Berman J.J., and English E.C. Failed appointments: a review. The Journal of Family Practice 8 (1979) 789-796
159. Pauly M.V. The economics of moral hazard. American Economic Review 49 (1968) 531-537
160. Pauly M.V. Is medical care different?. In: Greenberg (Ed). Competition in the Health Care. Sector: Past, Present and Future (1978), Aspen Systems Corporation, Cambridge
161. Pauly M.V. Medical staff characteristics and hospital costs. Journal of Human Resources 13 (1978) 77-114
162. Pauly M.V. The ethics and economics of kickbacks and fee-splitting. Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1979) 344-352
163. Pauly M.V. Doctors and Their Workshops: Economic Models of Physician Behavior (1980), University of Chicago Press
164. Pauly M.V. Is medical care different? Old questions, new answers. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 13 (1988) 227-237
165. Pauly M.V. Fee schedules and utilization. In: Frech III H.E. (Ed). Regulating Doctors' Fees: Competition, Controls, and Benefits under Medicare (1991) 288-305
166. Chapter 10. Pauly M.V. Insurance reimbursement. In: Culyer A.J., and Newhouse J.P. (Eds). Handbook of Health Economics (2000), Elsevier, Chicago
167. Pauly M.V., and Redisch M. The not-for-profit hospital as a physicians' cooperative. American Economic Review 63 (1973) 87-99
168. Pauly M.V., and Satterthwaite M.A. The pricing of primary care physicians' services: a test of the role of consumer information. Bell Journal of Economics 12 (1981) 488-506
169. Pescosolido B.A. Beyond rational choice: the social dynamics of how people seek help. American Journal of Sociology 97 4 (1992) 1096-1138
170. Phelps C.E. Induced demand: can we ever know its extent?. Journal of Health Economics 5 (1986) 355-365
171. Phelps C.E. Health Economics. 2nd edn. (1997), Harper Collins, Amsterdam
172. Physician Payment Review Commission. Annual Report to Congress (1991), The Commission, New York
173. Physician Payment Review Commission. Practice expenses under the Medicare fee schedule: a resource-based approach. Technical Report 92-1 (1992), PPRC, Washington, DC
174. Pope G.C., and Burge R.T. Inefficiencies in physician practices. Advances in Health Economics and Health Services 13 (1992) 129-164
175. Pratt J. Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica 32 (1964) 122-136
176. Reinhardt U. A production function for physician services. Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (1972) 55-65
177. Reinhardt U. Physician Productivity and the Demand for Health Manpower (1975), Ballinger Publishing, Washington, DC
178. Reinhardt U. Comment on monopolistic elements in the market for physician services. In: Greenberg (Ed). Competition in the Health Care Sector (1978), Aspen Publications, Cambridge, MA 121-148
179. Reinhardt U.E. Economists in health care: saviors or elephants in a porcelain shop?. American Economic Review 79 (1989) 337-342
180. Reinhardt U. The economic and moral case for letting the market determine the health workforce. In: Osterweis M., McLaughlin C.J., Manasse Jr. H.R., and Hopper C.L. (Eds). The U.S. Health Workforce: Power Politics, and Policy (1996), Association of Academic Health Centers
181. Remler D.K., et al. What do managed care plans do to affect care? Result from a survey of physicians. Inquiry 34 (1997) 196-204
182. Rice T. The impact of changing Medicare reimbursement rates on physician-induced demand. Medical Care 21 (1983) 803-815
183. Rice T. The Economics of Health Reconsidered (1998), Health Administration Press, Washington, DC
184. Rice T., and LaBelle R.J. Do physicians induce demand for medical services?. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 14 (1989) 239-261
185. Rice T., and McCall N. Factors influencing physician assignment decisions under Medicare. Inquiry 20 (1983) 45-56
186. Rizzo J.A., and Blumenthal D. Is the target income hypothesis an economic heresy?. Medical Care Research and Review (1996) 243-293
187. Rizzo J., and Zeckhauser R. Advertising and entry: the case of physician services. Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990) 476-500
188. unpublished. Rizzo J., and Zeckhauser R. Income targets and physician behavior (1997)
189. Robinson J.C. Physician-hospital integration and the economic theory of the firm. Medical Care Research and Review 54 (1997) 3-24
190. Rochaix L. Information asymmetry and search in the market for physician services. Journal of Health Economics 8 (1989) 53-84
191. Rochaix L. Financial incentives for physicians: the Quebec experience. Health Economics 2 (1993) 163-176
192. Rodwin M.A. Medicine, Money, and Morals: Physicians' Conflicts of Interests (1993), Oxford University Press, Chicago, IL
193. Rogerson W. Choice of treatment intensity by a nonprofit hospital under prospective pricing. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 351 (1994) 7-51
194. unpublished. Rosenthal M. Treatment intensity under prospective payment for outpatient mental health care (1998), Harvard School of Public Health, New York
195. unpublished. Rosenthal M., Frank R., Epstein A., and Buchanan J. Doctors, dollars and delegation (1999), School of Public Health
196. Rossiter L.F., and Wilensky G.R. A clarification of theories and evidence on supplier-induced demand for physicians' services (1983) 611-627
197. Rossiter L.F., and Wilensky G.R. Identification of physician-induced demand. Journal of Human Resources 19 (1984) 231-244
198. Roth A. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining (1979), Springer, Harvard University
199. Santerre R., and Neun S. Health Economics: Theory, Insights and Industry Studies (1996), Irwin, Berlin
200. Satterthwaite M. Consumer information, equilibrium price and the number of sellers. Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1979) 483-502
201. Chapter 25. Scherer F.M. The pharmaceutical industry. In: Culyer A.J., and Newhouse J.P. (Eds). Handbook of Health Economics (2000), Elsevier, Chicago
202. Schroeder S. Physician supply and the US medical market place. Health Affairs 11 (1992) 235-243
203. Scott A., and Shiell A. Do fee descriptors influence treatment choices in general practice: a multi-level discrete choice model. Journal of Health Economics 16 (1997) 323-342
204. Scott A., and Shiell A. Analyzing the effect of competition on general practitioners' behavior using a multi level modeling framework. Health Economics 6 (1997) 577-588
205. unpublished. Shen Y. Selection incentives in a performance-based contracting system (1999), Boston University, Amsterdam
206. Simon H. Theories of decision-making in economics and behavioral science. American Economic Review 49 (1958) 253-283
207. Simon C., and Born P. Physician earnings in a changing managed care environment. Health Affairs 15 3 (1996) 124-133
208. Sloan F.A. Lifetime earnings and physician's choice of specialty. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 24 (1970) 47-56
209. Sloan F.A. Physician supply behavior in the short run. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 29 (1975) 549-569
210. Sloan F.A. Physician fee inflation: evidence from the late 1960's. In: Rosett R. (Ed). The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services Sector (1976), National Bureau of Economics Research 321-354
211. Sloan F.A., et al. Suing for Medical Malpractice (1993), University of Chicago Press
212. Smith C.M., and Yawn B.P. Factors associated with appointment keeping in a family practice residency clinic. The Journal of Family Practice 38 (1994) 25-29
213. Spence M. Monopoly, quality and regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 6 (1975) 417-429
214. Stano M. A further analysis of the physician inducement controversy. Journal of Health Economics 6 (1987) 229-238
215. Stano M. A clarification of theories and evidence on supplier-induced demand for physicians' services. Journal of Human Resources 22 (1987) 611-620
216. Starr P. The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982), Basic Books, Chicago
217. Stearns S., Wolfe B., and Kindig D. Physician responses to fee-for-service and capitation payment. Inquiry 29 (1992) 416-425
218. Steinwald B., and Sloan F. Determinants of physicians' fees. Journal of Business 47 (1974) 493-511
219. Tai-Seale M., et al. Volume responses to Medicare payment inductions with multiple payers: a test of the McGuire-Pauly model. Health Economics 7 (1998) 199-219
220. Van Doorslaer E., and Geurts J. Supplier-induced demand for physiotherapy in the Netherlands. Social Science and Medicine 24 (1987) 919-925
221. Varian H. Price discrimination. In: Schmalensee R., and Willig R. (Eds). Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989), North-Holland, NY 598-654
222. Wedig G., Mitchell J., and Cromwell J. Can optimal physician behavior be obtained using price controls?. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 14 (1989) 601-620
223. Weeks W.B., et al. A comparison of the educational costs and incomes of physicians and other professionals. New England Journal of Medicine 330 (1994) 1280-1286
224. Weinstein M., Fineberg H., Elsten H., Frazier H., Neuhauser D., Neutra R., and McNeil B. Clinical Decision Analysis (1980), W.B. Saunders, Amsterdam
225. Wennberg J.E. On patient need, equity, supplier-induced demand, and the need to assess the outcome of common medical practices. Medical Care 23 (1985) 512-520
226. Werman B.G., Sostrin S.V., Pavlova Z., and Lundberg G.D. Why do physicians order laboratory tests? A study of laboratory test request and use patterns. Journal of American Medical Association 243 (1980) 2080-2082
227. Williams A. Medicine, economics, ethics and the NHS: a clash of cultures?. Health Economics 7 (1998) 565-568
228. Wolinsky A. Competition in a market for informed expert services. Rand Journal of Economics 24 (1993) 380-398
229. Wong H.S. Market structure and the role of consumer information in the physician services industry: an empirical test. Journal of Health Economics 15 (1996) 139-160
230. Woodward R.S., Schnitzler M.A., and Kuols L.K. Reduced uncertainty as a diagnostic benefit. Health Economics 7 (1998) 149-160
231. Woodward R.S., and Warren-Bolton F. Considering the effect of financial incentives and professional ethics on 'appropriate' medical care. Journal of Health Economics 3 (1984) 223-237
232. Yip W. Physician responses to medical fee reductions: changes in the volume and intensity of supply of Coronary, Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgeries in the medicare and private sectors. Journal of Health Economics 17 (1998) 675-700
233. Zuckerman S., and Holahan J. Medicare balance billing: its role in physician payment. In: Frech III H.E. (Ed). Regulating Doctors' Fees: Competition, Controls, and Benefits under Medicare (1991) 143-169
234. Zweifel P., and Breyer F. Health Economics (1997), Oxford University Press, Philadelphia