Physician dual practice

Health Policy

Volumn 78, Issue 2-3, 2006, Pages 157-166

  Eggleston, Karen ^a   Bir, Anupa ^b  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RTI INTERNATIONAL   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracting; Dual jobs; Moonlighting; Public private

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMPARATIVE STUDY; COMPENSATION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DEVELOPED COUNTRY; DEVELOPING COUNTRY; EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH CENTER; HEALTH ECONOMICS; MEDICAL PRACTICE; MEDICAL RESEARCH; PHYSICIAN; PREDICTION; PRIVATE PRACTICE; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE; PUBLIC HOSPITAL; SOCIAL ASPECT; THEORETICAL MODEL; THEORY;

HUMANS; MODELS, ORGANIZATIONAL; PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE; PHYSICIANS; PRIVATE SECTOR; PUBLIC HEALTH;

EID: 33747337281     PISSN: 01688510     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2005.09.007     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Rickman N., and McGuire A. Regulating providers' reimbursement in a mixed market for health care. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 46 1 (1999) 53-71
2. Gonzalez P. Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach. Health Economics 13 (2004) 505-524
3. Chawla M. Public-private interactions in the health sector in developing countries: sharing of labor resources. Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1996.
4. Bir A, Eggleston K. Physician dual practice: access enhancement or demand inducement? Tufts University Department of Economics Working Paper 2003-11; May 2003 http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/200311.pdf.
5. Lang K. Does the human-capital/educational-sorting debate matter for development policy?. American Economic Review 84 1 (1994) 353-358
6. Holmstrom B., and Milgrom P. Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7 (1991) 24-52 [Special Issue]
7. Holmstrom B. The firm as a subeconomy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 1 (1999) 74-102
8. Lewis M. Who is paying for health care in eastern Europe and central Asia? (2000), World Bank, Washington DC
9. Kornai J., and Eggleston K. Welfare, choice and solidarity in transition: reforming the health sector in eastern Europe (2001), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
10. McKee M., Healy J., and Falkingham J. Health care in central Asia (2002), Open University Press: European Observatory on Health Care Systems
11. Szendea A.A., and Culyer A.J. The inequity of informal payments for health care: the case of Hungary. Health Policy 75 (2006) 262-271
12. Biglaiser G, Ma CA. Moonlighting: public service and private practice. Boston University Working Paper; 2003 http://econ.bu.edu/ma/moonlighting-dec2003.pdf.
13. Banerjee A. A theory of misgovernance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 4 (1997) 1289-1332
14. Barros P.P., and Olivella P. Waiting lists and patient selection. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 14 (2005) 623-646
15. Lakdawalla D, Philipson T. Nonprofit production and competition. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6377; 1998.
16. Pauly M.V. Health benefits at work (1997), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
17. Miller N. Pricing health benefits: a cost-minimization approach. Journal of Health Economics 24 5 (2005) 931-949
18. Gruen R., Anwar R., Begum T., Killingsworth J.R., and Normand C. Dual job holding practicioners in Bangladesh: an exploration. Social Science and Medicine 54 (2002) 267-279
19. Hicks V, Adams O. Pay and non-pay incentives, performance and motivation. Prepared for the Global Health Workforce Strategy Group, World Health Organization, Geneva, December 2001.
20. Paxson C.H., and Sicherman N. The dynamics of dual job holding and job mobility. Journal of Labor Economics 14 3 (1996) 357-393
21. Cutler D. Equality, efficiency and market fundamentals: the dynamics of international medical-care reform. Journal of Economic Literature XL (2002) 881-906
22. Mitchell J.M., and Sass T.R. Physician ownership of ancillary services: indirect demand inducement or quality assurance?. Journal of Health Economics 14 (1995) 263-289
23. McGuire T.G. Physician agency. In: Culyer A.J., and Newhouse J.P. (Eds). Handbook of health economics vol. 1A (2000), North-Holland, Amsterdam 461-536
24. Dranove D., and Sattherthwaite M. Monopolistic competition when price and quality are imperfectly observable. RAND Journal of Economics 23 4 (1992) 518-534
25. Dranove D., and Sattherthwaite M. The industrial organization of health care markets. In: Culyer A.J., and Newhouse J.P. (Eds). Handbook of health economics vol. 1B (2000), North-Holland, Amsterdam 1093-1139
26. Zuckerman S., Bazzoli G., Davidoff A., and LoSasso A. How did safety-net hospitals cope in the 1990s?. Health Affairs 20 4 (2001) 159-168
27. Acemoglu D, Antras P, Helpman E. Contracts and the division of labor. National Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper 11356; 2005.
28. Bloor K.E., Maynard A., and Freemantle N. Variation in activity rates of consultant surgeons, and the influence of reward structures in the English NHS: descriptive analysis and multi-level model. Journal of Health Services Research and Policy 9 2 (2004) 76-84