Was privateering plunder efficient?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 79, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 303-317

  Leeson, Peter T ^a   Nowrasteh, Alex ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Coase theorem; D23; D86; K00; K49; N40; Plunder; Privateer

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960898600     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.009     Document Type: Article

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