Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: A survey

Public Choice

Volumn 140, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 503-538

  Powell, Benjamin ^a   Stringham, Edward P ^b  

^a SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Anarchism; Internalization of externalities; Lawlessness; Order; Self governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350026266     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9407-1     Document Type: Article

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