The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth-century Amsterdam

Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 321-344

  Stringham, Edward ^a  

^a SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Enforcement; Extralegal; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037410312     PISSN: 10629769     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1062-9769(02)00153-9     Document Type: Article

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