An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 66, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 669-686

  Powell, Benjamin ^a   Wilson, Bart J ^b  

^a SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Experimental economics; Hobbesian jungle; Social contract

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649094478     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.011     Document Type: Article

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