Climate change, fragmentation, and the challenges of global environmental law: Elements of a post-Copenhagen assemblage

University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 457-550

  Boyd, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 79960253353     PISSN: 10867872     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (351)

1. Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards, Introduction: The Globalization of Climate Science and Climate Politics, in CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 3 (Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards eds., 2001).
2. See Gerald A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Projections, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 747, 820-22 (Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing projections regarding sea-level rise).
3. See Peter Lemke et al., Observations: Changes in Snow, Ice and Frozen Ground, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 337, 361-69 (reviewing evidence regarding ice sheet mass loss in Greenland and Antarctica);
4. See Ulisses Confalonieri et al., Human Health, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 391, 407-12. (Parry et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing "projections of climatechange- related health impacts").
5. See Andreas Fischlin et al., Ecosystems, Their Properties, Goods and Services, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 211, 239-45 (discussing projections regarding biodiversity impacts of climate change).
6. See Tom Wilbanks et al., Industry, Settlement and Society, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 357, 364-77 (reviewing wide range of projected social and environmental impacts of climate change).
7. 2 will remain in the atmosphere for many thousands of years."). Susan Solomon and her co-authors elaborate on the "irreversible" effects of carbon dioxide emissions: It is not generally appreciated that the atmospheric temperature increases caused by rising carbon dioxide concentrations are not expected to decrease significantly even if carbon emissions were to completely cease. Future carbon dioxide emissions in the 21st century will hence lead to adverse climate changes on both short and long time scales that would be essentially irreversible []where irreversible is defined here as a time scale exceeding the end of the millennium in the year 3000 . . . .
8. Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) (internal references omitted);
9. see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 6 (2010) ("[C]ertain levels of warming associated with carbon dioxide emission could lock the Earth and many future generations of humans into very large impacts . . . .").
10. See John P. Holdren, The Energy Innovation Imperative: Addressing Oil Dependence, Climate Change, and Other 21st Century Energy Challenges, 1 INNOVATIONS TECH. GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 3, 6 (2006) ("The replacement cost of today's global energy-supply system . . . is in the range of $12 trillion, and this immense capital investment turns over with a characteristic time of 30-40 years, the average operating lifetime of the facilities involved.").
11. See Gert Jan Nabuurs et al., Forestry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 541, 546-47 (Metz et al. eds., 2007) (discussing forest sector emissions and removals)
12. Pete Smith et al., Agriculture, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra at 497, 503-05 (discussing regional and global trends in emissions from agricultural practices).
13. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 49 (2010) (noting that "the costs of mitigation policies are borne immediately, and the possibly large benefits of such policies (avoided damages) are enjoyed far in the future").
14. See Kenneth L. Denman et al., Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 499, 526-33 (discussing terrestrial and ocean carbon cycle processes and feedbacks to climate).
15. See W. Neil Adger et al., Assessment of Adaptation Practices, Options, Constraints and Capacity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 717, 733-37 (discussing "limits and barriers to adaptation");
16. Kirstin Dow et al., Exploring the Social Justice Implications of Adaptation and Vulnerability, in FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 79, 79-96 (W. Neil Adger et al. eds., 2006) (outlining asymmetries in worldwide adaptive capacities).
17. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009) (discussing the "super-wicked" nature of the climate change problem).
18. See BRITISH PETROLEUM, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 41 (2010) (reporting world energy consumption by fuel, with fossil fuels accounting for approximately 88% of total world energy consumption).
19. See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
20. REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 14, at 25, 29 (identifying sectoral contributions to GHG emissions with forestry (17.4%) and agriculture (13.5%) accounting for more than 30% of the total).
21. See generally THE ROYAL SOC'Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE, AND UNCERTAINTY (2009) (discussing geoengineering techniques and related governance issues);
22. David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort Against Global Warming?, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 64, 64-72 (2009) (evaluating geoengineering proposals).
23. See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009) (discussing the challenge of uncertainty regarding the effects of climate change for natural resource governance);
24. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (exploring interplay between state and federal responses to climate change)
25. Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity is Dead"- Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34
26. HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 9 (2010) (proposing a "principled flexibility" approach to climate change in order to adapt to changing environmental conditions);
27. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 (2008) (discussing the relationship between federal and state responses to climate change);
28. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo L.J. 1565 (2008) (positing that the United States' role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions should be independent from notions of corrective or distributive justice)
29. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010) (contextualizing approaches to climate change within a discussion of American environmental and political history);
30. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 65 (2010) (investigating challenges facing administrative agencies charged with responding to complex environmental problems such as climate change)
31. Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293 (2010) (evaluating alternative proposals to assign responsibility for reducing greenhouse gases and advocating on behalf of a per-capita approach);
32. Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010) (arguing that local governments have an important role to play in responding to climate change);
33. Jonathan B. Weiner, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210 (2008) (discussing political logjam facing climate legislation in the U.S.).
34. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on its 15th Sess., Dec. 7-19, 2009
35. Copenhagen Accord, Decision 2/CP.15, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord];
36. William D. Nordhaus, Economic Aspects of Global Warming in a Post-Copenhagen Environment, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 11721 (2010) (concluding that the actions contemplated by the Copenhagen Accord, even if carried out in full, would not be sufficient to meet prudent stabilization targets). The recently completed CancÚ;;n Agreement, which narrowly averted a complete breakdown of the U.N. climate process, represents a very modest step to enshrine and elaborate on some of the pledges embodied in the Copenhagen Accord and keeps the process alive for at least another year.
37. See UNFCCC, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, CancÚ;n Draft Decision -/CP.16, Advanced Unedited Version (Dec. 11, 2010) [hereinafter CancÚ;n Agreement].
38. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us/politics/23cong.html ("The effort to advance a major climate change bill through the Senate this summer collapsed . . . .")
39. Australia Shelves Key Emissions Trading Scheme, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8645767.stm ("The Australian government has put plans for a flagship emissions scheme on hold until 2013 at the earliest.").
40. See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 7-8 (2009) (discussing difficulties of solving global collective action problems such as climate change in the absence of world government, and criticizing "global legalism" as a naïve faith in the ability of "law without government" to solve such problems).
41. See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 95-96 (2004) (reviewing the performance of major international environmental agreements).
42. See Clark A. Miller, Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and Global Governance, 20 GOVERNANCE 325, 339 (2007) (describing globalism as "the explicit framing of policy issues as being capable of identification, analysis, and management on scales no smaller than the planet as a whole");
43. see also Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 3-4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009) (arguing against waiting for a single global solution to the climate change problem).
44. See generally DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010) (critiquing the role of technocratic knowledge practices such as risk-assessment and cost-benefit analysis as dominant ways of thinking in contemporary environmental law).
45. The Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the most obvious example. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]
46. Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism: Defining the Field, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225, 238 (2009).
47. see David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 641 (2007)
48. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 227 (2006).
49. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, A Multitrack Climate Treaty System, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 237
50. (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) (proposing a new "architecture" for climate policy that begins with the objective of sustainable development);
51. David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 150-51 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) ("Conceptualizing the climate change issue as one of economic cooperation might help to mobilize attention to better precedents.");
52. Jon Barnett, Security and Climate Change, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2003) (exploring climate change as a security issue).
53. See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 108-35 (2010) (describing key actors and their interests and roles in international environmental law)
54. PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2nd ed., 2003) (discussing key principles and norms of various substantive areas of international environmental law);
55. Jeffrey L. Dunhoff, Levels of Environmental Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 86 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (discussing "allocation of authority over environmental issues among different levels of governance");
56. Richard B. Stewart, Instrument Choice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 148 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (examining various environmental regulatory instruments and their role in international environmental law).
57. Stephen J. Collier & Aihwa Ong, Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems, in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 11 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005).
58. See Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 44-49 (2006) (" Vernacularization falls along a continuum depending on how extensively local cultural forms and practices are incorporated into imported institutions.") .
59. Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as a Mobile Technology, 32 TRANS. INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 3, 5 (2007). Elaborating further on the concept, Collier & Ong note that
60. See generally Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009) (discussing concept of global environmental law); see also infra Section 2.
61. See infra Section 3; William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 872-77 (2010) (providing background on REDD).
62. 2 emissions). Earlier estimates for the 1990s put emissions from deforestation at some 20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
63. See Raymond E. Gullison et al., Tropical Forests and Climate Policy, 316 SCI. 985, 985 (2007) (noting that "[t]ropical deforestation released ~1.5 billion metric tons of carbon to the atmosphere annually throughout the 1990s, accounting for almost 20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions")
64. 2 emissions decreased from 20% in 1990-2000 to 12% in 2008, owing to increasing fossil fuel emissions and below-average deforestation emissions in 2008.")
65. 2/yr.
66. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007: CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS 199 (2007) (comparing the emissions of China and India with other regions of the world).
67. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. on its 7th Sess. Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Decision 11/CP.7: Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 60 (Jan. 21, 2002) (excluding avoided deforestation activities from the Clean Development Mechanism);
68. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 310 (1998) ("Formal order, to be more explicit, is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognize, without which it could not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain.").
69. see also TANIA MURRAY LI, THE WILL TO IMPROVE: GOVERNMENTALITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE PRACTICE OF POLITICS 4-6 (2007) (describing experiences with various "improvement schemes" in Indonesia and analyzing such schemes as a distinct governmental rationality)
70. See generally PAUL N. EDWARDS, A VAST MACHINE: COMPUTER MODELS, CLIMATE DATA, AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2010) (tracing the history of how the global climate system became a coherent object of knowledge).
71. See William C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: An Historical Overview, in THE SOCIAL LEARNING GROUP, LEARNING TO MANAGE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 22-27 (2001) (discussing the historical development of Earth systems science and understandings of human impacts on the global environment).
72. See GEORGE P. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE, at iii (David Lowenthal ed., 1965) (1864) ("The object of the present volume is: to indicate the character and, approximately, the extent of the changes produced by human action in the physical conditions of the globe we inhabit . . . .");
73. see also CLARENCE GLACKEN, TRACES ON THE RHODIAN SHORE 704 (1967) (concluding that recognition of the "philosophic importance" of "man as a modifier of nature" did not happen until later in the nineteenth century);
74. Mike Hulme et al., Unstable Climates: Exploring the Statistical and Social Constructions of 'Normal' Climate, 40 GEOFORUM 197, 198 (2009) (discussing the role of standardized instruments, formal statistical rules, and particular knowledge practices of meteorologists and climatologists in the nineteenth century that "turned the idea of climate into something that could be measured and quantified").
75. See Paul N. Edwards, The World in a Machine: Origins and Impacts of Early Computerized Global Systems Models, in SYSTEMS, EXPERTS AND COMPUTERS: THE SYSTEMS APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD WAR II AND AFTER 221 (Agatha C. Hughes & Thomas P. Hughes eds., 2000) (noting that "grounded empirical knowledge of geophysical features and processes remained in a rudimentary state until the Second World War").
76. See generally W. I. VERNADSKY, THE BIOSPHERE (1926) (articulating the modern concept of the biosphere);
77. W. I. Vernadsky, The Biosphere and the Noösphere, 33 AMER. SCIENTIST 1, 9 (1945) (identifying "man" as a "large-scale geological force").
78. see Ronald E. Doel, Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military's Influence on the Environmental Sciences in the USA After 1945, 33 SOC. STUD. SCI. 635 (2003).
79. David M. Hart & David G. Victor, Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for Climate Change Research, 1957-74, 23 SOC. STUD. SCI. 643 (1993) (discussing emergence of climate research in the United States during the Cold War period).
80. See generally Peter J. Taylor, Technocratic Optimism, H.T. Odum, and the Partial Transformation of Ecological Metaphor after World War II, 21 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 213 (1988) (tracing the rise of systems thinking in ecology in the post WWII period).
81. Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes, Introduction to SYSTEMS, EXPERTS, AND COMPUTERS: THE SYSTEMS APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD WAR II AND AFTER 1 (Thomas P. Hughes & Agatha C. Hughes eds., 2000).
82. See Robert W. Kates, B.L. Turner II & William C. Clark, The Great Transformation, in THE EARTH AS TRANSFORMED BY HUMAN ACTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CHANGES IN THE BIOSPHERE OVER THE PAST 300 YEARS 1 (Turner et al. eds., 1990) ("Whereas humankind once acted primarily upon the visible 'faces' or 'states' of the earth such as forest cover, we are now also altering the fundamental flows of chemicals and energy that sustain life on the only inhabited planet we know.").
83. 2 During the Past Decades, 9 TELLUS 18, 19 (1957).
84. Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for Science, 279 SCI. 491, 492 (1998).
85. 2 in the air on a global scale.").
86. See MAN'S ROLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH (William L. Thomas et al eds., 1956) (presenting results of the multi-disciplinary Princeton symposium on past and present human impacts on the Earth).
87. Lewis Mumford, Prospect, in MAN'S ROLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH, supra note 57, at 1151.
88. See William C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Climate Change: An Historical Overview, in 1 LEARNING TO MANAGE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 22-23 (Social Learning Group eds., 2001) (describing the 1957-58 IGY as "one of the first coordinated, multinational efforts to study the earth as a dynamic system," resulting in "a revolution in our understanding of the earth as a dynamic, integrated system");
89. Robert G. Fleagle, From the International Geophysical Year to Global Change, 30 REV. OF GEOPHYSICS 305, 305-06 (1992) (tracing the history of global change research and noting the importance of the IGY of 1957 to 1958 as one of the first coordinated efforts to study the Earth as a dynamic system);
90. Sheila Jasanoff, Heaven and Earth: The Politics of Environmental Images, in EARTHLY POLITICS: LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 44-45 (Sheila Jasanoff & Marybeth Martello eds., 2004) (noting the importance of the 1957-58
91. see Peter J. Galison, Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone, in THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE: BOUNDARIES, CONTEXT, AND POWER 118 (Peter Galison & David J. Stump eds., 1996);
92. see also Eric Winsberg, Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation, 12 SCI. IN CONTEXT 275, 276 (1999) (describing simulation as "a form of calculation," but with its own unique epistemology).
93. See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, Why Believe a Computer? Models, Measures, and Meaning in the Natural World, in THE EARTH AROUND US: MAINTAINING A LIVABLE PLANET 70 (Jill S. Schneiderman ed., 2000) (discussing how modeling practices in the sciences create new objects of knowledge). In his recent book on climate change science
94. HAROLD A. MOONEY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF ECOLOGICAL THOUGHT 49 (1998) (characterizing remote sensing as "[o]ne of the foremost technological advances in recent decades" in terms of the "amount and quality of information on Earth System processes, at frequent intervals, and at many scales of resolution");
95. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 156-57 (2004) (discussing the role of remote sensing in environmental monitoring);
96. Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 219, 219-20 (2002) ("Satellite remote sensing and digital systems, including geographic information systems (GIS), provide powerful tools for visualizing and solving complex legal and environmental problems.").
97. See EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 38-39 (noting the "rudimentary view" of stratospheric ozone distribution provided by groundbased instruments in the "pre-satellite era" compared to the "revolutionized" understanding of atmospheric dynamics, and stratospheric ozone in particular, made possible by satellite instruments);
98. STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN & K. MADHAVA SARMA, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE UNITED NATIONS HISTORY 5-19 (2002) (discussing advances in Earth systems science and satellite observations that allowed the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer to be approached as a global environmental problem);
99. SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, BETWEEN EARTH AND SKY: HOW CFCS CHANGED OUR WORLD AND ENDANGERED THE OZONE LAYER 262-76 (1993) (discussing history and importance of satellite-based observations for understanding stratospheric ozone depletion).
100. See, e.g., EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 84 ("The advent of satellite data has revolutionized our ability to characterize global land cover and monitor land-use patterns. Satellite sensors offer a synoptic view of Earth, as well as the objectivity associated with a consistent measurement and methodology for mapping the entire planet.")
101. DeFries, Terrestrial Vegetation in the Coupled Human-Earth System: Contributions of Remote Sensing, 33 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOURCES 369, 383 (2008) ("The synoptic view from remote sensing has transformed the perceived role of terrestrial vegetation in the [Earth] system.").
102. See, e.g., WILL STEFFEN ET AL., GLOBAL CHANGE AND THE EARTH SYSTEM: A PLANET UNDER PRESSURE 271 (2004) ("Observation of the Earth from space has revolutionised human perspectives and understanding of the planet . . . .")
103. James J. McCarthy, Reflections on: Our Planet and Its Life, Origins, and Futures, 326 SCI. 1646, 1650 (2009).
104. See Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1698 (2008) (providing a general overview of climate models and noting the importance of understanding the uncertainties and limits associated with climate models); Hervé;
105. Le Treut et al., Historical Overview of Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 112-18 (providing an overview of the development of climate modeling and the increased complexity and resolution made possible by advances in computational capacity);
106. see also Leo J. Donner & William G. Large, Climate Modeling, 33 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOURCES 1 (2008) (reviewing current state of climate modeling).
107. See, e.g., Gregory P. Asner et al., High-Resolution Forest Carbon Stocks and Emissions in the Amazon, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16738, 16738 (2010) (reporting on use of high-resolution mapping of carbon stocks and emissions in the Amazon region);
108. Gregory P. Asner, Tropical Forest Carbon Assessment: Integrating Satellite and Airborne Mapping Approaches, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2-8 (2009) (discussing opportunities to combine satellite-based remote sensing with new airborne techniques for measuring carbon densities to develop high-resolution carbon maps);
109. See, e.g., Ken Sexton et al., Human Biomonitoring of Environmental Chemicals, 92 AM. SCI. 38, 40 (2004) ("Specialists can now detect extremely low levels-partsper- billion, parts-per-trillion, even parts-per-quadrillion-of multiple markers using a relatively small sample, say, 10 milliliters or less.").
110. See William C. Clark et al., Evaluating the Influence of Global Environmental Assessments, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS: INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE 1, 2-6 (Ronald B. Mitchell et al. eds., 2006) (discussing growth and influence of large-scale "global environmental assessments" over the last several decades as important components of international environmental governance).
111. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007).
112. UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1, THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT REPORT SERIES (2005);
113. UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SCENARIOS, VOLUME 2, THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM REPORT SERIES (2005);
114. UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: POLICY RESPONSES, VOLUME 3, THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM REPORT SERIES (2005).
115. FRANK BIERMANN ET AL., EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE: PEOPLE, PLACES AND THE PLANET: SCIENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OF THE EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE PROJECT 4 (2009). Though its lineage is much older, the concept has gained currency in the contemporary period through the work of the multi-disciplinary human dimensions of global change research community.
116. See, e.g., Frank Biermann et al., Navigating the Anthropocene: The Earth System Governance Strategy Paper, 2 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 202, 203 (2010) (describing new Earth System Governance Project of the International Human Dimensions Program on Global Environmental Change).
117. See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959) (chronicling the dominant role of experts and the quest for rationalization and efficiency during the progressive conservation era).
118. See David John Frank, Science, Nature, and the Globalization of the Environment, 1870-1990, 76 SOC. FORCES 409, 411 (1997) (asserting that a substantial increase in international environmental treaties "was catalyzed in part by a conceptual reconstitution of the entity 'nature'. . . [as] a natural system with planet-wide interdependencies").
119. According to William Clark, [i]t is as a global species that we are transforming the planet. It is only as a global species-pooling our knowledge, coordinating our actions and sharing what the planet has to offer-that we may have any prospect for managing the planet's transformation along pathways of sustainable development. Self-conscious, intelligent management of the earth is one of the great challenges facing humanity as it approaches the 21st century. William C. Clark, Managing Planet Earth, 261 SCI. AM., Sept. 1989, at 47;
120. William C. Clark, Managing Planet Earth, 261 SCI. AM., Sept. 1989, at 47; see also Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth's Ecosystems, 277 SCI. 494, 499 (1997) ("[H]umanity's dominance of Earth means that we cannot escape responsibility for managing the planet. . . . Maintaining populations, species, and ecosystems in the face of those changes, and maintaining the flow of goods and services they provide humanity, will require active management for the foreseeable future.").
121. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
122. See EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 38-39 (discussing role of satellite-based observations in revolutionizing understanding of stratospheric ozone dynamics).
123. See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 108-17, 163-217 (1998) (discussing new urgency associated with advances in the assessment of ozone depletion, with specific attention to the Antarctic ozone "hole," and chronicling the response by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to strengthen the instrument and accelerate the phase-out of ozone depleting substances);
124. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 12, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]
125. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31.
126. UNFCCC, supra note 94, art. 2.
127. See UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan] (establishing an action plan to develop a new legal instrument that would incorporate "[a] shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a longterm global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and taking into account social and economic conditions and other relevant factors");
128. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24 (endorsing the need for continued international action to combat climate change);
129. See UNFCCC, supra note 94, pmbl., para. 6, arts. 3.1, 4.1 (acknowledging that participation in the response to climate change should be on the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities);
130. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, art. 10 (reaffirming principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" for determining commitments under the Protocol).
131. See UNFCCC, supra note 94, pmbl., paras. 8-9 (reaffirming principle of state sovereignty).
132. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, arts. 3, 10 (establishing new commitments for Annex I Parties while nothing that the Protocol does not introduce any new commitments for non-Annex I parties).
133. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31 art 2.1, (discussing objective of promoting sustainable development).
134. See UNFCCC, supra note 94, art. 3.3 ("The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.").
135. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 27 (1987). The Brundtland Report echoed, in many ways, earlier work on global environmental disruption. In short, the two worlds of man-the biosphere of his inheritance, the technosphere of his creation-are out of balance, indeed potentially in deep conflict. And man is in the middle. This is the hinge of history at which we stand, the door of the future opening on to a crisis more sudden, more global, more inescapable, and more bewildering than any ever encountered by the human species and one which will take decisive shape within the life span of children who are already born.
136. BARBARA WARD & RENÉ; DUBOS, ONLY ONE EARTH: THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF A SMALL PLANET 12 (1972) 106 The Stockholm Declaration from the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment made the point explicit: "A growing class of environmental problems, because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the common international realm, will require extensive co-operation among nations and action by international organizations in the common interest." United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972
137. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, ch. 1, para. 7, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
138. See WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., supra note 105, at 49-65 (discussing strategic imperatives of the effort to operationalize sustainable development);
139. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (promoting sustainable development and related principles as overarching objectives of international environmental law).
140. Martti Koskenneimi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007). There is a rich social science literature exploring how questions of development and state projects of "improvement" are built upon similar processes of rendering questions of politics and political economy as technical issues reserved for experts.
141. See, e.g., JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT," DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREACRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO 256 (1994) (showing how the international "development apparatus" operates as "the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today")
142. TIMOTHY MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY 15 (2002) (discussing the pervasive role of technical expertise in articulating programs of national development and economic growth during the twentieth century);
143. NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 205 (1999) ("When . . . numbers are used as 'automatic pilots' in decision making they transform the thing being measured-segregation, hunger, poverty-into its statistical indicator and displace political disputes into technical disputes about methods.")
144. See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 102 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (deploying the notion of "governmentality" to capture an approach to government that first emerged in the 18th century, "which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security");
145. see also Eva Lövbrand et al., Earth System Governmentality: Reflections on Science in the Anthropocene, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2009) (analyzing Earth systems governance as an example of governmentality)
146. Nikolas Rose et al., Governmentality, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 83 (2006) (surveying the development of Foucault's ideas on governmentality and recent work in a variety of fields making use of the concept).
147. Cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005) (discussing utopian impulses embedded within the structure of certain strands of international legal argument);
148. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2002) (tracing the liberal, "civilizing" impulse of modern international law from its formative late 19th century roots through its mid-twentieth century decline).
149. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 6-12 (1998) (discussing the centrality of "bare life" to sovereign power and modern trend toward permanent state of exception). The general point was made in compelling fashion by a Brazilian participant at one of the public hearings held by the Brundtland Commission in its preparations for OUR COMMON FUTURE: You talk very little about life, you talk too much about survival. It is very important to remember that when the possibilities for life are over, the possibilities for survival start. And there are peoples here in Brazil, especially in the Amazon region, who still live, and these peoples that still live don't want to reach down to the level of survival.
150. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., supra note 105, at 40. Shelia Jasanoff sees in the observation of this nameless Brazilian an eloquent critique of modern biopolitics . . . . Policy-makers concerned with survival, this speaker from Brazil seems to say, will not be bothered by the fates of living individuals in real communities. This is why, from the standpoint of those 'who still live,' it is a sort of demotion, a 'reaching down,' to become a cipher in a calculus concerned only with the nameless, faceless challenge of planetary survival.
151. Shelia Jasanoff, A New Climate for Society, 27 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y 233, 239 (2010).
152. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
153. Garrett Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, 24 BIOSCIENCE 561, 568 (1974). Elinor Ostrom, among others, has criticized Hardin's presumption that centralized authority is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons, and her research has demonstrated in multiple cases the adaptive governance strategies of common property regimes.
154. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 9 (1990) ("The presumption that an external Leviathan is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons leads to recommendations that central governments control most natural resource systems.");
155. See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1971) (discussing the dangers of uncontrolled population growth).
156. See JAMES LOVELOCK, THE VANISHING FACE OF GAIA: A FINAL WARNING 61 (2009) (asserting that "orderly survival . . . may require, as in war, the suspension of democratic government for the duration of the survival emergency").
157. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 106 (1980) ("For the majority of capitalist nations, however, I do not see how one can avoid the conclusion that the required transformation will be likely to exceed the capabilities of representative democracy.");
158. WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYAN JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED: THE UNRAVELING OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 215 (1992) ("[T]he steady-state society will not only be ostensibly more authoritarian and less democratic than the industrial societies of today . . ., but it may also be more oligarchic as well . . . .");
159. see also ANNA BRAMWELL, ECOLOGY IN THE 20TH CENTURY: A HISTORY (1989) (discussing the complex politics of ecological movements in the 20th century).
160. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2004).
161. See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 61-84 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the evolution from common law to federal environmental laws in the context of air and water pollution).
162. see also Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"? Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (2009) (discussing issues of scale in climate governance).
163. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14
164. YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) ("The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the size of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution.").
165. see also Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH L. REV. 570, 593, 626-27 (1996) ("The presence of a transboundary harm demands some form of overarching governmental action across the scope of the harm.").
166. Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) ("When one examines existing environmental regimes more closely, however, a paradox emerges. Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for this trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists.").
167. See, e.g., A WORLD ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATION: SOLUTION OR THREAT FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE? (Frank Biermann & Steffen Bauer eds., 2005) (presenting scholarly arguments for and against the creation of a world environment organization);
168. Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323 (2002) (arguing for the creation of a world environment organization). Solving global environmental problems, in this view, is often conceived as an enterprise that requires international institutions that can somehow replicate the basic lawmaking and enforcement capabilities that exist at the national level.
169. ee, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 726-58 (2008) (discussing the role of "translocalism" in climate governance);
170. Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008) (arguing in favor of a plural model of climate regulation that allows for multiple regulatory systems);
171. See, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE (1999) (providing an overview of various strains of globalization studies).
172. See, e.g., 3 FERNAND BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH CENTURY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD (Siân Reynolds trans., 1984) (emphasizing the importance of a long-term, global perspective on economic history);
173. E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL: 1848-1875, at 48-68 (1975) (discussing how "the tightening net of the international economy drew even the geographically very remote areas into direct and not merely literary relations with the rest of the world");
174. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1974) (linking the rise of capitalism in Europe to the exploitation of the global periphery);
175. see also DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMIC OF GLOBALIZATION 18 (2008) (arguing that "[i]t is a rather parochial conceit of contemporary commentators . . . that globalization is something unique to our time");
176. A. G. Hopkins, The History of Globalization-and the Globalization of History?, in GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY 12 (A.G. Hopkins ed., 2002) (situating contemporary understanding of globalization in historical context).
177. See, e.g., KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 39 (Verso ed., 1998) (1848) ("The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.");
178. KARL MARX, GRUNDRISSE: FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 408 (Martin Nicolaus trans., Random House, Inc. 1973) (1858) ("The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself.");
179. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 155
180. (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., trans., Galaxy Book 1958) (1946) ("The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world.'").
181. See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION THEORY: APPROACHES AND CONTROVERSIES (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2007) (presenting various contemporary approaches to globalization);
182. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY (1990) (identifying globalization as a constitutive feature of the modern world).
183. David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827, 848 (2008). The extensive literature on law and colonialism offers another perspective on the manner in which law has acted as handmaiden to particular processes of globalization.
184. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 889, 917-18 (1991) (discussing multiple ways in which European law contributed to colonialism and capitalist expansion).
185. See Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 973, 987 (2005) ("It is hard to analyze the vertical and horizontal concatenation of national, supranational, and global law because we still do not know the (incomplete, despite being quite developed) global legal 'grammar' . . . ."). But see
186. David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 654 (2007) (criticizing efforts to fashion a unified legal vocabulary as a response to the pluralism of the international legal order).
187. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 490 (2005) (arguing for an expansive approach to "law and globalization" that recognizes the varied and complex ways that legal norms are constructed and disseminated "in an era when the prerogatives of territorially delimited nation-states, while not completely unimportant, have become less salient than they once were");
188. Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447, 447-48 (2006) (contrasting the "ubiquity of law in the empirical reality of globalization" with the "equivocal status" of law in studies of globalization and outlining key elements for a theory of globalization and law);
189. Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1550, 1554 (2008) (book review) (highlighting the importance of moving beyond debates over the merits of globalization per se to a focus on the "terms and conditions of global law" and "how the distinctive features of global legal processes . . . structure and constrain a global politics");
190. Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993) (emphasizing the limited, partial, and uneven globalization of public and private law).
191. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1996) ("Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice of how public and private actors-nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental organizations, and private individuals-interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law.");
192. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 745, 753 (2006) (arguing that "[t]ransnational law represents a kind of hybrid between domestic and international law that can be downloaded, uploaded, or transplanted from one national system to another.").
193. See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 663, 694 (2005) (noting the importance of ensuring "respect for the rule of law, the principle of participation, and the duty to give reasoned decision" as the scale and scope of global regulation increase);
194. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006) (arguing for adoption of administrative law principles in context of global policymaking to enhance legitimacy and good governance);
195. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (defining "global administrative law as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring that they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make");
196. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2006) (observing that "much of global governance can be understood as regulation and administration, and that we are witnessing the emergence of a 'global administrative space': a space in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has largely broken down, in which administrative functions are performed in often complex interplays between officials and institutions on different levels, and in which regulation may be highly effective despite its predominantly non-binding forms").
197. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868 (2006) (describing "dialectical regulation" as a strong form of intersystemic regulatory engagement marked by jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence as compared, for example, to "dialogic" regulatory interaction marked by information sharing and voluntary interactions);
198. Paul Schiff Berman, Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 929, 930-32 (2006) (characterizing "dialectical regulation" as a possible model "for understanding the new plural order of multiple and interlocking governance structures" that goes "beyond the relatively rigid legal doctrines of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgment recognition"). Berman goes on to argue that Ahdieh's model of dialectical regulation needs to be broadened beyond governmental actors to include the "wide variety of non-state normative communities" that are "empowered" as "regulatory actors . . . in a world defined by the simultaneous erosion of and persistence of territoriality as a relevant framework for understanding legal authority."
199. See, e.g., Kanishkia Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 446-47 (1999) (discussing the fragmentation of state sovereignty and the emergence of regulatory networks as a form of "network governance");
200. ANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 31-32 (2004) (discussing the "disaggregation" of the unitary state into its functional, specialized units and the emergence of transgovernmental networks of regulators (and courts and legislators) as key features of global governance);
201. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 211, 218 (2006) ("Networks comport with deep-seated intuitions about how globalization really works . . . . Regulatory networks parallel and comport with the disaggregated but powerful way that globalization has actually happened.").
202. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 621-22 (2009) (defending a "constitutionalist" approach to the international legal order).
203. Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1223-25 (2008) (identifying coordination as "the central dynamic of institutional engagement across jurisdictional lines in a regime of intersystemic governance");
204. See ADIL NAJAM ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: A REFORM AGENDA 30 (2006) (discussing the proliferation of MEAs). More than 500 multilateral environmental agreements ("MEAs") are registered with the United Nations.
205. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Weiner, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 681-83 (1999) (developing a model to test "optimal" instrument choice for global environmental regulation under alternative legal frameworks).
206. But see David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 51-52 (2000) (arguing for a "transnational legal process" approach to global environmental instrument choice that attends to national legal and political context).
207. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005) (discussing modular environmental regulation as an alternative to traditional approaches). Global environmental law, in this view, is not simply a version of "comparative law" as Dan Bodansky suggests.
208. See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12-13 (2010) (characterizing global environmental law as "the subject of comparative rather than international environmental law").
209. See Frank Biermann & Klaus Dingwerth, Global Environmental Change and the Nation State, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1 (2004) (detailing how global environmental change challenges the traditional Westphalian system by undermining the idea of sovereignty)
210. Sverker C. Jagers & Johannes Stripple, Climate Governance Beyond the State, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 385 (2003) (arguing for an approach to climate governance that includes non-state actors);
211. Chukwumerije Okereke et al., Conceptualizing Climate Governance Beyond the International Regime, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 58 (2009) (advocating for an approach to climate governance that incorporates the increasing visibility and influence of non-state actors).
212. see, for example, Karen T. Litfin, The Greening of Sovereignty: An Introduction, in THE GREENING OF SOVEREIGNTY IN WORLD POLITICS (Karen T. Litfin ed., 1998). Litfin argues for an approach to sovereignty that moves beyond the "geological model" wherein sovereignty is seen as being "'eroded' by efforts to address transboundary environmental problems."
213. See also Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029 (2003) (developing the concept of relational sovereignty). As with static notions of sovereignty and the "geological model," the international regime concept, which is rooted in the normative assumption that independent, sovereign states can in principle develop cooperative approaches to global environmental problems, has also come under enormous pressure as scholars seek to understand and explain emerging forms of global environmental governance
214. See, e.g., Matthew Paterson, Interpreting Trends in Global Environmental Governance, 75 INT'L AFF. 793, 794-95 (1999) (reviewing scholarship that seeks to go beyond the international regimes literature to assess emerging forms of global environmental governance that "break down the traditional dominance of states in such matters, and presage alternative forms of global politics");
215. see also INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 4th prtg. 2001) (arguing that effective international environmental protection will require modifications to traditional notions of state sovereignty).
216. But see John Vogler, Taking Institutions Seriously: How Regime Analysis Can be Relevant to Multilevel Environmental Governance, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 25, 38 (2003) (arguing for a "re-invigoration of the regime approach to global governance through an application of a social constructivist approach to institutions").
217. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 72, 75 (2004) ("Post-sovereign governance exhibits three distinguishing characteristics: it is non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and postterritorial.") (emphasis in original). Karkkainen draws heavily on "new governance" theory and a series of empirical case studies of adaptive ecosystem management (primarily in the U.S. context) to suggest that these "new governance arrangements represent a nascent polycentric substitute for more familiar forms of sovereign authority"-a development that "stands in sharp contrast to the model of fixed, territorially delimited, exclusive jurisdictional boundaries upon which the Westphalian system of sovereign states, and public international law as conventionally understood, are founded."
218. See LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400-1900, at 279-90 (2010) (taking issue with traditional idea of territorial sovereignty through a close examination of the "production of variegated legal spaces" and "layered systems of sovereignty" associated with European empires);
219. Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT'L ORG. 251 (2001) (taking international relations theory to task for theorizing against a conception of the "Westphalian system" that is largely imaginary when viewed in historical context);
220. Benno Teschke, Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism, 8 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 5, 8 (2002) (arguing that the "decisive break towards modern international relations is not marked by the Westphalian Peace Treaties, but comes with the rise of the first modern state-post-revolutionary England").
221. See SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 4 (2007) ("Conceiving of globalization not simply in terms of interdependence and global institutions but also as inhabiting the national opens up a vast and largely unaddressed research agenda.").
222. Frederick Cooper, What is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian's Perspective, 100 AFR. AFF. 189, 189-90 (2001)
223. ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 3 (1982).
224. See Neil Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies, 28 THEORY AND SOC'Y 39, 47 (1999) (noting that the "bundling of territoriality to state sovereignty is [seen as] the critical characteristic of the modern interstate system"). For a critical examination of the foundations of the Westphalian conception of state territorial sovereignty
225. see John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 171 (1993) (identifying the "unbundling" of territory and national sovereignty as a key feature in the transformation of the modern, Westphalian international order and arguing that "[t]he terrain of unbundled territoriality . . . is the place wherein a rearticulation of international political space would be occurring today"). Ruggie goes on to decry the general lack of attention to territoriality by students of international politics.
226. See Jean Gottmann, The Evolution of the Concept of Territory, 14 SOC. SCI. INFO. 29, 30-32 (1976) (discussing the challenges of defining territorial rights in international law posed by outer space and the deep sea bed).
227. J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: STATE TERRITORY 14 (1970).
228. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 94-96 (2009) (describing increased extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic statutes starting in mid-twentieth century).
229. See John Agnew, The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory, 1 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 53 (1994) (referring to the naturalized, and untheorized approach to territory in international relations scholarship as the "territorial trap").
230. See David Delaney, Environmental Regulation: Introduction, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 218 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the limited intersection between environmental law and geography). For a notable exception
231. See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 866-67 (1999) (locating the historical emergence of territorial jurisdiction as the product of the science of cartography and the ideology of rational, humanist government).
232. Stuart Elden, Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the World, 30 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 8, 8 (2010).
233. See Michael Biggs, Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 374, 399 (1999) ("It is easy to say 'the state mapped its territory,' implying that a preexisting entity increased the quantity of its knowledge. It is much harder to say that, through the process of mapping, a new kind of territory and hence a new kind of state came into being.");
234. Stuart Elden, Governmentality, Calculation, Territory, 25 ENV'T & PLAN. D: SOC. & SPACE 562, 578 (2007) ("Territory is more than merely land, but a rendering of the emergent concept of 'space' as a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered, and controlled."). Charles Maier makes a strong argument for the importance of territoriality to political history: Territoriality has been so pervasive a principle for organizing societies that only as it has begun to dissolve have social scientists and historians come to fathom its role. Epochs of world history hinge not only on the rise and fall of great powers or the successive struggles among mobilized social groups but on the attributes of political space, whether weakened or strengthened or rescaled into larger or smaller commanding units.
235. Charles S. Maier, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era, 105 AM. HIST. REV. 807, 809 (2000).
236. See Stuart Elden, Land, Terrain, Territory, PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY ONLINEFIRST 12-14 (Apr. 21, 2010) (arguing for an understanding of territory as a "political technology").
237. See Saskia Sassen, De-Nationalization: Some Conceptual and Empirical Elements, 22 POLAR 1 (1999) ("One way of conceptualizing this insertion of the global in the national is as a partial and incipient 'de-nationalization' of what has been constructed as the national, or rather, particular elements of the national.");
238. Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1141, 1155 (2004) ("As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to globalization, they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. This is one instantiation of what I call a process of incipient de-nationalization.").
239. See Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 244 (2009) (reviewing basic strands of legal pluralism and its move "into the mainstream of legal discourse" as a response to the challenges of understanding law and legal order in the context of globalization).
240. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869, 872 (1988).
241. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 220 (1983).
242. See Martti Koskenniemi, Member, U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Keynote Speech at Harvard University: Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought (Mar. 5, 2005), available at http://www.helsinki.fi /eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d%5B1%5D.pdf ("The problem with legal pluralism . . . is the way it ceases to pose demands on the world.").
243. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1174 (2007).
244. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596 (2007) (discussing fragmentation as "the increased proliferation of international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries" that serves to undermine coherence and accountability in the international legal order). Benvenisti and Downs argue that despite a general lack of concern among legal scholars regarding the consequences of fragmentation, it poses "a more serious problem . . . because it operates to sabotage the evolution of a more democratic and egalitarian international regulatory system and to undermine the normative integrity of international law" by constraining the bargaining ability of weaker states, by providing powerful states with opportunities to seek more advantageous venues, and by obscuring the role of intentionality on the part of stronger states to "create a legal order that both closely reflects their interest and that only they have the capacity to alter."
245. see also Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 382 (2005) ("Most predominant states have been active forces behind the development of international law, and they have made extensive use of the international legal order to stabilize and improve their position.").
246. EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 382 (2005) ("Most predominant states have been active forces behind the development of international law, and they have made extensive use of the international legal order to stabilize and improve their position.").
247. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing the increasing fragmentation of international law into a series of specialized areas or regimes dominated by technical experts).
248. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Appendix A: Proposed Regulation Order §§ 95991-95994 (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION] (establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits and identifying REDD as a source of sector-based credits);
249. CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Part I Vol. I, Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons II-48, III-22 to III-29 (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAL. AIR RES. BD.
250. See About GCF, GOVERNOR'S CLIMATE AND FOREST TASKFORCE, http://www.gcftaskforce.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) [hereinafter GCF] (outlining the objectives and activities of the GCF).
251. See Beth Daley, $3.5b Pledge Buoys Climate Talks; Poorer Nations Hail Tentative Deal to Protect Forests, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2009, at 6, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2009/12/17/35b- pledge-buoys-climate-talks ("The United States and five other countries pledged $3.5 billion over the next three years to help developing countries protect trees . . . .").
252. See About the FCPF, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/12 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (describing the work of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility).
253. See, e.g., Arun Agrawal et al., Changing Governance of the World's Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1460, 1461 (2008) (discussing decentralization of forest governance over past several decades);
254. Tanya Hayes & Lauren Persha, Nesting Local Forestry Initiatives: Revisiting Community Forest Management in a REDD+ World, 12 FOREST POL'Y & ECON. 545, 545-46 (2010) (reviewing extensive research on forest governance decentralization and arguing for importance of decentralized forest governance structures for the success of REDD+ initiatives).
255. Elinor Ostrom, Scales, Polycentricity, and Incentives: Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity, in PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: CONVERGING STRATEGIES 149, 150 (Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jeffrey A. McNeely eds., 1998) (citations omitted).
256. See William Laurance et al., Improving the Performance of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil for Nature Conservation, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 377 (2010) (discussing efforts of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil to reduce deforestation impacts of palm oil production);
257. Lesley K. McAllister, Sustainable Consumption Governance in the Amazon, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873, 10878-80 (2008) (discussing "responsible sourcing" and certification schemes aimed at improving environmental performance of soy and beef industries in Brazil);
258. Daniel C. Nepstad et al., Globalization of the Amazon Soy and Beef Industries: Opportunities for Conservation, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1595, 1600-01 (2006) (discussing potential for environmental certification systems to reduce deforestation associated with soy and beef supply chains in Brazil).
259. These include pure carbon accounting standards such as the REDD methodologies being developed under the Voluntary Carbon Standard ("VCS") as well as project design standards focused on ensuring certain social and environmental co-benefits from REDD activities such as the Community, Climate and Biodiversity Alliance ("CCBA") standards. See VOLUNTARY CARBON STANDARD, http://www.v-c-s.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (providing background on program objectives of the Voluntary Carbon Standard);
260. THE CLIMATE, COMMUNITY & BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, http://www. climatestandards.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (providing an overview of The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance);
261. see also ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF THE FOREST CARBON MARKETS 2009 (2010) (reviewing status of voluntary forest carbon standards).
262. See ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, supra note 204 (reviewing the status of REDD projects around the world).
263. See, e.g., The World's Lungs: Forests, and How to Save Them, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2010, at 15, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17093495 (noting that without a serious effort to make REDD work "the risk from climate change will be vastly increased and the planet will lose one of its most valuable, and most beautiful, assets").
264. See MCKINSEY & COMPANY, PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY: VERSION 2 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST CURVE 116 (2009) (identifying avoided deforestation as large, low-cost abatement opportunity for GHG mitigation)
265. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 537 (2007) ("Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and has the potential to offer significant reductions fairly quickly.");
266. See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER & WILLIAM A. PIZER, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2006) (discussing concept of "where" and "when" flexibility in context of GHG mitigation efforts). The enthusiasm for REDD as a low-cost, near-term abatement option (a point that the consultants from McKinsey & Co. have been making for several years) needs to be tempered with some recognition of the difficulties involved in getting the laws and institutions in place to make this happen. One afternoon in an Indonesian village is all it would take to dispel the view that this will be quick, easy, or even cheap.
267. Brazil and Indonesia are among the top global emitters when emissions from deforestation are included. See LARRY PARKER & JOHN BLODGETT, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TOP 20 EMITTERS AND DEVELOPED VERSUS DEVELOPING NATIONS 6 (2008) ("Land-use practices in certain developing countries, notably Brazil and Indonesia, are having the effect of substantially upping their relative emissions ranks: The ranking of their cumulative net emissions from 1950 to 2000 rise from 18th to 5th, and 27th to 4th, respectively, when land use is taken into account."). For Brazil, emissions from deforestation have historically accounted for some two-thirds of total emissions. In Indonesia, the proportion is around 80%.
268. See Gustavo A. Silva Chávez, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Tropical Deforestation by Applying Compensated Reduction to Bolivia, in AMAZON INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 73 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005).
269. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL, REDD MYTHS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF PROPOSED MECHANISMS TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2008) (arguing that REDD could "[r]educe developing countries' sovereignty over their natural resources, by prioritising investment decisions that focus on maximizing profits and allowing foreign investors to buy up forest 'services,'" "[f]oster an 'armed protection' mentality that could lead to the displacement of millions of forest-dependent people, including by force," and "[f]acilitate corruption and poor governance in countries with tropical forests, because of the large sums of money proposed and the complex nature of the financial mechanisms likely to be involved");
270. ; TOM GRIFFITHS WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRANCESCO MARTONE, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME, SEEING REDD?: FORESTS, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1 (2009) (stressing that "many initial REDD concepts fail to acknowledge forest governance problems, do not propose forest tenure reform," and contain no clear commitments to address indigenous rights and equity issues).
271. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, ROOTS FOR GOOD FOREST GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNANCE REFORMS 33 (2009) ("In the specific context of REDD, for example, it is widely agreed that without good governance and promotion of legality in the forest sector, REDD schemes have little opportunity to be successful.")
272. Rhitu Chatterjee, The Road to REDD, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 557 (2009) (detailing difficulties associated with the implementation of a REDD project due to limitations in funding, science, monitoring, and complexities of institutions and indigenous rights);
273. Manish Bapna, Forests, Climate Change and the Challenge of REDD, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/03/forests- climate-change-and-challengeredd (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (discussing significant challenges to REDD posed by the problem of weak governance in many tropical forest countries).
274. David Melick, Credibility of REDD and Experiences from Papua New Guinea, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 359, 361 (2010). A recent study of some eighty forest commons in ten countries identified positive links between local autonomy over forest resources and increased carbon storage in forests.
275. See Ashwini Chhatre & Arun Agrawal, Trade-offs and Synergies Between Carbon Storage and Livelihood Benefits from Forest Commons, 106 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 17667, 17667 (2009) (discussing links between local autonomy over forest resources and enhanced carbon storage). Of course, the concept of "community" is itself contested, and efforts to translate REDD into local institutions must be tempered with a critical appreciation for the politics of particular communities in particular contexts.
276. Michael Watts, The Sinister Political Life of Community: Economies of Violence and Governable Spaces in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, in THE SEDUCTIONS OF COMMUNITY: EMANCIPATIONS, OPPRESSIONS, QUANDARIES 101, 101-42
277. see, e.g., Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 7-12 (2005) (discussing the history of efforts to develop international legal instrument on forests).
278. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2010: MAIN REPORT 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT] (reporting gross average annual deforestation of 13 million hectares per year during 2000-2010).
279. See, e.g., R.A. Houghton, Balancing the Global Carbon Budget, 35 ANN. REV. EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 313, 316 fig.1 (2007) (illustrating role of vegetation and land use change in global carbon cycle).
280. Seeing the Forest Through the Cloud, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Dec. 10, 2009, 7:06 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/seeing-forest-throughc loud.html. According to Google, the new technology, known as Google Earth Engine, will provide a low-cost, publicly available, and transparent tool for forest monitoring, reporting and verification to support emerging REDD policy mechanisms.
281. See Ruth DeFries et al., Earth Observations for Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, 10 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 385, 389 (2007) ("High resolution data with nearly complete global coverage are available at low or no cost for early 1990s and early 2000s . . . . These data serve a key role in establishing historical deforestation rates . . . .").
282. B. L. Turner II et al., The Emergence of Land Change Science for Global Environmental Change and Sustainability, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 20666, 20666-67 (2007)
283. see INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, (John Costenbader ed., 2009) [hereinafter IUCN]
284. DAVID TAKACS, CONSERVATION INT'L, FOREST CARBON: LAW & PROPERTY RIGHTS (2009)
285. Samantha Hepburn, Carbon Rights as New Property: The Benefits of Statutory Verification, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 239 (2009).
286. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION, supra note 197, §§ 95991-94 (Oct. 28, 2010) (establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits and identifying REDD as a source of sector-based credits)
287. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE 38 (Oct. 2008) (approved Dec. 2008) (identifying the possibility of accepting offsets in a California GHG compliance system from "those jurisdictions that demonstrate performance . . . in reducing emissions or enhancing sequestration through eligible forest carbon activities in accordance with appropriate national or subnational accounting frameworks").
288. See, e.g., ARILD ANGELSEN ET AL., MERIDIAN INST., REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD): AN OPTIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT 4-11 (2009) (discussing options for the mobilization and delivery of international finance for REDD). For an overview of the current state of climate funding, including funding for REDD
289. see Climate Funds Update, THE GREEN POLITICAL FOUND., http://www.climatefundsupdate.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2010).
290. Brazil Offered $1 Billion to Save Amazon Forest, MSNBC (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26744780/ (stating that Norway's billion dollar donation to Brazil is contingent on clear documentation that deforestation is being reduced);
291. Norway Pledges $1 billion for REDD as Indonesia Re-Affirms Commitment to Scheme, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (May 27, 2010) http://www .ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page-id=7569&se ction=news-articles&eod=1 (describing Norwegian commitment to Indonesia for activities to reduce emissions from deforestation) he current 2011 U.S. appropriation for REDD activities is expected to be on the order of $300 million, representing a part of the U.S. pledge of $1 billion for REDD activities during 2010-12.
292. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Apr. 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/140689.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (emphasizing the U.S.'s commitment to REDD+ financing as part of its Copenhagen Accord commitment). Other major donor countries such as Germany and Japan have collectively pledged some one billion dollars.
293. See WORLD RES. INST., SUMMARY OF CLIMATE FINANCE PLEDGES PUT FORWARD BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (2010) (summarizing climate pledges made by selected countries). Several multilateral entities are also providing significant financing for REDD activities. The World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility has an initial capitalization of $300 million, and the U.N. REDD program is currently funded at $48 million.
294. See World Bank Offers $300M for Forest Conservation, Emissions Reductions, MONGABAY.COM (Oct. 15, 2007), http://news.mongabay.com/2007/1015- world-bank.html (stipulating the World Bank's plan to "help developing countries build the technical, regulatory, and sustainable forestry capacity to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation") (internal quotations omitted);
295. UN REDD: More Countries, More Financing, CARBON POSITIVE (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx ?articleID=1941 (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (introducing the U.N. REDD program).
296. See Decreto No. 6.527, de 1 de agosto de 2008, DIá;RIO OFICIAL DA UNIãO [D.O.U.] de 4.8.2008 (Braz.) (establishing the Amazon Fund).
297. See generally FUNDO AMAZôNIA, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (describing the purpose, organization, and operation of the Amazon Fund).
298. See Fitrian Ardiansyah, Untangling the Web of REDD Governance, JAKARTA POST (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/03 /untangling-web-redd-governance.html (discussing proposed new institutional mechanisms for REDD within the Indonesian government in the wake of Norway's $1 billion commitment).
299. Krister Andersson, Understanding Decentralized Forest Governance: An Application of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 2 SUSTAINABILITY: SCI., PRAC., & POL'Y 25 (2006) (evaluating local institutional strategies associated with effective forest governance);
300. See Do Sistema Estadual De Incentivos A Serviços Ambientais - Sisa [State System of Incentives for Environmental Services], Lei No 2.308 (Oct. 22, 2010) (State of Acre, Brazil).
301. See INSTITUTO CENTRO DE VIDA, REFERENCE DOCUMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATO GROSSO STATE'S REDD PROGRAM (Dec. 2009) (describing REDD activities in Mato Grosso);
302. See Awang Faroek, Gubernur Provinsi Kalimantan Timur [Gov. East Kalimantan], Rencana Aksi Antisipasi Pemanasan Global Dan Mitigasi Perubahan Iklim Melalui Kaltim Hijau Tahun 2010-2014 [Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia] (May 2010), available at http://www .gcftaskforce.org/ documents/May-Aceh/Day-1-2/East%20Kalimantan%20Prese ntation%20(May%2018%202010) .pdf
303. (detailing East Kalimantan's REDD activities); West Kalimantan REDD Team, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia: Overview of REDD in West Kalimantan Province (May 2010), available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/ documents/May-Aceh/Day-1-2/West %20Kalimantan%20Presentation%20(May%2018%202010) .pdf (discussing REDD activities in West Kalimantan).
304. See Aceh, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, Aceh Province REDD Progress Update (May 2010), available at http://www .gcftaskforce.org/documents/May-Aceh/Day-1-2/Aceh%20Presentation%20(M ay%2018%202010).pdf (summarizing REDD activies in Aceh)
305. see also JANE DUNLOP, REDD, TENURE AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES: A STUDY FROM ACEH, INDONESIA 11-16 (2009) (describing REDD initiatives in Aceh).
306. See Noak Kapisa, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, REDD and a Low-Carbon Economy: Update from Papua Province, (May 2010), available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May -Aceh/Day-1-2/ Papua%20Presentation%20(May%2018%202010).pdf (describing REDD activities in Papua).
307. GOV'T OF ACEH, REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION IN THE ULU MASEN ECOSYSTEM, ACEH, INDONESIA (2007), available at http://www. climatestandards.org/projects/files/Final-Ulu-Masen-CCBA-project-design-note- Dec29.pdf (summarizing key features of Ulu Masen project).
308. See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL & THE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (REDD): A CASEBOOK OF ON-THE-GROUND EXPERIENCE 10, 27-29, 37-38 (2010) (discussing the Makira project in Madagascar).
309. See GREENOXX, MADRE DE DIOS AMAZON REDD PROJECT (2009), available at http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/files/madre-peru/Madre-de-Dios-Amazon- REDD-Project-REVISED.pdf (outlining the features of the Madre de Dios Amazon REDD project)
310. see also WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CTR., AN OVERVIEW OF READINESS FOR REDD: A COMPILATION OF READINESS ACTIVITIES PREPARED ON BEHALF OF THE FORUM ON READINESS FOR REDD (Tracy Johns et al. eds., 2009), available at www.cbd.int/forest/doc/ overview-readiness-redd.pdf (compiling information on various REDD activities and projects around the world).
311. See Bryan Walsh, In Copenhagen's Dark Mood, a Ray of Light for Forests, TIME, Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/ article /0,28804,1929071-1929070-1948263,00.html (stating that despite "the gloomy atmosphere in Copenhagen," REDD has been a sign of hope).
312. Tania Murray Li, Masyarakat Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia's Forest Zone, 35 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 645, 645 (2001) (citing the formal definition of masyarakat adat as "people who adhere to customary ways")
313. ROBERT POGUE HARRISON, FORESTS: THE SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION 69 (1992).
314. See Nancy Lee Peluso, Whose Woods are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia, 27 ANTIPODE 383, 383 (1995) ("Mapping of forest resources is therefore an intrinsically political act: whether drawn for their protection or production, they are drawings of a nation's strategic space.").
315. See, e.g., ROGER J.P. KAIN & ELIZABETH BAIGENT, THE CADASTRAL MAP IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE: A HISTORY OF PROPERTY MAPPING 132 (1992) ("Forest maps are thus an important category of early state maps. Initially concentration was on delineation of boundaries and codification of the rights of the monarch, the nobility, and the peasantry to ownership or use of the forest.").
316. See NANCY LEE PELUSO, RICH FORESTS, POOR PEOPLE: RESOURCE CONTROL AND RESISTANCE IN JAVA (1992) (tracing efforts to extend state control over forests in Java)
317. S. RAVI RAJAN, MODERNIZING NATURE: FORESTRY AND IMPERIAL ECODEVELOPMENT 1800-1950, at 55 (2006) ("By the end of the nineteenth century . . .
318. Peter Vandergeest & Nancy Lee Peluso, Territorialization and State Power in Thailand, 24 THEORY & SOC'Y 385, 391 (1995) (tracing the ways in which the classification and demarcation of major portions of national territory as "forest," enhanced state control by extending state jurisdiction over such territory).
319. Nancy Lee Peluso & Peter Vandergeest, Genealogies of the Political Forest and Customary Rights in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, 60 J. ASIAN STUDIES 761 (2001) (discussing plural normative orders that helped create state dominated "political" forests and "customary rights" in Southeast Asia).
320. See JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 10-11 (2009) (discussing strategies of bringing forests and other formerly "ungoverned regions" into the ambit of state control);
321. CONSTITUIÇãO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225, ¶ 4 (1985) (Braz.), available at http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/titleVIII. html.
322. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Disputes and Pluralism in Modern Indonesian Land Law, 22 YALE J. INT'L. L. 171, 173 (1997) (discussing conflict between legal reform under Indonesia's Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 and adat (customary) law);
323. See Anthony Stocks, Too Much for Too Few: Problems of Indigenous Land Rights in Latin America, 34 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 85 (2005) (examining trends and challenges associated with indigenous land rights in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Nicaragua). Very little research to date has focused on the question of indigenous rights to carbon. In Brazil, for example, three such analyses have been conducted and the Brazilian government agency responsible for indigenous territories (FUNAI) has issued a concept note in response to requests from indigenous peoples seeking clarification regarding rights to carbon and legal frameworks governing REDD activities in indigenous territories. In general, these legal analyses conclude that indigenous communities have the legal autonomy to sign contracts to engage in REDD and other forest carbon activities subject to the Brazilian Constitution and existing international conventions to which Brazil is a party and which seek to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.
324. See Simon Counsell, Forest Governance in Africa (S. Afr. Inst. of Int'l Aff., Occ. Paper No. 50, 2009) (discussing challenges of forest governance in various African countries).
325. Jacob Phelps et al., Does REDD+ Threaten to Recentralize Forest Governance?, 328 SCI. 312 (2010) (raising concerns about the possibility that REDD+ could reverse trends toward decentralization of forest governance).
326. See PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 547 (2d ed. 2003) ("[T]ropical and other forests are not the 'common heritage of mankind' under international law, and were not identified as a 'common concern' to mankind in the forest principles.").
327. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., para. 4, art. 3 opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity] (reaffirming principle of sovereignty over natural resources);
328. Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), pmbl., para. 4, U.N., 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962) (referring to the "inalienable right of all states to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests");
329. See Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2, 3-12 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (defining salient features of global public goods).
330. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 270, pmbl., para. 4, art. 3 (reaffirming principle of sovereignty over natural resources).
331. See Tata Cara Pengurangan Emisi Dari Deforestasi Dan Degradasi Hutan (REDD) [Implementation Procedures of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation], No. P.30/Menhut-II/2009 (2009) (Indon.) (defining the procedures for application, assessment, approval and duration of REDD activities, and specifying rights and obligations of the parties involved);
332. Tata Cara Perizinan Usaha Pemenfaatan Penyerapan Dan/Atau Penyimpanan Karbon Pada Hutan Produksi Dan Hutan Lindung [Procedures for Licensing of Commercial Utilisation of Carbon Sequestration and/or Storage in Production and Protected Forests], No. P.36/Menhut-II/2009 (2009) (Indon.) (defining the licensing procedures for commercial utilization of carbon sequestration and/or storage in production and protected forests).
333. See Reese Ewing, Lula Signs Land Law Aimed at Reforming Amazon, REUTERS, June 26, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55P62M20090626 (discussing Brazilian law aimed at clarifying land tenure).
334. See Comissão de Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sustentá;vel - Relató;rio, Projeto De Lei No 5.586, de 10 de Novembro de 2009 (proposing a national REDD+ system for Brazil).
335. See, e.g., Memorandum from Rodrigo Sales et al. to The Katoomba Group (Nov. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing issues regarding legal title to forest carbon as part of Suruí carbon project in Brazil).
336. See Michael Dutschke & Arild Angelsen, How Do We Ensure Permanence and Assign Liability?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 77-85 (Arild Angelsen ed., 2008) (discussing various approaches to permanence in the context of REDD).
337. EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975) (discussing the criminalization of customary forest use in England during the 17th and 18th centuries).
338. See, e.g., LORENZO COTULA & JAMES MAYERS, TENURE IN REDD: START-POINT OR AFTERTHOUGHT? (2009) (emphasizing the importance of considering local forest-dependent communities and land tenure in REDD implementation);
339. Benjamin Blom et al., Getting REDD to Work Locally: Lessons Learned from Integrated Conservation and Development Projects, 13 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 164 (2010) (emphasizing importance of attending to rights and interests of local communities in developing REDD programs);
340. J. Phelps et al., What Makes a 'REDD' Country?, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 322, 329 (2010) ("The Philippines case study helps elucidate why governance, conservation priorities and rights frameworks should feed into more comprehensive REDD planning and sub-national analyses.").
341. The World Bank estimates that some 60 million indigenous people are totally dependent on forests. In addition, about 350 million people are considered highly forest dependent, and 1.2 billion people are dependent on agro-forestry for some part of their livelihoods. IUCN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND REDD-PLUS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN REDD-PLUS 2 n.2 (June 2010).
342. KATHERINE VERDERY, THE VANISHING HECTARE: PROPERTY AND VALUE IN POSTSOCIALIST TRANSYLVANIA 21 (2003).
343. Clifford Geertz, What Is a State If It Is Not a Sovereign? Reflections on Politics in Complicated Places, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 577, 580 (2004).
344. See, e.g., JOHAN ELIASCH, CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCING GLOBAL FORESTS: THE ELIASCH REVIEW 145 (2008) ("Satellite images of changing forest cover provide a greater degree of transparency in monitoring forest emissions reductions than monitoring in other sectors.").
345. See, e.g., Better REDD than Dead: Tropical Forests' Best Hope, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2010, at 8-9 (discussing potential of REDD to tap into large-scale carbon finance).
346. See, e.g., Arild Angelsen & Stibniati Atmadja, What is this Book About?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 284, at 1 (describing potential for REDD as a "win-win" strategy of reducing GHG emissions "because the potentially large financial transfers and better governance can benefit the poor in developing countries and provide other environmental gains on top of the climate-related benefits.").
347. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, SUSTAINING FORESTS: A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 31-32 (2004) (discussing poor governance and corruption in the forest sector).
348. See Michael P. Vandenberg, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 918 (2007) ("The New Wal-Mart effect occurs when a mix of social, economic, and legal factors induces a firm to impose on its suppliers private environmental or other requirements that are traditionally the subject of government regulations.").
349. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy? 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 763, 763 (2005).
350. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 179 (Beacon Press 1957) (1944);
351. Albert O. Hirschman, The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding, 22 WORLD POL. 329, 343 (1970).