International law in times of hegemony: Unequal power and the shaping of the international legal order

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 369-408

  Krisch, Nico ^a  

^a MERTON COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 27644583460     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chi123     Document Type: Review

References (364)

1. See Schmitt, 'USA. und die völkerrechtlichen Formen des modernen Imperialismus', 8 Königsberger Auslandsstudien (1933) 117, esp. at 127.
2. See Ginther, 'Hegemony', in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International law (1986), ix, at 158-161
3. H. Mosler, Die Großmachtstellung im Völkerrecht (1949), esp. at 32-35 (regretting this fact).
4. See also the distinction between factual and legalized hegemony in H. Triepel, Die Hegemonie: Ein Buch von führenden Staaten (1938), at 202-206.
5. H.J. Morgenthau, 'Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law', 34 AJIL (1940) 260, at 274.
6. See also id., Politics Among Nations (1948), at 229
7. L. Oppenheim, International Law (1905), i, at 73
8. F. von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht (1898), at 15-38.
9. See, e.g., Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 162-164.
10. See also infra, Section 4, B 2.
11. In this direction see also Vagts, 'Hegemonic International Law', 95 AJIL (2001) 843.
12. See, on the one hand, G. Schwarzenberger, Power politics: A Study of World Society (3rd ed., 1964), at 199-203
13. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', 19 International Security (1994), 5, at 13
14. and (similarly, though on a rationalist rather than realist basis) J. L. Goldsmith and E. A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005).
15. On the other hand, see M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (1989);
16. A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004);
17. Chimni, 'An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law', 17 Leiden JIL (2004) 1
18. see also S. Marks, 'Empire's Law', 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2003) 449.
19. W.G. Grewe, Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (2nd ed., 1988).
20. To use the words of Koskenniemi, supra note 6. In this article, I use 'power' and 'powerful' as referring primarily to a 'compulsory' (interactional, direct) form of power. Other, more indirect and constitutive, forms will be considered below as regards their importance for stable dominance and the role of law in them.
21. On the concepts, see only Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', 59 Int Org (2005) 39.
22. Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 199-203
23. taken up in H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (3rd ed., 2002), at 134.
24. For this observation, see also M. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules (1999), at 35
25. Hurrell, 'Conclusion: International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society', in M. Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics (2000), at 327, 329-331.
26. For important exceptions, see Byers. ibid.;
27. J.L. Goldstein et al. (eds.), Legalization and World Politics (2001) (originally in 54 Int Org (2000) 385);
28. Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 6.
29. For a general survey of attempts at linking international law and international relations, see Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship', 92 AJIL (1998) 367
30. and Slaughter, 'International Law and International Relations', 285 RdC (2000) 9.
31. See Ruggie, 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', 46 Int Org (1992) 561, at 568-574.
32. Just see R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984).
33. For critiques in this direction, see only Martin, 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', 46 Int Org (1992) 765, at 769
34. Abbott and Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', 42 J Conflict Resolution (1998) 3, at 6
35. Woods, 'The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank and the IMF', in R. Foot, S.N. MacFarlane, and M. Mastanduno (eds.), US Hegemony and International Organizations (2003), 92, at 95
36. Hurrell, 'Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality', in M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds.), Power in Global Governance (2005), at 33-58.
37. See Martin, supra note 13, at 768-777
38. see also Ruggie, supra note 11, at 592.
39. See Martin, supra note 13, at 783-789.
40. This appears as one of the major reasons for establishing multilateral trade regimes: See, e.g., Abbott, 'NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study', in Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 135, 141-145.
41. This has been used to explain, e.g., the lack of balancing against the US after the end of the Cold War: See J. S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power (2002).
42. This was arguably the main motive behind US institution-building after World War II: See G. J. Ikenberry, After Victory (2000), at chap. 6.
43. On the methodological basis, see, e.g., Keohane, supra note 12, at chap. 1.
44. See Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics', 53 Int Org (1999) 379, at 387-389
45. Wendt and Friedheim, 'Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State', 49 Int Org (1995) 689, at 700-701
46. see also I. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (2005).
47. See F. V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (1989);
48. J. G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (1998);
49. A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (2000);
50. for constructivist approaches to international law, see also C. Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law (2004).
51. See Hurd, supra note 20, at 397.
52. See Martin, supra note 13, at 788.
53. See Kingsbury, 'The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law', 19 Michigan J Int'l L (1998) 345, at 354-356, 358-360
54. Brunnée and Toope, 'International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law', 39 Columbia J Transnat'l L (2000) 19, at 64-71.
55. As Thomas Franck puts it, legitimate norms exert a 'compliance pull': T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990), at 24.
56. See Wendt and Friedheim, supra note 20, at 700-705
57. Steinberg, 'In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO', 56 Int Org (2002) 339, at 360-365.
58. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', 44 Int Org (1990) 283.
59. This could also be described as a form of 'constitutive' power: See Barnett and Duvall, supra note 8, at 52-57.
60. See Chimni, 'International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making', 15 EJIL (2004) 1, at 23-24
61. also Scott, 'International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and International Politics', 5 EJIL (1994) 313.
62. Abbott and Snidal, supra note 13, at 16
63. see also Hurrell, supra note 10, at 344.
64. See Martin, supra note 13, at 785
65. Weber, 'Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO', 46 Int Org (1992) 633.
66. For less structuralist accounts, see only Ruggie, supra note 11, at 584-593
67. J. W. Legro, 'Whence American Internationalism', 54 Int Org (2000) 253.
68. See D. Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (1993), at chaps. 3, 4, and 6.
69. Martin, supra note 13, at 784-786.
70. See Martin, supra note 13, at 786-789
71. for a critical discussion of the influence of bipolarity on US multilateralism after World War II, see Ruggie, supra note 11, at 584-593.
72. Armstrong, supra note 31, at 84-91, 207-219.
73. For a closer analysis, see Krisch, 'More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law', in A Byers and G. Nolte (eds.), Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (2003), at 135-175.
74. But see also Triepel, supra note 2, at 206-218, who regards the impact of sovereign equality as more limited;
75. and see G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (2004), on the extent to which inequality has been legalized despite formal sovereign equality.
76. See only Steinberg, supra note 26.
77. See Byers, Custom, Power supra note 10, at 37-40.
78. But see also the opposite argument in Toope, 'Powerful but Unpersuasive? The Role of the USA in the Evolution of Customary International Law', in Byers and Nolte, supra note 35, at 287-316.
79. See also Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 'Law, Politics, and International Governance', in Reus-Smit, supra note 21, at 238, 257-258, who regard as constraining the fact that arguments for change in customary law have to take the form of analogies.
80. In a similar argument, Byers, Custom, Power supra note 10, at chaps. 4-7, identifies jurisdiction, personality, reciprocity, and legitimate expectations as principles that resist the simple translation of power into customary international law.
81. See also Eckersley, 'Soft Law, Hard Politics, and the Climate Change Treaty', in Reus-Smit, supra note 21, at 80-105, who identifies similar elements as regulative ideals in the treaty-making process.
82. On the central role of legitimacy for the function of international law, see only Brunnée and Toope, supra note 24, at 70-71
83. Finnemore and Toope, 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics', 55 Int Org (2001) 743, at 749-750.
84. For a similar picture, see Hurrell, supra note 10, at 344-345.
85. See the conceptualization of different degrees of legalization in Abbott et al., 'The Concept of Legalization', in Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 17-35
86. and of dispute resolution in Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter, 'Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational', in ibid., at 73-104.
87. See Abbott and Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance'. in Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 37, 52-56.
88. But see, as mentioned before, Toope, supra note 37, for a different perspective.
89. See Kahler, 'Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers', 46 Int Org (1992) 681, esp. at 685-691
90. Steinberg, 'Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development', 91 AJIL (1997) 231, at 233, 265-266.
91. See Abbott and Snidal, supra note 42, at 46-47
92. but see also the differences highlighted by Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 6, at 91-100.
93. See Weiss, 'Conclusion: Understanding Compliance with Soft Law', in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000), at 535-553.
94. See Kahler, 'Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization', in Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 277, 281-282
95. Abbott and Snidal, supra note 42, at 63-66.
96. See also the findings of McCall Smith, 'The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts', 54 Int Org (2000) 137.
97. For a discussion of alternative approaches (many of which I regard with great sympathy), see S. Hobden and J. M. Hobson (eds.), Historical Sociology and International Relations (2002).
98. See also Kratochwil, 'How Do Norms Matter?', in Byers, The Role of Law, supra note 10, at 35, 62-68.
99. See especially Grewe, supra note 7
100. and for international institutions in general, Ikenberry, supra note 18.
101. See J. Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht (1984), at 45-75
102. A. Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800 (1995), at chaps. 1-3
103. R. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (1999), at chaps. 1-4.
104. Fisch, supra note 50, at 47.
105. On the conceptions and justifications of empire underlying these different claims, see Pagden, supra note 50.
106. See Grewe, supra note 7, at 300-322
107. Fisch, supra note 50, at 45-75
108. Tuck, supra note 50, at 63-65, 89-92, 111-113.
109. On the Dutch-Portuguese dispute in this respect, see C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (1967), at chaps. 3 and 4:
110. see also ibid., at 71-77, on the Portuguese (and sometimes also Dutch) cartazes systems as another way of bringing the seas under control.
111. See also Tuck, supra note 50, at 114, on the parallel reasons for the British turn to an argument for a mare clausum in the face of Dutch ascendancy.
112. Grewe, supra note 7, at 605.
113. See Fisch, supra note 50, at 57-66.
114. Grewe, supra note 7, at 614
115. A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (1947), at 213-218.
116. See the statement of the Swiss Federal Council in 1919, quoted in Grewe, supra note 7, at 614.
117. See Fisch, supra note 50, at 77-79
118. Grewe, supra note 7, at 471-477
119. Tuck, supra note 50, at 92-94.
120. See only Alexandrowicz, supra note 52, at chaps. 5-9.
121. See G. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society (1984), at chaps. 5-7
122. R. Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914 (3rd ed., 2002), at 123-133.
123. P. W. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (1976), at 152
124. on the mixture of unilateralism and bilateralism involved in British trade policy at the time, see Ruggie, supra note 11, at 580-582.
125. See Weber, supra note 30
126. Ikenberry, supra note 18, at chap. 6.
127. But see also Ruggie, supra note 11, at 584-593
128. for a stronger emphasis on contextual factors, and Kahler, supra note 44, at 685-591, who points to the strong 'minilateral' and bilateral elements in US policy at the time.
129. See, in general, Krisch, 'Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: The Place of International Law in U.S. Foreign Policy', in D. M. Malone and Y. F. Khong (eds.), Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy (2003), at 41, 45-53
130. Scott, 'Is There Room for International Law in Realpolitik?: Accounting for the US "Attitude" towards International Law', 30 Review of Int'l Studies (2004) 71, at 71-73, 81-87
131. J. F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (2004).
132. See Elliott and Hufbauer, 'Ambivalent Multilateralism and the Emerging Backlash: The IMF and the WTO', in S. Patrick and S. Forman (eds.), Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy (2002), at 377-413.
133. On bilateral investment treaties, see Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (ed.), Treaties and International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate (2001), at 266-269
134. on the MAI, see Canner, 'The Multilateral Agreement on Investment', 31 Cornell Int'l LJ (1998) 657, at 677-679.
135. On the extent to which the shape of the current trade regime reflects the influence of economically powerful states, see Steinberg, supra notes 26 and 44
136. Kwakwa, 'Regulating the International Economy: What Role for the State?', in Byers, The Role of Law, supra note 10, at 227, 232-240
137. Shaffer, 'Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach', in Barnett and Duvall, supra note 13, at 130, 133-139.
138. See Scott, 'The Impact on International Law of US Non-compliance', in Byers and Nolte, supra note 35, at 427, 428-429.
139. On the development of the principle of sovereign equality, see P. H. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States (1964).
140. See M. W. Doyle, Empires (1986);
141. Pagden, supra note 50, at chaps. 1-3.
142. See Doyle, supra note 69, at 135-136, 341-344.
143. See Fisch, supra note 50, at 183-246
144. Pagden, supra note 50, at 24-28, and chap. 2.
145. Just see Fisch, supra note 50, at 183-186.
146. See Gong, supra note 60, esp. chap. 3
147. Anghie, 'Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law', 40 Harvard' Int'l LJ (1999) 1, at 22-57 (now also in Anghie, supra note 6, at chap. 2).
148. However, the international society of the previous period was hardly more inclusive: See Bull, 'The Emergence of a Universal International Society', in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (1986), at 117-120
149. E. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (2002), in 26-29.
150. For an account that places the distinction between European and non-European territories at the centre of the international legal order for the whole period from the 16th to the 19th centuries, see C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erdei im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (1950).
151. See Gong, supra note 60, esp. at 68
152. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of Modern International Law, 1870-1960 (2002), at 127-132, 136-143
153. on treaties, see also C. H. Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation: A Study in Treaty-Making (1973), at 94-105.
154. On the link between 'civilization' and the legal status of these relations, see also Keene, supra note 73, at chap. 4.
155. See J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999);
156. F. R. Tesón, A Philosophy of International Law (1998);
157. Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States', 6 EJIL (1995) 503.
158. See also Reisman, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law', 84 AJIL (1990) 866.
159. See Simpson, 'Two Liberalisms', 12 EJIL (2001) 537, at 556-570
160. B. R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999).
161. See P. Minnerop, Paria-Staaten im Völkerrecht? (2004), at chap. 2,
162. and 'Legal Status of State Sponsors of Terrorism in US Law', in C. Walter et al. (eds.), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law (2004), at 733-786.
163. For the National Security Strategy, see www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (visited 23 Mar. 2005), at 13-15.
164. See Aldrich, 'The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants', 96 AJIL (2002) 891
165. Paust, 'War and Enemy Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War', 28 Yale J Int'l L (2003) 325
166. Roberts, 'Righting Wrongs or Wronging Rights? The United States and Human Rights Post-September 11', 15 EJIL (2004) 721, at 739-746.
167. But see also the decisions of the US Supreme Court in Rasul v Bush and Hamdi v Rumsfeld, Nos. 03-334 and 03-6696 (decisions of 28 June 2004).
168. On contemporary parallels with colonialist strategies of differentiation, see also Keene, supra note 73, at chap. 5
169. Allain, 'Orientalism and International Law: The Middle East as the Underclass of the International Legal Order', 17 Leiden J Int'l L (2004) 391.
170. On the extent of this dominance, see only Kennedy, supra note 61, at chaps. 6 and 7.
171. See Grewe, supra note 7, at 635, 647.
172. See B. Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology. Interest, and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica (1986), at chaps. 4 and 7, esp. on the British domestic debate.
173. See Grewe, supra note 7, at 656-671
174. Semmel, supra note 82, at chap. 3
175. Kern, 'Strategies of Legal Change: Great Britain, International Law, and the Abolition of the Transatlantic Slave Trade', 6 J Hist Int'l L (2004) 233.
176. Data as of Jan. 2004; see, in more detail, Krisch, supra note 63, at 45-47.
177. See UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50 (1995); see also Foot, 'Credibility at Stake: Domestic Supremacy in U.S. Human Rights Policy', in Malone and Khong, supra note 63, at 95-115
178. Redgwell, 'United States Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: All for One and None for All?', in Byers and Nolte, supra note 35, at 392-415.
179. See US Library of Congress, supra note 65, at 274-276.
180. Just see Malanczuk, 'The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What are the Consequences of Leaving the US Behind?', 11 EJIL (2000) 77, at 84-85.
181. See Galbraith, 'The Bush Administration's Response to the International Criminal Court', 21 Berkeley J Int'l L (2003) 683.
182. See only L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution (2nd ed., 1996), at 175-179.
183. See Ackerman and Golove, 'Is NAFTA Constitutional?', 108 Harvard L Rev (1995) 799
184. Spiro, 'Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method', 79 Texas L Rev (2001) 961, at 993-1003.
185. For a largely realist interpretation of the US attitude towards international law, see also Scott, supra note 63.
186. See supra, Section 3, B 2.
187. See Alvarez, 'Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory', 12 EJIL (2001) 183, at 194-198.
188. See also Abbott and Snidal, supra note 42, at note 68
189. Kahler, supra note 44, at 681-682.
190. On a particularly interesting case, see Guzman, 'Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties', 38 Virginia J Int'l L (1998) 639.
191. See also Klein, 'The Effects of US Predominance on the Elaboration of Treaty Regimes and on the Evolution of the Law of Treaties', in Byers and Nolte, supra note 35, at 363, 371-376.
192. Grewe, supra note 7, at 235-236.
193. See supra, Section 3, A, also for a caveat.
194. Quoted in Semmel, supra note 82, at 110
195. see also ibid., at 115.
196. On the reasons for US acceptance of NAFTA dispute settlement, see Abbott, supra note 16, at 151-159.
197. See Nolte, 'The United States and the International Criminal Court', in Malone and Khong, supra note 63, at 71-93
198. Malanczuk, supra note 87, at 80.
199. See Smithson, 'The Chemical Weapons Convention', in Patrick and Forman, supra note 64, at 247, 254-258
200. Kervers, 'Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: The Protocol Negotiations', 7 J Conflict and Security L (2002) 275, at 289.
201. See Henkin, 'U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker', 89 AJIL (1995) 314, at 344-345.
202. See Paulus, 'From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication', 15 EJIL (2004) 783
203. Murphy, supra note 63, at chap. 7
204. Kirgis, 'President Bush's Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights', ASIL Insight, Mar. 2005 and Addendum.
205. See Shelton (ed.), supra note 46
206. A.-M. Slaughter, The New World Order (2004).
207. See Abbott and Snidal, supra note 42, at 63-65
208. see also Kahler, supra note 47, at 281-282.
209. On the US case in particular, see also Murphy, supra note 63, at 351.
210. See Armstrong, supra note 31, at chaps. 3 and 6 (also for the turn to greater pragmatism after the first wave of the revolution);
211. M. Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics (2002), at chap. 5
212. Grewe, supra note 7, at 485-495.
213. See Grewe, supra note 7, at 526-535
214. see also Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at chap. 2, esp. at 127-132.
215. Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at 134-135
216. Gong, supra note 60, at 56, 61
217. Anghie, supra note 73, at 43-49, 52-54.
218. Grewe, supra note 7, at 573-583.
219. See supra, Section 3, B 2.
220. For the quotation from Castlereagh, see W. G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (trans. M. Byers) (2000), at 554.
221. See Krisch, 'Amerikanische Hegemonie und liberale Revolution im Völkerrecht', 43 Der Staat (2004) 267, at 278-281, 283-285.
222. On the concept of international community in general, see A. Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht (2001);
223. on a similar phenomenon - the current rise of 'interstitial norms' see Lowe, 'The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing,', in Byers The Role of Law,
224. supra note 10, at 207-226.
225. See Krisch, 'Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq and the Security Council', 3 Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law (1999) 59.
226. See the speeches of the US President of 20 Sept. 2001 and 29 Jan. 2002, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html and www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (visited on 23 Mar. 2005).
227. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgment of 2 Oct. 1995, in Prosecutor v Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, 35 ILM (1996) 32, at paras. 119 and 97
228. Filartiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F 2d 876, 890 (2d Cir., 1980);
229. Flatow v Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F Supp 1, 23 (DDC, 1998).
230. Koskenniemi, '"The Lady Doth Protest Too Much": Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law', 65 MLR (2002) 159, at 171.
231. In this sense, see also Fisch, supra note 50, at 14.
232. But see also S. V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: An Introduction (2004), at 16, suggesting that the prohibition on the use of force usually benefits the powerful since it protects the status quo. Yet this holds only if indeed a hegemon is interested in the status quo, which is not to be assumed: See supra, Section 2, A 2.
233. For an overview, see Fisch, supra note 50, at 209-246.
234. See Grewe, supra note 7, at 240-247
235. Schmitt, supra note 73, at 124-126.
236. See supra, Section 3, A.
237. In contrast, Schmitt, supra note 73, at 60-68,
238. and, following him, Grewe, supra note 7, at 181-193, claim that Spain agreed that 'no peace beyond the line' of amity existed, and that thus, in most of the colonial world, force could be used without restrictions.
239. Fisch, supra note 50, at chap. 2, esp. 57-66, 75-77, challenges this interpretation convincingly.
240. Quoted in Grewe, supra note 7, at 657.
241. See supra, Section 3, B 2.
242. On the American and French objections, see esp. Semmel, supra note 82, at 33-34, 44-49
243. on the international debate in general, see Kern, supra note 83.
244. Kennedy, supra note 61, at 166.
245. But see also Kaufmann and Pape, 'Explaining Costly Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade', 53 Int Org (1999) 631, at 637-638.
246. See Semmel, supra note 82, at chaps. 4-7
247. Grewe. supra note 7, at 616-637, 647-648.
248. On the latter point, see M. E. Chamberlain, 'Pax Britannica'? British Foreign Policy 1789-1914 (1988), at 7.
249. See Semmel, supra note 82, at 1-52, on the importance of the US rise in sea power for the adoption of the Paris Declaration of 1856.
250. See only Krisch, supra note 112
251. Byers, 'Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September', 51 ICLQ (2002) 401, at 406-410
252. Bothe, 'Terrorism and the Legality of Preemptive Force', 14 EJIL (2003) 227.
253. See also, for a general overview, Murphy, supra note 63, at chap. 4.
254. See Roth, 'Bending the Law, Breaking It, or Developing It? The United States and the Humanitarian Use of Force in the post-Cold War Era'. in Byers and Nolte, supra note 35, at 232, 250-256.
255. Benvenisti, 'The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and the Management of Global Emergencies', 15 EJIL (2004) 677, sees these moves as an attempt to provide a public good (global security). This view is not incompatible with the one advanced here: International law is a constraint on the unilateral definition of global public goods, and dominant states will often find this constraint unjustified. The British attempts to eradicate the slave trade, for example, can be interpreted in the same way.
256. On the latter concept, see Triepel, supra note 2, at 202-206
257. J. Markus, Grandes puissances, petites nations et le problème de l'organisation internationale (1947), at 47-55
258. Simpson, supra note 35, at 67-76.
259. See Keene, supra note 73, at chap. 3, on the contrast between unitary sovereignty and equality within Europe and 'divisible' sovereignty and hierarchy in the relations between Europe and the non-European world, especially Asia.
260. See supra, Section 3, B 1.
261. See in particular Alexandrowicz, supra note 52, at chaps. 8 and 9
262. J. Fisch, Krieg und Frieden im Friedensvertrag (1979), 554-556, 579-580, 589-590, 594-596
263. see also Keene, supra note 73, at 90-92, especially on the concept of 'paramountcy'.
264. For similar developments in Africa, see Alexandrowicz, supra note 74
265. Fisch, supra this note, at 561-563.
266. Poleman, 'The Indian Princes' Treaty Rights', 11 Far Eastern Survey (1942) 196, at 197; for the citation see 199.
267. See Alexandrowicz, supra note 74, at 62-83, 94-105
268. Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at 136-143
269. Gong, supra note 60, at 54-63.
270. On the shift in the 19th century, see also the concise statement in Bull, 'European States and African Political Communities', in Bull and Watson, supra note 73, at 99, 111-114.
271. See Simpson, supra note 35, at chap. 4.
272. See, on the one hand, Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 162-164
273. on the other, T.J. Lawrence, Essays on Some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law, (1884), at 209, 230, 232.
274. For a thoughtful survey of the debate at the time, see Simpson, supra note 35, at chap. 4.
275. On this change, see ibid., at chaps. 5 and 6.
276. See Malone, 'US-UN Relations in the UN Security Council in the Post-Cold
277. On the Security Council as a hegemonic instrument, see Alvarez, 'Hegemonic International Law Revisited', 97 AJIL(2003) 873.
278. For a concise survey of different interpretations of the Council's action, see Abbott and Snidal, supra note 13, at 27-29.
279. On the US role in these institutions, see Woods, supra note 13, at 92-114
280. on their expansion of activity, see M. Miller-Adams, The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing World (1999), at 100-133
281. E. Riesenhuber, The International Monetary Fund under Constraint (2001), at 36-39.
282. For critical analyses, see Anghie, 'Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World', 32 NYU J Int'l L and Pol (2000) 243
283. B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance (2003), at chap. 5.
284. See Nolte, supra note 100
285. Murphy, supra note 63, at 312-318
286. Schabas, 'United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's All About the Security Council', 15 EJIL (2004) 701, at 712-720.
287. See Salzman, 'Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development', 21 Michigan J Int'l L (2001) 769.
288. See Simmons, 'International Efforts against Money Laundering', in Shelton, supra note 46, at 244, 255-260.
289. Just see Slaughter, supra note 104
290. Zaring, 'International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations', 33 Texas Int'l LJ (1998) 281.
291. For a critique, see Delonis, 'International Financial Standards and Codes: Mandatory Regulation without Representation', 36 NYU J Int'l L and Pol (2004) 563.
292. Slaughter, 'Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks', in Byers, The Role of Law
293. supra note 10, at 177, 205.
294. For a defence of this position, see only Rubenfeld, 'Unilateralism and Constitutionalism', 79 NYU LR (2004) 1971.
295. This is reinforced by a tendency further to restrict international law's (already weak) role in US domestic law; see only Bradley and Goldsmith, 'Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position', 110 Harvard LR (1997) 815.
296. On that role in general, see Bianchi, 'International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited', 15 EJIL (2004) 751.
297. For a similar analysis (with different explanations), see Scott, supra note 63
298. Cohen, 'The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework for Debate', 28 Yale J Int'l L (2003) 551.
299. For a more extensive discussion, see Krisch, supra note 35, at 156-173.
300. As Alexandrowicz, supra note 74, at 127, puts it with respect to Africa in the 19th century: '[i]nternational law disappears from the scene and the various European municipal laws take its place...'.
301. See in particular L. Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (2002);
302. W.J.Mommsen and J.A. de Moor (eds.), European Expansion and Law (1992).
303. See Benton, supra note 150, at 127-128
304. and passim; Fisch, 'Law as a Means and an End: Some Remarks on the Function of European and non-European Law in the Process of European Expansion', in Mommsen and de Moor, supra note 150, at 15-38.
305. On the contrast in principle, see Pagden, supra note 50, at chap. 5.
306. On the actual deviation from the unitary theory in the initial period of Spanish America, see Benton, supra note 150, at 81-86.
307. See Benton, supra note 150, at chap. 4
308. and on France, Pagden, supra note 50, at 149-152
309. on Britain, Burroughs, 'Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire', in A. Porter and A. Low (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. III: The Nineteenth Century (1999), at 170-197.
310. On deliberate British attempts at legal change, see Engels, 'Wives, Widows and Workers: Women and the Law in Colonial India', in Mommsen and de Moor, supra note 150, at 159-178
311. Simensen, 'Jurisdiction as Politics: The Gold Coast During the Colonial Period', in ibid., at 257-277.
312. See Benton, supra note 150, at 127-166 on British India and French West Africa, and 114-124 on Portuguese Goa;
313. Leue, 'Legal Expansion in the Age of the Companies: Aspects of the Administration of Justice in the English and Dutch Settlements of Maritime Asia, c. 1600-1750', in Mommsen and de Moor, supra note 150, at 129-158.
314. On problems in using metropolitan law, see Fasseur, 'Colonial Dilemma: Van Vollenhoven and the Struggle Between Adat Law and Western Law in Indonesia', in ibid., at 237-256
315. Chanock, 'The Law Market: The Legal Encounter in British East and Central Africa', in ibid., at 279-305.
316. See, in general, Alexandrowicz, supra note 52, at chap. 6,
317. and supra note 74, at 83-91, 125-126.
318. See Gong, supra note 60, at chaps. 5-7
319. Ch'en, 'The Treaty System and European Law in China: A Study of the Exercise of British Jurisdiction in Late Imperial China', in Mommsen and de Moor, supra note 150, at 83-100
320. see also Benton, supra note 150, at 246-251.
321. For possible contemporary analogues, see Fidler, 'A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization', 35 Texas Int'l LJ (2000) 387.
322. See Benton, supra note 150. at chaps. 4 and 5
323. Price, 'The "Popularity" of the Imperial Courts of Law: Three Views of the Anglo-Indian Legal Encounter', in Mommsen and de Moor, supra note 150, at 179-200.
324. See, e.g., Benton, supra note 150, at 136, on the establishment of the British Supreme Court of Judicature in India.
325. See P. A. Howell, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1833-1867 (1979);
326. on the later debate over the Committee's role and its shrinking jurisdiction, see D. B. Swinfen, Imperial Appeal: The Debate on the Appeal to the Privy Council, 1833-1986 (1987).
327. On the forms of unilateral alternatives in the area of the environment, see Brunnée, 'The United States and International Environmental Law: Living with an Elephant', 15 EJIL (2004) 617, at 630-636.
328. See Chinen, 'Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation', 31 NYU J Int'l L and Pol (1999) 217
329. on a particularly comprehensive regime, see Akech, 'The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Implications for Kenya's Trade and Development', 33 NYU J Int'l L and Pol (2001) 651, at 663-670.
330. Cleveland, 'Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions', 26 Yale J Int'l L (2001) 1. at 70-73.
331. For the 2004 report, see www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/index.htm (visited on 23 Mar. 2005).
332. See M. P. Malloy, United States Economic Sanctions: Theory and Practice (2001).
333. See Puckett and Reynolds, 'Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?', 90 AJIL (1996) 675.
334. See DeSombre, 'Environmental Sanctions in U.S. Foreign Policy', in P. G. Harris (ed.), The Environment, International Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy (2001).
335. See Stern, 'Vers la mondialisation juridique? Les lois Helms-Burton et D'Amato-Kennedy', 100 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1996) 979, at 996.
336. As to the limits to unilateral sanctions under WTO law, especially in environmental matters, see only M. J. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (2nd ed., 1999), at 428-432.
337. See Mattei and Lena, 'U.S. Jurisdiction over Conflicts Arising Outside the United States: Some Hegemonic Implications', 24 Hastings Int'l and Comp LR (2001) 381.
338. See B. Stephens and M. Ratner, International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts (1996);
339. Rosen, 'The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act', 6 Cardozo J Int'l and Comp L (1998) 461. But see also the cautious reaffirmation of the use of the Alien Tort Claims Act, as well as the restriction of its scope, by the US Supreme Court in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain. No. 03-339 (decision of 29 June 2004).
340. See supra, Section 3, B 1.
341. See Mattei, 'A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance', 10 Indiana J Global Legal Studies (2003) 383
342. Slaughter, 'Judicial Globalization', 40 Virginia J Int'l L (2000) 1103.
343. In this sense, see only A. Loomba, Colonialism - Postcolonialism (1998), at chap. 2
344. on the imagery of superiority, see also Hyam, supra note 60, at 301-310.
345. On the particularly interesting case of Japan, see Gong, supra note 60, at 174-187,
346. but see also ibid., at 98-100.
347. J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000), at 157-158, 457-460, 475-477, 578-601
348. for further examples taken from the regulation of capital markets, see Simmons, 'The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation', 55 Int Org (2001) 589, at 601-615.
349. See supra, Section 5, A.
350. See supra, Section 3, A.
351. See Fisch, supra note 50, at 2-3
352. Doyle, supra note 69, at 110-113.
353. See Alexandrowicz, supra note 52, at 26-38.
354. On the situation in Africa, see Alexandrowicz, supra note 74, at 41-43.
355. See only Gallagher and Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', 6 Economic History Review (1953) 1.
356. See R. B. Hall and T. Biersteker (eds.), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (2003). On the rise of private judicial actors,
357. see Mattli, 'Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration', 55 Int Org (2001) 919.
358. See only G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (1996);
359. Mattli and Büthe, 'Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?', 56 World Politics (2003) 1
360. Ruggie, 'Taking Embedded liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection', in D. Helm and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (2003).
361. Mattli and Büthe, supra note 181, also reach this conclusion, though they find that domestic institutional settings have an important impact in determining which of the powerful actors prevails. Thus, in the case of ISO, Europeans appear to be more successful than Americans.
362. See Mayer, 'Europe and the Internet: The Old World and the New Medium', 11 EJIL (2000) 149.
363. See also Kwakwa, 'The International Community, International Law and the United States: Three in One, Two Against One, or One and the Same?', in Byers and Nolte, supra note 35, at 25, 49-51.
364. See only S. Sassen, Losing Control? (1996), at 15-16.