The emergence of global administrative law

Law and Contemporary Problems

Volumn 68, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 15-61

  Kingsbury, Benedict ^a   Krisch, Nico ^b   Stewart, Richard B ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

^b MERTON COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744557047     PISSN: 00239186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (187)

1. Research Project on Global Administrative Law, NYU School of Law Institute for International Law and Justice in conjunction with the Center on Environmental and Land Use Law. Working papers, a bibliography, and project documents appear on the project website at http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw. This website also includes links to project partners, and to other research projects around the world in related areas. We thank for ideas and for specific comments the many faculty, visiting fellows, and students participating in this project, as well as participants at the Japan Society of International Law Hiroshima Conference, at an NYU Law School faculty workshop, and at an NYU-Oxford Global Law Institute project workshop at Merton College, Oxford University. We acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max Greenberg Faculty Research Fund, the Hauser Global Law School Program, and a grant to the IILJ from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
2. An extensive bibliography is found in this volume. A Global Administrative Law Bibliography, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 357 (Summer/ Autumn 2005).
3. On the German example, see Hartmut Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (14th ed., 2002).
4. Some forms of global administrative decisionmaking are closely connected with dispute settlement, not least because quasi-judicial organs such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body also perform important regulatory oversight functions.
5. See Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 63 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
6. On antitrust, see Eleanor Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 911, 925-32 (2003).
7. For analysis of the Basle Committee, see David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 Tex. Int'l L.J. 281, 287-91 (1998);
8. see also David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 547 (2005).
9. Lorenz von Stein, Einige Bemerkungen über das international Verwaltungsrecht, 6 Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich 395 (1882).
10. For discussion of the early history of the field, see José Gascón y Marin, Les transformations du droit administratif international, 34 Rescueil des Cours, 4, 7-15 (1930);
11. and more recently, Christian Tietje, Internationalisiertes Verwaltungshandeln (2001).
12. On Lorenz von Stein, see Frank Schulz-Nieswandt, Die Lehre vom öffentlichen Gesundheitswesen bei Lorenz von Stein (1989).
13. See Paul S. Reinsch, International Administrative Law and National Sovereignty, 3 AJIL 1 (1909);
14. see also Paul Négulesco, Principes du droit international administratif, 51 Recueil des Cours 579 (1935).
15. For a central work developing a conflict of laws approach to administrative law on transborder issues, see Karl Neumeyer, 4 Internationales Verwaltungsrecht (1936).
16. See Pierre Kazansky, Théorie de l'administration internationale, 9 Revue Generale de Droit International Public 353, 360 (1902);
17. see also Négulesco, supra note 9, at 589-93.
18. George Scelle, in the first two volumes of his Précis de droit des gens (1932 and 1934), sketched aspects of such an approach, focusing on the double role of national governmental agencies as both national actors and administrators of international action. Scelle had intended to develop this approach in a third volume on international administrative law.
19. See Scelle, 1 Précis de droit des gens 69 (1932).
20. Notions such as "international administrative unions" continue to be recognized, see, e.g., Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Administrative Unions, in 2 Enyclopedia of Public International Law 1041 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
21. The "administrative tribunals" of international organizations, and associated review mechanisms, have long been concerned with a narrow but important aspect of international administration relating to the rights of staff members of these organizations and to general issues concerning the international civil service. The significant role these tribunals may play in certain cases is exemplified by the decision of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization in Bustani v. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Judgment No. 2232, July 16, 2003, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/ english/tribunal/fulltext/2232.htm.
22. The Tribunal upheld elements of José Bustani's complaint about his dismissal from the post of Director-General of the OPCW, a dismissal that followed confrontations with the United States about inspections of chemical facilities under the OPCW regime; see also Ana Stani, Removal of the Head of a Multilateral Organization - Independence of International Organization and Their Secretariat - Political Interference by Member State in the Operation of International Organization, 98 AJIL 810 (2004).
23. C. Wilfred Jenks, the Proper Law of International Organisations (1963);
24. Soji Yamamoto, Kokusai gyoseiho no sonritsu kiban ("The Positive Basis of International Administrative Law"), in 76:5 Kokuaiho Gaiko Zasshi ("The Jornal of International Law and Diplomcy") 1 (1967);
25. see also International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications (Robert S. Jordan ed., 1971);
26. and Hugo J. Hahn, Control Under the Euratom Compact 7 A. J. Comp. L. 23 (1958)
27. On the combination of different layers in E.U. administration see Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 21 (Winter 2004);
28. see also Giacinto della Cananea, The European Union's Mixed Administrative Proceedings, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 197 (Winter 2004);
29. Edoardo Chiti, Administrative Proceedings Involving European Agencies, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 219 (Winter 2004).
30. See Sidney Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 435, 453-57 (2002).
31. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 263 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
32. WTO Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R Doc. No. 98-3899 (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle];
33. see discussion infra Part III.C.3;
34. see also United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (2003) [hereinafter U.S. Steel].
35. See generally The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
36. See Stewart, supra note 5. The argument that individuals are the ultimate subjects of legal regulation has long been made by one liberal tradition of international lawyers.
37. See, e.g., J.L. Brierly, Règles générales du droit de la paix, 58 Recueil des Cours 5, 47-52 (1936).
38. For an early approach along such lines, see Négulesco, supra note 9, at 604-05.
39. For tendencies towards a similar conceptualization in the European Union, including by E.U. courts, see della Cananea, supra note 13.
40. See Martin Shapiro, The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, in The Institutionalization of Europe 94 (Alec Stone Sweet et al. eds., 2001);
41. Der europäische Verwaltungsraum (Heinrich Siedentopf ed., 2004).
42. See Anna Leander, Conditional Legitimacy, Reinterpreted Monopolies: Globalisation and the Evolving State Monopoly on Legitimate Violence, COPRI Working Paper 2002/10, 18, at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/lea04.pdf;
43. Elke Krahmann, Private Firms and the New Security Governance, 5 Conflict, Security and Development (forthcoming 2005);
44. Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law. Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42 Colum. J. of Transnat'l L. 521 (2004).
45. On similar approaches in E.U. jurisprudence, see Cassese, supra note 13, at 34-36.
46. For an emphasis on the roots of international administrative law in both public law and international law, see, e.g., Négulesco, supra note 9, at 592-99;
47. see also Kazansky, supra note 10, at 365.
48. See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality 87 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991);
49. see also Christian Joerges, The Turn to Transnational Governance and its Legitimacy Problems: The Examples of Standardization and Food Safety, at http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/spring04/globalization/ Joerges%20Draft4%20%20g%20Feb%2004.doc.
50. See Andrew Moravcsik, Is there a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39 Government and Opposition 336 (2004).
51. See the intricate conceptual distinctions in Karl Neumeyer, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht: Völkerrechtliche Grundlagen, in 1 Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie 577, 577-81 (Karl Strupp ed., 1924);
52. see also Gascón y Marin, supra note 8, at 9-24.
53. See Neumeyer, supra note 26;
54. see also Gerhard Hoffmann, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht, in Besonderes Verwaltungsrecht 781 (Ingo von Münch ed., 6th ed. 1982).
55. See Négulesco, supra note 9, at 593.
56. See generally Maurer, supra note 3.
57. The study of domestic administrative law illuminates the subject's normative implications as well as its political functions. Historically, the political function has by no means been the same in different political systems: in the nineteenth century, administrative law came about in different ways and for different reasons in democratic systems such as the United Kingdom or the United States than in monarchical settings prevalent in much of continental Europe. These differences in origins and in attitudes towards the executive branch have continuing repercussions. Inquiry into the diverse traditions of administrative law is thus of great relevance to global administrative law. See Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 Yale L.J. 1341 (2004).
58. For a similarly broad approach, see Tietje, supra note 8.
59. See Kazansky, supra note 10, at 361;
60. see also Gascón y Marin, supra note 8, at 20 and passim.
61. Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance, 99 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2005).
62. See, e.g., Global Law Without a State (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
63. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004).
64. See Stewart, supra note 5.
65. On the application of U.S. environmental impact assessment procedures to the United States' ratification of NAFTA and the WTO Uruguay Round agreements, see Matthew Porterfield, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative: The (Con)Fusion of APA Standing and the Merits Under NEPA, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 157 (1995);
66. James Salzman, Seattle's Legacy and Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements, 31 Envtl. L. 501 (2001).
67. On the balance to be struck in administrative law proceedings in U.S. courts between upholding international law rules and according deference to a U.S. government agency when the agency's action is in conflict with a WTO ruling, see Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, Essay, Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is the Charming Betsy Sinking?, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1533 (2001), who argue courts should be more deferential to the agency if the agency has followed notice-and-comment procedures or other due process safeguards.
68. Id. at 1543-45.
69. See Case U9/00 (Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Nov. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Case U9/00] (evaluating the Law on State Border Service), at para. 9.
70. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 10, art. II;
71. see also S.C. Res. U.N SCOR, 50th Sess. U.N. Doc./RES/1031, pp. 26-27 (1995).
72. Case U9/00, at para. 9. See Carsten Stahn, International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges Ahead, 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 107, 158-59, 167-71 (2001).
73. Case T-306/01 R. Aden v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2002 E.C.R. II-02387 (application for interim measures).
74. Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of May 7, 2002, at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/end/oj/dat/2002/c_191/ c_19120020810en00250026.pdf (last visited March 25, 2005) (rejecting application for interim measures because there was no urgency).
75. For the Security Council's general procedure see Guidelines of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) for the Conduct of its Work, Nov. 7, 2002 as amended April 10, 2003, at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf.
76. For commentary on the de-listing decision, see Per Cramér, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted U.N. Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in the Security Council, in Review of the Security Council by Member States 85, 94-95 (Erika de Wet & André Nollkaemper eds., 2003);
77. see also David Dyzenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 127 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
78. See Mattias Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, 36 Common Market L. Rev. 351 (1999).
79. See Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 361, para. 32 (1999) (affirming the continuing responsibility of states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter Convention] after they transfer competences to an international organization, like the European Communities, that are not directly bound by the Convention).
80. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 261, para. 68 (1999) (stating that a "material factor" in determining whether the Convention permits Germany to grant the European Space Agency immunity from German courts is whether the applicants have a reasonable alternative means to protect their rights under the Convention).
81. Id. at para. 73.
82. Stewart, supra note 5.
83. See Stewart, supra note 5.
84. See Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 7, at 598.
85. See Peter Gutherie, Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 60 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 491, 512-14 (2004).
86. See Demanding Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (Dana Clark et al. eds., 2003);
87. see also The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Rolf Ring eds., 2001).
88. See Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 7, at 557.
89. See James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 189 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
90. Information about the Financial Action Task Force's methods is available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/ 0,2966,en_32250379_32237277_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
91. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 03/25/3: Report of the Evaluation of the Codex Alimentarius and Other FAO and WHO Food Standards Work (2002).
92. See Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance. Product Standards in the Regulatory of Intergrating Markets (2004).
93. See John Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection, in Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance 93, 105-06 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003).
94. Slaughter discusses the dual national and global roles of national public officials in A New World Order, supra note 34.
95. See Shrimp - Turtle, supra note 16.
96. Id.
97. For commentary see Giacinto Della Cananea, Beyond the State: the Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 European Public Law 563 (2003);
98. see also Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 109 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
99. Markus Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services 164-78 (2003).
100. See generally Henri Labayle et al., Droit administratif et Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, 11 Revue française de droit administratif 1172 (1995).
101. See Ngaire Woods & Amrita Narlikar, Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, 53 Int'l Soc. Sci. J. 569 (2001).
102. Shrimp - Turtle, supra note 16, at para. 180 et seq.
103. See Report of the Financial Action Task Force on Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/57/22/ 33921735.pdf, at para. 41.
104. Steve Suppan, Consumers International's Decision-Making in the Global Market, Codex Briefing Paper (2004), at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/ library.cfm?RefID=36988.
105. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (entered in force Oct. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
106. For an early, though brief, discussion, see Négulesco, supra note 9, at 684-86.
107. See Shrimp - Turtle, supra note 16, at para. 180;
108. and U.S. Steel, supra note 16.
109. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR];
110. Convention, Arts. 6, 13, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955).
111. ECHR, Art. 8 (1); see also John Joseph Cremona, The Proportionality Principle in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in Recht Zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung 323 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995).
112. Krabbe v. IAAF et al., Oberlandesgericht Munich, 17 May 1995,
113. cited in Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Antonio Ragozzi & Giorgio Malinvervi, Legal Opinion on the Conformity of Certain Provisions of the Draft World Anti-Doping Code with Commonly Accepted Principles of International Law 32, 121 (2003), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/ rtecontent/document/kaufmann-kohler-full.pdf.
114. For a useful overview see Enzo Cannizzaro, Il Principio della Proporzionalità nell'Ordinamento Internazionale (2000).
115. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 261 (1999).
116. Id. at para. 73.
117. Id.
118. Id. at paras. 59, 64, 66, and 70.
119. Fogarty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37112/97 34, Eur. H.R. Rep. 302 (2001).
120. Id. at 314, para. 36.
121. See Iain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights, 72 Nordic J. of Int'l L. 159 (2003).
122. See Salzman, supra note 35;
123. see also Dyzenhaus, supra note 41.
124. See Benedict Kingsbury, Omnilateralism and Partial International Communities: Contributions of the Emerging Global Administrative Law, 104 Kokusaihoo Gaiko Zasshi ("The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy") 1 (2005).
125. On these ideal types, see Andrew Hurrell, International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries, in States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries, 275, 278-87 (Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore eds., 2003);
126. Benedict Kingsbury, People and Boundaries: An "Internationalized Public Law" Approach, in States, Nations, and Borders 298, 299-302.
127. On similar normative conceptions behind domestic administrative law, see Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann, Das Allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee (2d ed. 2004).
128. The conception is first chronologically in terms of the evolutionary development of national administrative law and practically in terms of the needs of global administration.
129. See, e.g., Johannes Masing, Die Mobilisierung des Bürgers für die Durchsetzung des Rechts (1997).
130. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 A.J.I.L. 1 (1996);
131. see also B. Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 E.J.I.L. 517 (1999).
132. See Dyzenhaus, supra note 41.
133. Id.
134. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 55, para 33. (NAFTA/ICSID (AF), 2001);
135. see also Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, Case No. ARB/02/ 3, pending before the ICSID Tribunal.
136. Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. Int'l Econ. L. 431 (2004).
137. See Cassese, supra note 13.
138. See Financial Action Task Force website, supra note 52.
139. On different conceptions and traditions of participation rights and their development in the European Union, see Francesca Bignami, Three Generations of Participation Rights before the European Commission, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 61 (Winter 2004).
140. On the different approaches to participation in administrative rulemaking, see Theodora Th. Ziamou, Rulemaking, Participation and the Limits of Public Law in the USA and Europe (2001).
141. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, 80 Foreign Aff. 212 (2001).
142. For a similar problem in the E.U. context, see Renaud Dehousse, Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in a Polycentric Polity, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 135 (Joseph H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
143. See Robert L. Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation and the Problem of Democracy, in Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation 469, 478-80 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
144. See the critique in Ruth Grant & Robert Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, IILJ Working Paper 2004/7, 14, at http://iilj.org/papers/2004/2004.7%20Grant%20Keohane.pdf.
145. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Max Pensky trans. & ed., 2001).
146. See Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Networked Governance and Pragmatic Constitutionalism: The New Transformation of Europe (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
147. See Joerges, supra note 24.
148. See the relevant critique in Martin Shapiro, "Deliberative," "Independent" Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Global Echo the E.U.?, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 341 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
149. On the lack of salience of many areas of E.U. regulation in this context, see Andrew Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 25-26;
150. see also Fritz Scharpf, Governing Europe: Effective and Democratic? (1999).
151. See Slaughter, supra note 34.
152. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 96.
153. We treat European and American administrative law traditions and their derivatives here as part of one family, which is, however, not meant to downplay the important differences between various traditions.
154. See Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 E.J.I.L. 599 (1998).
155. For such a proposal see Jürgen Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (2004).
156. See Bhupinder Singh Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 E.J.I.L. 1 (2004).
157. See Stewart, supra note 5.
158. For an example of a parallel debate, see Reuven Avi-Yonah's proposal for a World Investment Organization to regulate multinational enterprises and Merritt Fox's skeptical response, Reuven Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 5 (2003);
159. Merritt Fox, What's So Special About Multinational Enterprises?: A Comment on Avi-Yonah, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 551 (2004).
160. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 437 (2003).
161. See, e.g., Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Verwaltungskooperation und Verwaltungskooperationsrecht, in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 31 Europarecht 270 (1996);
162. see also Cassese, supra note 13;
163. della Cananea, supra note 13;
164. Chiti, supra note 13.
165. Joerges is one of the initiators of contemporary exploration of this area. See supra note 24.
166. On attempts of European courts to review "preparatory" acts in the multi-level context of the E.U. see Cassese, supra note 13;
167. see also della Cananea, supra note 13.
168. But on related problems, see Mario P. Chiti, Forms of European Administrative Action, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 37-57 (Winter 2004).
169. For an assertion of the right to set aside supranational decisions, see Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) [hereinafter BVerfG], Judgment of October 12, 1993 (Maastricht), 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [hereinafter BVerfGE] 155 (English translation in 33 I.L.M. 395 (1994)).
170. For greater detail see Stewart, supra note 5.
171. Id.
172. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 96, at 14-16.
173. Id. at 14.
174. Id. at 18.
175. See Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 98.
176. For a parallel interpretation of developments in the E.U., see Miguel Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What if This is as Good as it Gets?, in European Contitutionalism Beyond the State 74.
177. See Stewart, supra note 5.
178. For the domestic level, see Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Politics and the Courts. A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631 (1995);
179. see also Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 180 (1999).
180. See Eyal Benvenisti, Public Choice and Global Administrative Law: Who's Afraid of Executive Discretion?, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 319 (Summer/ Autumn 2005).
181. Id. at 329-30.
182. Id. at 331-33.
183. Id. at 333-34.
184. Id. at 334-35.
185. See Grant and Keohane, supra note 96, at 8-9.
186. Benvenisti, supra note 122, at 329-30.
187. Id. at 334-35.