Stable cartels revisited

Economic Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 907-921

  Diamantoudi, Effrosyni ^a  

^a Civil and Environmental Engineering   (Canada)

Author keywords

Abstract stable set; Cartel stability; Coalition formation; Foresight

Indexed keywords

EID: 12744265246     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0550-0     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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